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ABSTRACT
The Strategic Nature of Politics. (December 2009)
Mark Daniel Ramirez, B.I.S., Arizona State University
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. David A.M. Peterson
Scholarship shows that the social construction of crime is responsible for the
public’s demand for tougher criminal justice policies. Yet, there remains disagreement
over several key issues regarding the relationship between strategic communication
and the punitiveness of the mass public. Little is known about the magnitude and
direction of changes in punitive sentiment over the last 50 years. Moreover, there
is disagreement over when the public began to demand punitive solutions to crime
over alternative policies. Many scholars point to the racial turmoil of the 1960s, but
none has shown conclusive evidence of any fundamental change in punitive sentiment.
Finally, there is disagreement over what type of strategic appeal is most effective at
shaping public opinion.
The argument of this research is that the democratic nature of American pol-
itics creates an environment where the competition of ideas flourish. Political ac-
tors can use several types of strategic communication (agenda-setting, persuasion,
priming, framing) to shape political outcomes. The effectiveness of an appeal does
not remain constant over time, but should evolve around systematic social changes—
environmental conditions and social norms. Thus, there is a time varying relationship
between various appeals and public opinion.
A content analysis of crime news in the New York Times provides measures
of four types of strategic messages. Instrumental factors such as the economy and
public policy are also shown to influence the public’s desire for punitive criminal
justice policies. A Bayesian changepoint model provides a means to test when, if any,
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fundamental change occurred in the public’s punitive sentiment. Contrary to most
accounts, the changepoint model identifies 1972 as having the highest probability of
a breakpoint suggesting a public backlash against the Supreme Court’s Furman vs.
Georgia decision to abolish the death penalty.
Estimates from a state-space model show that different types of messages in
the media shape punitive sentiment and that the effectiveness of racial primes and
presidential attention to crime changes over time. Moreover, these changes are shown
to be a function of changes in social context and norms suggesting ways to improve
political communication.
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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION: THE POLITICS OF RACE, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT
August 2006, Jena High School, Louisiana. Six teenagers attack another teenager,
Justin Barker, after gym class. Barker is punched, pushed to the grown, and kicked
repeatedly by the six other students. The assault is vicious and brutal. Eventually,
Barker loses consciousness and is taken to the emergency room of the local hospital.
Barker had to be treated for injuries to his face, hands, and ears and suffered extensive,
although not permanent, damage to his right eye. Barker is white. The six teenagers
that took part in the assault on Barker, soon to be known nationally as the Jena 6,
are black.
The altercation is a result of several weeks of high tension between blacks and
whites in Jena that started when a group of black students sat under a tree at the high
school. There is nothing special about this particular tree except it is a place where
white students normally gather. The next day, three nooses were hung from the tree
as a reminder of the days when blacks were lynched for encroaching on the property
of white Americans. The altercation between Barker and the six other teenage boys
began after Barker allegedly taunted one of the black students about losing a fight at
a party over the previous weekend.
The perpetrators of the assault, the Jena 6, were quickly arrested and initially
charged with attempted second-degree murder and conspiracy to murder. In order to
bring such serious charges—charges with a penalty much more severe than an assault
or battery conviction—the prosecuting attorney argued the defendant’s shoes were
used as deadly weapons. Bail for the Jena 6 was set between $70,000 and $138,000,
The journal model is The American Political Science Review.
2which was seen as an abnormally high amount for juveniles in a fight. One of the
Jena 6, 16 year old Mychal Bell, sat in jail for over a year awaiting trial. Under the
second-degree murder and conspiracy charges, the Jena 6 were facing up to 22 years
in prison.1
Rewind a few years back to March 21, 1997. The focus is on Leonard Clark, a
thirteen year old black male. Leonard was riding his bike from the predominately
black housing projects in Chicago’s South Side to play football with a friend in the
largely white Bridgeport neighborhood. Unprovoked, the 13 year old is attacked by
three white males—Frank Caruso Jr., 19, Victor Jasas, 18, and Michael Kwidzinski,
21. The three young adults knocked Clark off his bicycle and viciously kicked and
beat Clark unconscious. Clark’s injuries were severe. While laying unconscious in
the hospital, doctors realized Clark would lose his basic motor functions and suffer
from permanent brain damage due to the beating. Clark spent several months in
the hospital following the incident. The thirteen year old would spend the rest of his
teenage years undergoing physical, speech, and occupational therapy and will spend
the rest of his life in a wheelchair.
Why did these three young adults choose to assault a thirteen year old boy? The
motive was racial. The perpetrators of this horrendous crime would eventually brag
to friends that they wanted to “keep Bridgeport white.” Given the severity of the
crime and its racially charged motive, what would be the punishment given to the
three assailants? Only one defendant, Frank Caruso Jr., was given any type of jail
time. The district attorney was able to convict Caruso of aggravated battery and for
committing a hate crime. A judge gave Caruso an eight year prison sentence, primarily
for the hate crime conviction. Two of the defendants, Victor Jasas and Michael
1These charges were later reduced, but only after a series protests by national
leaders over the extreme racial discrimination in the case.
3Kwidzinski, pleaded guilty to a lesser charge of aggravated battery—a misdemeanor.
They were each sentenced to 24 months of probation and 300 hours of community
service. Although these two took equal part in the beating of Leonard Clark, neither
would spend a day in jail. For savagely beating a thirteen year old boy just because he
was a black in a white neighborhood, these two defendants received an exceptionally
lenient sentence.
Nobody condones the actions of any of these individuals. Each of these beatings
were severe and the assailants should have to deal with the consequences of their
actions. Yet, in each case many observers were outraged with the punishments relative
to the crime. In one instance, authorities tried to charge six teenagers with second-
degree murder and a possible 22 year prison sentence for what some would consider an
out-of-control high school brawl. In the second example, two defendants were allowed
to plea bargain with authorities and walk out of the courtroom without serving any
time in jail.
The clear differences in the severity of the punishment in each of these incidents
could hardly be attributed to the nature of the crimes. The Jena 6 incident revolved
around a series of high profile racial disputes in and around the high school. Further,
the teenagers were provoked when Barker started taunting one of them about a pre-
vious altercation. Leonard Clark, was beaten because of his skin color while he was
riding his bicycle. The Clark beating was also more severe. Clark was unconscious
for several days and spent months in the hospital. Following his release, he continues
to undergo physical and speech therapy to regain basic motor functions. In contrast,
Barker spent two hours in the hospital and attended a school ring ceremony the same
evening as the attack. It is possible that other factors could have contributed in
these different outcomes. The quality of representation, availability of witnesses, and
variation in local laws surely played some role in explaining these differences. Yet,
4in each community a largely white criminal justice system determined to give some
(i.e., black) defendants a severe punishment and other defendants (i.e., white) a more
lenient punishment.
1. The duality of American criminal justice
Many scholars and political observers note the duality of the criminal justice system
in America. One system seems to prevail for white Americans and another for racial
minorities. Mann (1993, xi) states this succinctly:
Woven throughout the description of the history, lives, and criminal jus-
tice experiences of the four primary American racial minorities is the
belief that since racial discrimination is endemic to the United States, it
permeates the criminal justice system—as well as every other American
institution—and results in unjust treatment of these minorities.
Blacks have historically been subject to unfair and racially biased treatment within
the U.S. criminal justice system. Racial distinctions in the law—a legal requirement
prescribing one mode of conduct for a person of one race and a different rule of
conduct for a person of another race—were prevalent in both the North and South
following the Civil War (Stephenson 1910). For instance, many states passed laws
forbidding blacks to testify in cases involving a white person. Black defendants had
no recourse to defend themselves against accusations made by a white person and
were often falsely accused, imprisoned, and executed of crimes they probably did not
commit. Legal restrictions were also placed on black marriages, property rights, and
occupational rights and blacks could not sit on juries or vote. These so-called “black
codes” were some of the first forms of post-slavery institutional racism—racism that
is built directly into the criminal justice system.
5The duality of the American criminal justice system is most visible, and indis-
putable, when it is made explicit. The convict lease system was a predominate means
to maintain social dominance over blacks and subject them to harsh punitive measures
for behavior deemed criminal by local authorities. The system allowed individuals
or companies to purchase blacks convicted of any crime from the government. The
purchaser could then use black Americans as a source of free labor and force them
to work for an indefinite amount of time. The convict-lease system essentially re-
instituted slavery by forcing many blacks to perform free labor for whites. No similar
system or criminal penalty existed for white.
Blacks were also subject to laws that were not enforced on whites. One of the
most visible laws that led to the creation of a black, but not white, criminal class were
vagrancy laws. A typical vagrancy law allowed local law enforcement to arrest anyone
that did not have consistent employment or a permanent residency. This obviously
applied to most blacks in the South that were recently freed after the abolition of
slavery. These freed slaves never had the opportunity to acquire employment or
residency after being released from a lifetime of slavery. In some instances, state
vagrancy laws made no racial distinction between blacks and whites. However, racial
biases clearly existed in the implementation of these laws and it is evident that in most
cases these laws were aimed at creating a black criminal class for use as slave labor.
This purpose was made explicit in some state laws. For example, the South Carolina
legislation explicitly states that the purpose of its vagrancy law is to “establish and
regulate the domestic relations of persons of color and to amend the law in relation
to paupers and vagrancy.” Subsequently, law enforcement officials were more likely to
arrest black vagrants under these laws and rarely arrested white vagrants. Thousands
of unemployed and homeless black Americans, recently free from slavery, were arrested
and fined under vagrancy laws. Since these individuals could rarely pay the fines
6associated with these laws, they were forced under the convict-lease system to work
as slave labor. The practice was profitable for both the government who collected
revenue from selling black labor and for whites that received free labor from black
convicts. Thus, white Americans have historically established a dual criminal justice
system that provided more punitive punishments for blacks.
Although some would argue that this duality is no longer in existence, criminal
justice policy continues to discriminate against racial minorities. Blacks are more
likely than whites to be pulled over while driving, stopped for speeding, and have
their vehicles searched. People of color are also more likely to be arrested by the
police. Blacks are disproportionately targeted by law enforcement officials, which
skews the composition of the population that is ultimately charged, convicted, and
incarcerated in the criminal justice system.
Empirical evidence also shows that blacks receive more punitive sentences than
whites, even after controlling for other factors such as the nature of the crime (Spohn
1990, Steffensmeier, Ulmer and Kramer 1998). Studies by non-governmental organi-
zations suggest that a third of blacks incarcerated in American prisons would receive
shorter or non-prison sentence if they had been white facing similar charges. Blacks
with no criminal record are more likely to be incarcerated for their first offense than
whites with no criminal record. Black juveniles with no prior criminal record are six
times more likely than white juveniles with no criminal record to be sent to juvenile
detention facility.
The disparity in sentencing between whites and blacks is most visible in the crim-
inal drug codes. Several scholars have noted that federal cocaine laws are a prime
example of institutional racism (Meier 1994, Walker, Spohn and DeLone 1996). The
punishment for crimes involving crack-cocaine are much more severe than those in-
volving powder-cocaine despite the same chemical composition of each of these drugs.
7Under the 1986 Federal Anti-Drug Abuse Act, judges must consider a given amount
of crack the same as a hundred times the amount of powder-cocaine. This hundred-
to-one ratio produces sentences for crack defendants that are far more severe than
sentences for defendants whose crimes involve powder-cocaine. For instance, five
grams of crack cocaine results in a mandatory minimum five year prison sentence,
while it takes 500 grams of powder cocaine for the same mandatory minimum sen-
tence.
The racial disparity arises because most crack users are black, while most powder
cocaine users are white. Indeed, 84% of all crack cocaine defendants are black, while
less than 30% of powder cocaine users are black. Since crack users receive harsher
sentences and most crack users are black, the law basically requires tougher sentences
for blacks. Subsequently, drug offenses are responsible for the large influx of blacks
into the nation’s prisons and the growing racial divide in the American criminal justice
system.
After reviewing hundreds of studies on race and criminal sentencing, Walker,
Spohn and DeLone (1996, 232) conclude that “the American criminal justice system
has never been, is not now, color blind.” Although they do concede that not all
aspects of the criminal justice system are systematically biased against blacks and
other racial minorities they do find evidence that that racial minorities are treated
more harshly than whites at some stages in the criminal justice system. For instance,
law enforcement officials are more likely to arrest, victimize, shoot, and kill racial
minorities than white Americans. Racial minorities are also more likely than whites
to receive punitive sentences including incarceration and capital punishment.
These racial disparities in the American criminal justice system have a nega-
tive influence on African-American communities and the political system as a whole.
People of color are more likely to become disenfranchised. Recent figures suggest
8that one in seven black Americans are currently or permanently disenfranchised from
voting because of a felony conviction. Disenfranchisement limits the ability of the
black community to elect candidates to federal, state, and local offices that will rep-
resent their community interests. The high rate of imprisonment also leads to the
dissolution of family and social structures leading to more incidents of crime in black
communities. Having a prison record also makes it more difficult for blacks to earn
a living wage. For each property crime conviction, the average income for black
families decreases by 7%. Since blacks are targeted more frequently by police and
receive harsher sentencing, this 7% decline in income disproportionately affects black
communities, increasing well-known disparities in income and social-economic status
between blacks and whites.
1.1. The connection of policy to public opinion
Despite the gross racial and social imbalances that punitive policies impose, punitive
solutions to crime are supported by a majority of the American public. A series of
General Social Survey polls shows that the percentage of Americans who believe the
courts are not tough enough with criminals ranges between 65% to 86% from 1972
to 2006. A 1994 ABC/Washington Post poll shows that 73% of Americans support
the construction of more prisons to incarcerate criminals. This same poll found that
86% of Americans support mandatory life imprisonment for three time violent felony
offenders.
The public’s support for punitive policies becomes problematic for two reasons.
First, there is some evidence that public support for these policies is a function of
racial prejudice and stereotypes that blacks are prone to violence and crime (Hurwitz
and Peffley 1997, Jackson and Carroll 1981) and that various public officials in-
fluence the public’s support of punitive policies by capitalizing on these attitudes
9(Beckett 1997, Edsall and Edsall 1992). Second, public opinion indirectly shapes
public policy through the election of public officials and directly by influencing how
politicians vote (Erikson, Mackuen and Stimson 2002). The aggregate movement of
the public’s punitive sentiment has been show to directly influence federal criminal
justice policy including federal budgets, the number of criminal charges by federal
district attorneys, and federal incarceration rates (Nicholson-Crotty, Peterson and
Ramirez 2009). Moreover, the courts use public support for individual punitive poli-
cies such as the death penalty as a measure to determine if capital punishment is
“cruel and unusual.” Public sentiment directly influences judicial decisions and forms
the basis for legal opinions on these cases. It is therefore important to determine
the extent that the public’s preference for punitive policies is a function of racial
considerations to understand how responsible the public is for supporting the racial
disparities in the criminal justice system.
2. The micro-foundations of punitive sentiment
The issue of crime and punishment reflects a deep concern over the safety and security
of individual property and well-being. Scheingold (1992, 15) writes:
Street crime evokes elemental concerns about personal safety that are
widely, perhaps universally shared—an insight that goes back at least as
far as Hobbesian worries about a society in which life is solitary, poor,
nasty, brutish, and short.
The very formation of governments is based on an individual and social need to
prevent crimes against oneself and property. Not surprisingly, the public generally
finds issues relating to crime and punishment as important.
10
Given the fundamental significance of security and safety, it is not surprising that
a great deal of research exists on how citizens think about crime and punishment.
One line of research seeks to understand what types of policies citizens are willing to
accept and the extent of public support for these policies. Americans strongly favor
punitive policies such as capital punishment, mandatory minimum sentencing, and
prison labor. The public also regularly agrees that the nation’s judicial system is too
lenient in its criminal sentencing (Cullen, Fisher and Applegate 1985). As Warr (2000)
concludes, “Americans overwhelmingly regard imprisonment as the appropriate form
of punishment for most crimes.”
Yet, individual attitudes toward crime and punishment are complex and mul-
tifaceted. People also support efforts to rehabilitate criminals, eliminate the social
and economic factors that lead to crime, and community service for non-violent of-
fenders (Cullen, Wright, Brown, Moon, Blankenship and Applegate 2002, Payne and
Gainey 1999). For example, a 2004 poll by the Gallup organization shows a ma-
jority of Americans think “additional money and effort should go to attacking the
social and economic problems that lead to crime,” but many of these same indi-
viduals support building new prisons and tougher criminal sentencing. Additional
research shows that people are willing to offer reduced sentencing, parole, and com-
munity service when given more information about specific crimes (Cullen, Fisher
and Applegate 1985, Roberts and Stalans 1997). These findings lead some to con-
clude that the public “support[s] multiple correctional goals simultaneously” (Cullen,
Pealer, Fisher, Applegate and Santana 2000).
A substantial amount of research is devoted to who supports punitive policies—
that is the correlates of policy support. For instance, there is some evidence, albeit
mixed, that suggests demographic variables are associated with punitive attitudes.
In general, citizens that are older, male, and white are more likely to favor punitive
11
criminal justice policies (Payne, Gainey, Triplett and Danner 2004, Sims and Johnston
2004). However, Langworthy and Whitehead (1986) suggest these relationships can
be explained by differing levels of fear of crime and Cohn, Barkan and Halteman
(1991, 287) argue that differences between whites and blacks are a result of different
reasons or considerations. The punitive attitudes of blacks tend to be based on
procedural justice concerns and fear of crime due to higher victimization rates, while
the attitudes of whites are based on racial prejudices and fear of a threatening minority
group. There is also evidence that individuals that engage in more religious behaviors
and with strong protestant beliefs hold more punitive attitudes (Grasmick and McGill
2006). However, the Judeo-Christian value of forgiveness can also lead these same
individuals to favor less punitive policies such as rehabilitation (Applegate, Cullen,
Fisher and Vander Ven 2006).
A range of political attitudes also seem to determine individual level attitudes
toward punitive criminal justice policies. Authoritarian values are related to puni-
tive policy preferences, while egalitarianism, individualism, and moral traditionalism
appear orthogonal to individual preferences for punitive policies (Soss, Langbein and
Metelko 2003). In addition, Republicans and ideological conservatives tend to fa-
vor more punitive policies to combat criminal behavior than Democrats and liberals.
(Sims and Johnston 2004, Soss, Langbein and Metelko 2003). These relationships
appear robust—remaining when other variables are included in statistical models.
There are two overarching theoretical frameworks on what leads to individual
support for punitive policies. The instrumental approach argues that people are ra-
tional individuals and base their support for punitive policies on their experiences
with crime, environmental factors such as the economy and poverty, and how effec-
tive they believe punitive policies are at solving these social problems. The second
approach argues that crime is socially constructed. Political actors use strategic com-
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munication to shape public opinions. These constructions may be grounded in reality,
but they may also deviate from actual conditions leading many scholars to assume
that socially constructed attitudes are an indication of elite manipulation.
A great deal of research focuses on the extent that the public’s preferences for
punitive criminal justice policies are responsive to changes in criminal activity. Wil-
son (1975) suggests that government cannot change the fundamental problems of
society that lead to crime nor can they alter the individual moral vacancy and psy-
chological dispositions of individuals. Thus, rational public policy should increase
the transaction costs of committing a crime. According to this view, enacting more
punitive policies will increase the risks of criminal behavior and thus deter potential
criminals from engaging in criminal activity. Subsequently, the extent that citizens
use actual or their perceptions of criminal activity suggests a rational citizen using
a relevant piece of information to inform their policy preference. This instrumen-
tal view of punitive policies suggests 1) perceptions that crime is increasing should
lead to more punitive policy preferences, 2) increases in fear or anxiety about crime
should lead to more punitive policy preferences, and 3) a belief that punitive policies
are an effective means to reduce criminal behavior should lead to greater support for
punitive policies.
The empirical findings on these relationships are mixed. Some scholars find
evidence that punitive attitudes are connected to perceptions of crime. For instance,
people are willing to support tougher sanctions and the death penalty when they
perceive the crime rate as high, fear being a victim of crime, and believe that punitive
policies are a deterrent (Thomas and Cage 1976, Thomas and Foster 1975). Marion
(1994) also finds that individual support for punitive policies is a result of rising fear
of crime. Moreover, the public has been shown to distinguish among different crimes
and support tougher criminal penalties when they perceive the crime to be more
13
serious (Warr, Meier and Erickson 1983).
These studies, however, are in the minority. A great deal of research counters
that there is little, if any, relationship between crime perceptions, fear of crime, the
belief that punitive policies serve as a deterrent, and individual support for punitive
policies. Tyler and Weber (1982) find that the relationship between fear of crime
and punitive policy preferences is reduced after basic political beliefs such as liber-
alism and authoritarianism are included in statistical models. Other research shows
that individuals with a high risk of being a victim of crime—particularly blacks and
women—are more likely to oppose rather than support punitive policies (Sears, Lau,
Tyler and Allen 2000). There is also no relationship between being a victim of crime
and fear of crime (McIntyre 1967) and victimization and support for punitive policies
(Cohn, Barkan and Halteman 1991, Secret and Johnson 1989, Taylor, Scheppele and
Stinchcombe 1979). Recent scholarship finds no connection between fear of crime
and support for capital punishment (Sims and Johnston 2004). Several authors note
that rising crime rates or an increase in the public’s fear of crime cannot explain the
rising punitiveness of public opinion—particularly in periods where there are notice-
able decreases in crime (Beckett 1997, Langworthy and Whitehead 1986, Warr 1995).
After reviewing the literature, Beckett (1997, 26) concludes that “neither the risk nor
actual experience of criminal victimization is consistently correlated with support for
punitive policies.”
Punitive attitudes are also a function of the information environment leading
many scholars to conclude that punitive attitudes are based on the social construction
of crime by elite and the news media. Strategic messages linking crime to black
Americans are often linked to the punitiveness of the public. Several scholars argue
that elite rhetoric connecting crime to blacks became a successful strategy among
Republicans to gain public support for punitive policies and themselves (Beckett
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1997, Edsall and Edsall 1992).
Scholars have been able to empirically connect the use of racial messages within
crime news and public attitudes toward punitive policies. Gilliam and Iyengar (2000)
find that exposing people to news stories about crime with a black suspect increases
support for punitive policies. Further, they find that when the race of the suspect in
the story is absent, about 70% of their sample infers that the suspect is black. They
conclude that crime coverage by the news media racializes the politics of crime and
punishment (also see Dixon and Linz 2000). Campaign advertisements and rhetoric
can also be an effective means to use race in shaping the public’s punitive attitudes.
Mendelberg (1997), for example, shows that advertisements featuring black criminals
result in an increase in punitive sentiment.
Non-racial messages by elite or the news media can also shape public support
for punitive policies. Several studies find that news stories that focus on individuals
causes citizens to support for punitive policies since citizens attribute causal respon-
sibility for the crime to the individual (Cullen, Clark, Cullen and Mathers 1998,
Iyengar 1991, Scheingold 1984, Scheingold 1992). Media stories that focus on the
social causes of crime, conversely, lead to less citizen support for punitive policies
since society rather than the moral failings of an individual are seen as responsible
for crime.
The reason these appeals are so effective is because they lead citizens to rely
racial prejudice and stereotypes when formulating their opinions regarding crime and
punishment. Individuals that hold negative stereotypes of black Americans are more
likely to support increases in criminal justice spending (Barkan and Cohn 2005). Hur-
witz and Peffley (1997) find that negative racial stereotypes of blacks as “lazy” or
“violent” lead to greater support for punitive, but not preventative criminal justice
policies (also see Peffley, Hurwitz and Sniderman 2007). However, when survey re-
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spondents were presented with information counter to the predominate stereotypes
of blacks as “lazy” or “violent” (i.e., a portrayal of a black man as a model pris-
oner), negative stereotypes had less influence on support for punitive policies. Thus,
counter-stereotypical information appears successful at shaping public opinion. Fur-
ther studies indicate that these same racial stereotypes lead to greater support for
the death penalty and more severe prison sentences among white Americans (Peffley
and Hurwitz 2002). In a more subtle experiment, Hurwitz and Peffley (2005) found
that simply including the term “inner-city” within a news article about crime led
white subjects to rely more on their racial stereotypes toward blacks, which in turn
generated greater support for punitive policies. Thus, explicit frames and implicit
primes by the news media can activate racial stereotypes and alter individual puni-
tive preferences.
3. What we don’t know
Past research has led to a greater understanding of the nature and origins of individual
preferences for punitive criminal justice policies. It is becoming clear who supports
and opposes such policies and the conditions that lead to more or less support. By
contrast, there is only scant literature on the trends of these attitudes over time and
very little on the origins of the dynamic movement of the public’s punitive policy
preferences.
When over time movement in public opinion has been examined, the focus has
been on specific policy areas—mainly the issue of capital punishment—rather than
the general tenor of the public’s punitive policy preferences. We know that support
for the death penalty decreased from the 1930s to the early 1960s (Erskine 1970) and
that there were dramatic increases in support for capital punishment from the late
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1960s to the 1990s (Mayer 1993, Page and Shapiro 1992, Warr 1995) that appear to
have waned during the last ten years (Baumgartner, De Boef and Boydstun 2008).
Yet, it is unclear if these movements are specific to public opinion regarding capital
punishment or if they reflect a larger mass movement toward greater punitiveness.
Mayer (1993, 263) does examines survey data throughout the 1970s showing the public
increasingly believes that the judicial system is “too lenient” on criminals leading to
the conclusion that public opinion made a “clear, substantial, long-term shift to the
right” (also see Page and Shapiro 1992). However, this data is limited to the 1970s
occurring prior to the rise of public liberalism in the 1980s (Stimson 1999) and the
substantial decrease in crime during the 1990s making it unclear if American’s made
a permanent shift in favoring punitive policies.
As a scholarly community, we have very little sense of how, as a whole, American’s
punitive policy preferences have varied over time. We know that for most of the post-
war era, a majority of Americans have supported punitive policies such as the death
penalty and less judicial leniency, but it is unclear if those preferences have become
more punitive, less punitive, or relatively stable over time. Have American’s held
steadfast to the belief that punitive policies are the best solution to crime or have
there been periods when punishment has fallen out of favor with the public? Nor do we
know the rate of change that these preferences undergo over time. Does the public’s
punitive preferences move rapidly, changing to short-term events and information, or
do they move more slowly as citizens hesitate to update their pre-existing attitudes?
Moreover, there is virtually no empirical research connecting the dynamics of
Americans’ punitive policy preferences and other macro phenomenon. In other words,
what are the correlates of the public’s over time preferences for punitive policies?
Although some scholars suggest that support for the death penalty is linked to actual
criminal conditions and violent crimes (Mayer 1993, Page and Shapiro 1992, Rankin
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1979), there is no systematic analysis to test if these relationships exist. Do the
over time dynamics of public opinion, in the aggregate, move in response to the
same factors that shape individual level attitudes or does public preferences move to
an entirely different set of events or information. This latter question is especially
important in understanding how factors like the crime rate and the economy influence
public opinion, because the crime rate is constant at any single point in time. Thus,
there is no variation in the crime rate for scholars who use cross-sectional research
designs to study these phenomenon and public opinion.
3.1. A turning point in American criminal justice?
The lack of time series data on American’s punitive policy preferences leads to many
unanswered questions that are crucial to various theories relating to crime and pun-
ishment. An important question debated by scholars is when public concern for crime
led to a dramatic upturn in public demand for punitive solutions. Reading through
the literature there seems to be a consensus that Americans experienced a funda-
mental change in how they think about crime and punishment during the last half
of the 20th century. Instead of trying to solve the antecedent social causes of crime,
Americans took on a more punitive approach to dealing with the issue. Many schol-
ars assume that this upturn coincided with the infusion of racial attitudes into the
crime issue. Yet, there is no empirical evidence showing that public preferences for
punitive criminal justice policies experienced a dramatic turning point that led to a
sharp increase in support for such policies. Nor is there evidence that these attitudes
became infused with considerations relating to race in a new or unique manner during
this time period. In fact, the claim that race and crime became tied together in the
20th century ignores the longstanding relationship between crime and race described
above.
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There is some consensus that a major shift in the public’s support for puni-
tive policies occurred during the 1960s. For Erskine (1974), the fundamental shift
in American punitiveness began immediately following the assassination of John F.
Kennedy and was compounded by the growth in campus protests against the Vietnam
War. However, a more conventional view is that the 1964 presidential campaign of
Barry Goldwater led to the dramatic upturn in concern over crime and public support
for punitive policies.
Hoenisch (2004) provides a clear depiction of the conventional thinking regarding
the rise of punitiveness in America:
During the second half of the 20th century, growing concern over orga-
nized crime, drug abuse, and violent crime as well as the advent of the
civil rights movement brought a massive increase in federal involvement in
law and order issues. And in the mid-1960s, a dramatic shift in national
attitude took place: Crime began to be viewed as a national problem war-
ranting a national solution. In fact, it was largely the 1964 presidential
campaign battle among Republican Senator Barry Goldwater, Indepen-
dent candidate George Wallace, and Democrat Lyndon B. Johnson that
returned crime to the national spotlight as a policy issue. In reaction to
Civil Rights demonstrations and a rising crime rate, both Goldwater and
Wallace included a strong law and order plank in their campaigns. Gold-
water, in particular, often referred to the “crime in the streets” and the
need for “law and order.” Both Goldwater and Wallace accused Johnson
of fostering a leniency that abetted crime.
Thus, the confluence of events such as increases in drug use, violent crime, or-
ganized crime, and civil rights protest came to a tipping point in 1964 leading to a
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consensus among the public for a “national solution” that was punitive in nature.
Similarly, Finckenauer (1978, 16) begins his examination of the changing debate over
crime and punishment in America by also implicating the 1964 election:
The 1964 presidential campaign was critical in initiating a new political era
in the United States. . . . Running on a law and order platform, Goldwater
attacked the Kennedy-Johnson administration for its inattention to “crime
in the streets.” Since that time the crime problem has remained high in
public opinion polls concerned with major domestic issues and has been
a factor in national politics.
According to Finckenauer (1978, 16), the 1964 election led to a “new political
era” that is different from the previous era and “since that time” has remained an
important issue among the public. Thus, there is the implication of a major structural
change in public opinion regarding crime and punishment. Other scholars share this
view that a major turning point occurred during the 1964 election. In a detailed
examination of elite rhetoric, crime, and race, Beckett (1997) states, “[w]hat became
known as the “crime issue” emerged on the national political scene during the 1964
presidential campaign.” Many other scholars share this view that a substantial shift
in the nature of how Americans think about crime and punishment began with the
1964 presidential campaign (e.g., Barlow and Barlow 1995, Friedman 1993), but have
only provided anecdotal evidence of what led to the increase in punitive sentiment.
Some scholars note that Goldwater was not the initial catalyst for bringing the
issue of crime into the 1964 presidential election. Instead, Democratic Governor
George Wallace initially brought the issue of “law and order” into the campaign during
the Democratic Party primaries. Wallace, like other Southern politicians, maintained
that the civil rights movement encourages lawlessness and disorder. Thus, linking
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civil rights to crime. Indeed, the linkage of race to crime became a southern strategy
among conservatives to realign the electorate along the lines of race and class and shift
the allegiance of southern white voters away from the Democratic party (Beckett and
Sasson 1999, Edsall and Edsall 1992). By this account, it was not Barry Goldwater
that led to national shift, but southern conservatives prior to the 1964 election that
began to infuse race, civil rights, crime, and punishment together and bring it onto the
national spotlight. Thus, the fundamental change-point might have begun somewhat
earlier than the 1964 presidential campaign.
Scholars also argue that the civil rights movement and specifically the passage
of the 1964 Civil Rights Act led to a vital transformation in public opinion regarding
crime and punishment and led to the linkage between race and crime. Indeed, there is
almost a conventional wisdom that the public’s rising concern and punitiveness over
crime is linked to the civil rights movement and black mobilization (Cronin, Cronin
and Milakovich 1981, Feagin and Hahn 1973, Flamm 2005, Furstenberg 1971). Simon
(2007, 23) notes the connection between growing dissatisfaction with the welfare state,
civil rights, and the rise of punitiveness arguing that civil rights is probably the issue
that led to the “recasting of New Deal governance” that was stymied when the “crime
agenda decisively sprinted ahead.” Even scholars that take a more economic approach
to explain the rising demand for punitive policies, arguing they are partly a rational
response to rising crime rates, agree that the change in public opinion was also a
“response to an upheaval in American race relations in the 1960s” (Western 2006).
Murakawa (2005) provides a detailed overview of how race and crime intersected
during the 1960s noting the major change in punitiveness was “born race-laden” and
began “with the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965.” Thus,
there are many accounts that point to 1964 and even 1965 as a turning point in
punitiveness.
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Contrary to these accounts, Loo and Grimes (2004) find no evidence that white
aversion for civil rights and black mobilization are associated with public opinion
toward crime and punishment. In their examination of public opinion polls from the
1950s to 1970s, they find little evidence that race, civil rights, and black political
mobilization is entangled with issues relating to crime and punishment. Yet, even
these authors hint that a fundamental change in public opinion began during the
1960s. For instance, Loo and Grimes (2004, 50) summarize the turning point as
follows:
Crime first emerged as a national political issue in the U.S. in the 1960s.
It played a central role in the presidential contests of 1964 and especially
1968. GOP nominee Barry Goldwater raised the ”crime in the streets”
issue in the 1964 presidential contest, and in 1968 Richard Nixon ran
successfully for president touting a “law and order” platform. In con-
junction with the 1964 and 1968 presidential races, major media widely
and prominently publicized polls that appeared to show that, for the first
time in U.S. history, crime had risen to the status of America’s number
one domestic problem.
Yet some scholars disagree that any substantial change in public concern and
punitiveness over crime occurred during the 1960s. This latter point is put forth by
several scholars that examine the pre-1960s evolution of crime and public opinion in
America. Feeley (2003) provides a recent analysis of crime studies and concludes that
the 1960s increase in concern over crime was nothing new. Instead, he argues that
crime and public awareness of the problem was already increasing during the 1950s.
Gottschalk (2006) argues that the foundation for the modern punitive expansion of
the criminal justice system began prior to the 1960s. Instead of elite rhetoric and
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race, a series of historical developments that led to new criminal justice institutions
and room for the expansion of power by those institutions laid the foundation for the
rise in punitiveness. Thus, Gottschalk (2006) denounces the notion that the 1960s
led to a “special” or “distinct” change in American punitiveness.
If the 1960s did not lead to a distinct change in how the public thought about
crime and punishment, maybe it was a later era that led to this fundamental trans-
formation. Several previous passages point to former President Richard M. Nixon
as a potential catalyst. Loo and Grimes (2004) suggest Nixon’s 1968 presidential
campaign continued to carry the “law and order” theme, which might have led to
growing public demand for punitive criminal justice policies. Savelsberg (1999, 188)
states that the “new era in U.S. criminal justice began with the 1968 passing of the
Safe Streets and Crime Control Act”, which occurred during the initial term of pres-
ident Richard Nixon. Nixon might have been able to capitalize on the events of the
late 1960s such as the increase in race riots in 1967, the continuation of Vietnam
protests, and the increasing rate of crime. In addition to these events, Nixon’s popu-
lar support was greater than either Wallace or Goldwater suggesting the public was
more receptive to his “law and order” messages. Nixon’s ability to stir public interest
in crime can be seen in his 1970 state of the union address:
We have heard a great deal of overblown rhetoric during the sixties in
which the word ‘war’ has perhaps too often been used—the war on poverty,
the war on misery, the war on disease, the war on hunger. But if there is
one area in which the term ‘war’ is appropriate it is in the fight against
crime. We must declare and win the war against the criminal elements
which increasingly threaten our cities, our homes, and our lives. (Nixon
1971, 12).
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Button (1978, 135) specifically singles out Nixon as the person who best capitalized
on the turmoil (e.g., Vietnam protests, civil rights movement) of the 1960s arguing
that Nixon’s administration “marked a clear shift in federal strategy toward achieving
social order.” Others scholars also point to Nixon as the catalyst for the rise in public
demand for punitive policies (Baum 1996).
Finally, there is also a possibility that while crime began as a national issue in the
1960s, that it was the 1980s and the “War on Drugs” that really catapulted crime into
the national spotlight. Beckett (1997, 60) makes this point suggesting that the use of
crack cocaine during the 1980s led to a stronger connection between race and crime
and a desire for more punitive policies. Other scholarship also notes the abundance of
literature that also speculates that a substantial change in American criminal justice
policy and thinking about crime occurred later than the 1960s. Weaver (2007, 32)
states that “A canvass of the shelves devoted to criminal justice in a library would
reveal a clear pattern: a tacit assumption that criminal justice change began in the
late 1970s and early 1980s with the determinant sentencing movement and Reagan’s
drug policies.”
So scholars are left with several basic questions concerning race, crime, and pub-
lic opinion. When, if at all, did public preferences for punitive policies experience
a dramatic structural change? What is the catalyst or catalysts that led to such a
turning point, if one exists? Is the connection between race and punitiveness fun-
damentally different today than it has been in the past or did it change after some
event such as the passage of the Civil Rights Act, the presidential campaign of Barry
Goldwater, the presidency of Richard M. Nixon, or the growing use of crack-cocaine
in the 1980s? Although there is a great deal of qualitative evidence suggesting a
major turning point in punitiveness, there is no agreement on when this happened
or the extent of the change. Clearly, this empirical question warrants an empirical
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answer.
3.2. The social construction of crime and the use of strategic communication
Scholars are also in disagreement regarding the social construction of crime and what
type of strategic messages are responsible for shaping the public’s punitive sentiment.
Criminality is a socially constructed political issue—a political problem that is char-
acterized by a particular culture or society through popular images, symbols, and
narratives. Socially constructed issues such as criminality might have some basis in
objective conditions, but are frequently construed from popular stereotypes, biased
information, and strategic messages from elite actors (e.g., politicians, interest groups,
or the news media). Social constructions are therefore dynamic, subject to debate
and interpretation, and prone to conflict among competing groups. Strategic actors
attempt to influence public opinion by socially constructing target populations—the
group that is most effected by the policy (e.g, criminals)—in a manner that distin-
guishes the target population as an actual group and attributes specific positive or
negative characteristics to members of the group (Schneider and Ingram 1993).
Criminals are often discussed in the media as social deviants—lacking moral char-
acter, the inability to conform to social norms, and personally responsible for their
criminal behavior. The negative social construction of criminals promotes the use of
punitive solutions since the public views the target population (criminals) negatively
and members of the target population have little recourse to counter such tough sanc-
tions because they lack political power (e.g., resources, organization, credibility). The
public is also inclined to support such policies because the most visible costs of puni-
tive policies are bestowed on criminals, while the dispersion of the actual monetary
costs across the public through tax revenues are often less noticeable. Furthermore,
punitive policies are argued to bestow specific benefits on the mass public and society
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by reducing. Thus, public support for punitive policies is typically high.
The social construction of criminality facilitates the use of strategic communi-
cation among entrepreneurial political actors. The lack of political power among
criminals and the high level of public support for punitive policies creates an atmo-
sphere where strategic actors can promote punitive policies to gain public approval
without alienating a large number of politically powerful constituencies. Research
shows that elite actors will try to influence the public in order to achieve electoral
support and policy goals and these elite signals can shape the public’s policy prefer-
ences (e.g., Zaller 1992). Yet, there are multiple views about what type of strategic
message is the most effective at shaping the public’s punitive sentiment.
One view among scholars and political observers is that the rise of crime as a
political issue onto the national stage led to the rise in demand for punitive criminal
justice policies among the mass public. In other words, the ability of elite actors to
engage in agenda setting—shifting the importance of an attitude object (e.g., issue)
in the minds of the public—is what led to the rising demand among the public for
more punitive criminal justice policies. Wilson (1975) is perhaps the first to make
a connection between agenda setting and changes in public preferences for punitive
policies. He notes that on four separate occasions during the 1960s, the public listed
crime as the “most important problem” (MIP) facing America. Wilson (1975, 65-66)
wrote, “In May 1965 the Gallup Poll reported that for the first time ‘crime’ (along
with education) was viewed by Americans as the most important problem facing the
nation.” He adds, “in the months leading up to the Democratic National Convention
in 1968—Gallup continued to report crime as the most important issue.”2 He goes
2Although Wilson (1975) writes that crime became the MIP on these instances,
examination of these same data fail to show crime as the MIP. The latter is inconse-
quential for the point that Wilson believed the rise of crime on the public agenda led
to a demand for more punitive policies.
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on to argue that the public concern over crime is synonymous with public demand
for more punitive policies and that the government should enact those policies which
the public demands.
Agenda setting may also be responsible for both the rise in punitiveness and the
connection between race and crime. Weaver (2007, 230) presents a theory of frontlash
which she describes as,
the process by which formerly defeated groups may become dominant issue
entrepreneurs in light of the development of a new issue campaign. In the
case of criminal justice, several stinging defeats for opponents of civil rights
galvanized a powerful elite countermovement. . . . [I]ssue entrepreneurs
articulated a problem in a new, ostensibly unrelated domain—the problem
of crime.
In short, frontlash is a preemptive strategic maneuver to shift the political agenda
from one issue to another issue. Losing coalitions on one issue have an incentive
to change the agenda to an issue where they have a higher probability of forming a
winning coalition by mobilizing public support. According to Weaver (2007), once
southern conservatives realized they were going to lose the debate over civil rights,
they began to shift the debate from civil rights to crime and punishment. In addition
to focusing public attention on crime and creating greater public desire for punitive
policies, the movement of the debate over civil rights into a debate over crime led to
the connection between race, crime, and punishment.
Several studies examine how persuasive arguments shape public support for cap-
ital punishment. In a comprehensive examination of the death penalty debate, Gross
and Ellsworth (2001) examine the use of six different arguments that have been used
for and against the death penalty. These arguments target various dimensions of
27
the issue such as morality, constitutionality, costs, deterrence, fairness, and inno-
cence. They find that the newest appeal linking capital punishment to the exe-
cution of wrongfully convicted individuals has been particularly effective at shap-
ing punitive attitudes. These “innocence” messages have been effective, according
to Gross and Ellsworth (2001), because DNA evidence provides convincing “scien-
tific” proof of problems in the criminal justice system (Baumgartner, De Boef and
Boydstun 2008, Radelet and Borg 2000).
A different set of research points to the ability of strategic actors to define crime
by highlighting different aspects of the issue and ignoring other dimensions of the issue
as the cause of the rise in punitiveness. This phenomena is known as issue framing.
The ability to define the causes and consequences of an issue often shapes how the
mass public thinks about and understands an issue such as crime. Beckett (1997,
5-6) argues that strategic actors “struggle to gain acceptance for preferred ways of
framing” the crime issue and “compete to have [their] versions of reality accepted as
truth.” Instead of a response to increases in crime or fear of crime, Beckett (1997)
argues, the public’s punitive attitudes are shaped by the exploits of politicians that
use framing messages to exacerbate the crime problem.
Murakawa (2005) describes how elected officials have incentives to offer racial
framings of the crime problem since the negatively constructed ‘black criminals’ have
little political power to counter the punitive change in crime policy. These racial
frames explicitly linked the civil rights movement to black lawlessness and crime.
Attempts to reframe the origins of crime as stemming from the lack of civil rights
and social opportunities among blacks were less successful. Subsequently, the negative
racial frames prevailed and Americans began to support punitive policies.
One reason for the effectiveness of these frames is because they lead to causal
attributions. Messages that define crime in terms of racial stereotypes, morality, and
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procedural or social fairness can lead citizens to make inferences about the social
or individual causes of crime, which have been shown to shape punitive attitudes
(Iyengar 1991). For instance, a morality frames define crime as a function of the
lack of principles and social values among individuals, which is a clear example of
an individualistic attribution frame. Arguments that define crime in terms of the
race of the offender also shift attention toward individual responsibility because they
focus on traits of an individual or group member. In contrast, procedural fairness
or innocence frames focus on the broader institutional problems within the criminal
justice system taking responsibility away from the individual and pointing it toward
the larger social-political system.
An alternative form of strategic communication to agenda-setting, persuasion,
and framing is priming. Priming is the process of making some considerations more
accessible and therefore important in the minds of individuals when they evaluate an
issue through implicit communication. Several scholars and pundits have argued that
various images, symbols, and code words, linking race to crime changed the debate
over how to solve crime (Edsall and Edsall 1992, Omi and Winant 1986). These
authors claim that the Republican strategy was to use symbols and rhetoric that
“refers indirectly to racial themes but do not directly challenge popular democratic
or egalitarian ideals” (Omi and Winant 1986, 120).
Gilliam and Iyengar (2000) performed a series of priming experiments to show
how implicit racial images affect punitive attitudes (also see Gilliam, Iyengar, Simon
and Wright 1996). In one experiment, subjects were shown a crime narrative with
either a black or white offender. A third pool of subjects were given a crime story
where the race of the offender was not mentioned. The central finding of their re-
search is that exposure to a black offender increases support for punitive solutions to
crime such as mandatory sentencing, putting more police on the street, and capital
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punishment. They also find that this relationship is mediated by racial stereotypes
such as the belief that blacks are violent. Even more surprising is their finding that
in 70% of the cases where the race of the defendant was not identified, experimental
subjects inferred the race of the offender was black. Kinder and Mendelberg (2000)
find more modest effects that covert racial images in media depictions of crime lead to
more support for punitive policies such as capital punishment, but that race plays a
larger factor in preference formation when race is explicit in policies such as affirma-
tive action and school busing. Thus, priming is seen as a significant form of strategic
communication in linking race to punitive attitudes.
Despite all of the attention to the social construction of crime, there is no consen-
sus on the type of strategic communication that is most effective in determining the
public’s policy preferences in this domain. Most research on strategic communication
and criminal justice policy preferences focuses on a single type of strategic message
within a controlled experimental setting. Experimental research is ideal to test causal
theories at the individual level, but unable to determine the over-time relationships
that exist outside the laboratory. Further, there is no attempt to determine if one type
of strategic message is more effective than another type of message, what contextual
factors change a message’s influence, and how the relationship between strategic com-
munication and public policy preferences vary across time. The latter is important
in understanding the dynamics of the public’s support for punitive policies because
past theories of punitiveness point to different forms of strategic communication as a
determinant of policy support.
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4. The macro politics of public punitiveness
The central argument of this research is that democratic government creates a political
system that leads to the competition of strategic messages. Political actors are able
to use all four types of strategic communication in order to influence public opinion
and often shift between these types of communication as the effectiveness of messages
evolve over time. Therefore, studies of strategic communication need to model the
relationship between a strategic message and public opinion in a manner that captures
the time varying nature of message effectiveness. Furthermore, the effectiveness of
strategic messages is not random, but depends on over time factors that either lend
credence to strategic appeals or make the public more open to accept an appeal. In
other words, the effectiveness of a strategic appeal depends on both competition of
other appeals and social context.
Changes in the social environment that makes various messages more or less
plausible interact with different messages to influence public opinion. Although most
scholars argue that actual conditions in crime fail to shape public opinion, recent po-
litical science research suggests contextual variables can influence how citizens think
about politics and policy. I argue that the effect of crime on public opinion is indirect,
working by given credence to strategic messages. Levels in criminal activity and mes-
sages politicizing criminal activity work together to change the public’s preferences
toward punitive solutions to crime. Furthermore, the effectiveness of racial appeals
should change over time in relation to changing norms regarding racial equality and
tolerance (Mendelberg 2001).
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5. Chapter overviews
Chapter II defines strategic communication and describe how various political actors
can use strategic messages to influence political outcomes. Each type of strategic
communication—agenda-setting, persuasion, framing, and priming—are defined using
the expectancy-value model of an attitude to show how each type of appeal intends to
shape public opinion. The model is also able to show the strengths and weaknesses of
each type of appeal and provide some guidance into 1) why racial appeals are effective
and 2) why the effectiveness of each appeal should vary over time.
Chapter III examines the evolution of each type of strategic appeal in media
coverage of crime from 1950 to 2006. A content analysis of strategic messages from
the New York Times provides an over time measure of the use of agenda-setting,
persuasive messages, racial frames, and racial primes. In addition, a simple model of
the determinants of strategic messages in crime news is built around the incentives of
the media, political actors, and the public. The model predicts the over time variation
in the content of media coverage of crime providing evidence that media coverage of
crime is grounded in environmental conditions.
Chapter IV defines punitive policies and the concept of public preference’s for
punitive criminal justice policies. The shared movement of over 240 observations
of the public’s support or opposition for punitive policies provides a measure of the
dynamics of punitive sentiment from 1951 to 2006. This chapter provides details on
the over time dynamics of punitive sentiment answering the question of the direction
and magnitude of change in the public preferences for punitive policies.
Chapter V takes up the issue of when, if any, did the public experience a fun-
damental change in their preferences for punitive policies. A Bayesian changepoint
model is introduced to examine every potential breakpoint in the punitive sentiment
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series. The results show a fundamental change in 1972, contrary to the expectations
of many scholars. The breakpoint estimate is consistent with the Supreme Court’s
decision to abolish capital punishment. A formal test of the relationship between the
dramatic increase in punitive sentiment and judicial activism by the Supreme Court
using Markov Chain Monte Carlo simulations shows a public backlash against liberal
Supreme Court decisions regarding the death penalty.
Chapter VI builds a model of punitive sentiment based on the public’s instru-
mental concerns and the social construction of crime. Punitive sentiment is modeled
as a function of each type of strategic communication—agenda-setting, persuasion,
framing, and priming. The relationship between these messages and punitive senti-
ment is shown to vary across time rather than remain constant. Furthermore, the
time varying nature of these relationships are shown to be a function of environmental
and social conditions such as changes in criminal activity and racial sentiment.
Chapter VII provides a brief overview of the major findings of this research
and relates these findings to public policy, representation, and democracy. It also
provides some conjecture about what the nature of the public’s punitive policy pref-
erences means for the rationality of the public, its ability to learn and integrate new
information, and the public’s susceptibility to manipulation.
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CHAPTER II
THE STRATEGIC NATURE OF POLITICS
Conflict pervades politics. The essence of politics is conflict over the obtainment of po-
litical power in order to control the allocation of scarce resources and determine what
values prevail in society. For instance, global, regional, and ethnic wars are fought
over resources such as land or water rights. Debates regarding abortion, euthanasia,
and homosexuality are to determine what values prevail in society. Similarly, debates
over criminal statutes and sentencing are to determine what behaviors a society will
tolerate and for the protection of property rights. These and other political issues are
the manifestation of political conflict over the obtainment of allocative authority.
The opportunity for debate and deliberation (i.e., conflict) concerning the allo-
cation of resources and values is one of the defining attributes of a democratic society
(Dahl 1971, Riker 1982). Symbiotically, the ability for multiple viewpoints and ideas
to flourish and challenge the status quo within a democracy facilitates political con-
flict. Elite and citizens alike can express their, often diverging, opinions and attempt
to mobilize supporters around their position. In turn, citizens can choose among
these competing viewpoints to update their own beliefs and make their own attempts
to influence political outcomes.
Some of the most central and important questions in political science revolve
around who wins in this ongoing competition. For instance, why do some conflicts
lead to widespread social movements and mass participation while other political
problems fail to catch the attention of even the most astute political observers? Why
do some political strategies allow some ideas to win favor among the mass public
while other strategies fail? What institutional structures help preserve the status quo
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and which designs facilitate change? Why do some politicians carry favor with the
public, while others fail to get their political careers off the ground? The answer to
these and related questions derive from the core essence of politics: conflict over the
authority and power to allocate resources and values.
One view, although not the only answer to this over-arching question, centers
on the ability of political actors to use strategic communication to obtain influence
and control over the allocation of who gets what, when, and how. For instance,
several scholars note that the ability to define the alternatives within a conflict is
synonymous with political power (Polsby 1960, Schattschneider 1960). According to
Schattschneider (1960, 66), the “definition of alternatives is the supreme instrument
of power” in politics. Riker (1986) elaborates on this view by noting that strategic
communication can alter the dimensions of a debate encouraging mass participation
and changing the composition of existing alliances as preferences shift around these
new dimensions. Altering the meaning of an issue can activate or diminish citizen
participation, widening or narrowing the scope of conflict. The current majority has
no incentive to change the dimensions of a debate since they are already in a position of
power. Majority coalitions usually benefit from the status quo and attempt to bound
discourse on a topic along existing lines of debate. Those unhappy with the status
quo will often attempt to redefine a political debate to rearrange current alliances or
mobilize new groups into the debate. As preferences shift and the scope of conflict
changes, the previous minority view can become the new majority leading to a new
equilibrium outcome. Thus, according to this view, strategic communication is a
driving force behind political power and change.
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1. Strategic communication
Strategic communication is a plan of action identifying specific messages and informa-
tion, mediums to convey those messages, and target audiences to achieve specific goals
or outcomes. ‘Strategic communication can be any set of messages or arguments—
factual information, symbols, images, narratives, metaphors, writings—that are used
to achieve some a priori goal or outcome. Strategic communication can derive from a
variety of sources: interest groups, politicians, pop-culture icons, individual citizens,
grassroots organizations, or foreign nations to name just a few. The target audience
can also vary in size from the entire world to a single nation to a single individual.
Any formulation and distribution of a signal (message or communication) with an a
priori desire to achieve a specific end-state is strategic communication.
At some point, everyone has attempted to use strategic communication to in-
fluence a target audience with the intention that the recipient(s) will endorse the
message and the desired outcome will be achieved. Political campaigns, market-
ing agencies, teachers, journalists, social movement leaders, and ordinary citizens all
engage in strategic communication. Teachers, for instance, will attempt to craft a
lecture comprising of a series of arguments and use various presentation styles (e.g.,
lectures, blackboard, films, powerpoint, group discussion) to ensure students pay close
attention and learn a subject. Politicians often devise a variety of messages over the
course of a campaign or policy debate to influence voters and other policy-makers.
Members of the mass public will attempt to sway influence over friends or colleagues
on topics ranging from important social problems to minor issues such as where to
go to lunch. Thus, there are no limitations on who can craft a strategic message and
engage in the practice of influence.
Strategic communicators can employ a variety of messages to achieve influence.
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Some messages attempt to target individual cognitive facilities by using informative
facts and empirical data, while other messages try to evoke emotions such as anger,
fear, hope, or enthusiasm thru the use of symbols, images, and sound. Changing
the volume of ones voice during a speech, emphasizing certain words or phrases,
or wearing certain clothes to evoke emotions are all examples of different types of
strategic messages. Appeals may try to get people to make inferences about a desired
end-state by making prior beliefs, stereotypes, or feelings accessible in memory or
they may directly make a connection between an argument and the desired outcome.
Strategic messages can be one-sided making a single argument for or against an
outcome or they can be two-sided noting the cons of an alternative outcome before
citing the pros of the desired outcome. In fact, these are just a few of the variations
in messages that strategic actors can use to gain influence.
Further, these messages can vary in the amount of time and resources used to
construct them. Some messages will be devised on-the-spot with little more than a
person’s intuition about how influential a set of words or images will be in achieving a
desired outcome. Other messages will undergo an immense amount of scrutiny being
subject to mass opinion surveys, evaluation by experts, or testing by focus groups.
There is also no limit on the size of the target audience. Strategic messages can be
crafted to appeal to the entire world or just a single individual. The target audience
can consist of the entire nation as when the president makes a speech on national
television arguing that “law and order” is necessary to ensure domestic stability and
peace. A strategic appeal can be directed at a specific organization or group such
as a when criminal justice experts testify or submit amicus briefs before the U.S.
Supreme Court about the “cruel and unusual” nature of lethal injection in capital
punishment sentences. A target audience can also consist of a few friends that are
sitting around a bar arguing about the effectiveness and morality of “three-strikes”
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laws that set mandatory lifetime sentences for three time felony offenders. Further,
a strategic message can attempt to target multiple audiences at the same time such
as blue-collar workers, soccer moms, and religious activists. In fact, a message that
is able to target multiple audiences is likely to be more effective at shaping political
outcomes than a message that appeals to only a single target audience.
Finally, there is variation in how well a strategic communicator evaluates a mes-
sage. For marketing agencies, evaluation of an ad campaign is crucial to determine
the success of the message and whether or not resources should continue to be spent
promoting that message. It is also relatively easy to measure increases in sales pre
and post the advertising campaign to determine what changes in sales are normal
and what changes can be attributed to the new message. In less formal settings a
message’s effectiveness can be gauged by whether or not someone engages in a de-
sired behavior or expresses a certain opinion. Within the realm of politics, it can be
more difficult to measure and evaluate the effect of a message. Sometimes the only
measure of the effectiveness of a message is an election or voting outcome, when the
message sender can no longer alter the message. Policy outputs are a possible means
to evaluate the effectiveness of a strategic message during a policy debate, but it
may be difficult to isolate the effect of the message from other variables that can also
shape political outcomes. Politicians can use public opinion poll results to determine
if the public or segments of the public are accepting a given message and supporting
their position. Yet, often there is no formal means to evaluate the effectiveness of a
message and the only way to gauge success is by noting if a desirable outcome was
achieved.
The use of strategic communication as a means of social influence, particularly
in politics, is often portrayed as manipulative, sinister, and undemocratic. Strategic
political appeals are often characterized as attempts to deceive the public and misrep-
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resent information. In some instances, these are valid concerns. For instance, during
the 1988 presidential election, George H. W. Bush used implicit racial messages por-
traying crime as a problem among blacks despite the problem of crime transcending
race (Edsall and Edsall 1992, Mendelberg 2001). Yet, those that engage in strategic
communication can also be ethical and informative, using strategic communication to
educate the public. Consider, for example, the constructive role of non-profit orga-
nizations such as the Amnesty International in illuminating human rights abuses or
the attempts of Smokey the Bear, McGruff the crime dog, and Woodsy Owl teaching
children to prevent forest fires, report crime, and to “give a hoot, don’t pollute.”
Few would suggest the latter instances of strategic communication are manipulative
and unethical. Often prejudice against strategic communication discredits many le-
gitimate and well-intentioned attempts at social influence. This research will refrain
from casting normative judgments on strategic communication, noting that in most
instances, the intentions of the message sender and the implications of strategic com-
munication for democratic politics is a subjective judgment. What matters for this
research is that strategic communication is a common aspect of democratic politics
regardless of its overall effect on public life.
1.1. Types of strategic communication
Scholars have identified four key forms of strategic communication: Agenda-setting,
persuasion, framing, and priming. Strategic communication attempts to influence the
attitudes, opinions, and behaviors of a target audience. Since attitudes form the foun-
dation of subsequent opinions—the verbal expression of an attitude—and behaviors—
the physical expression of an attitude—we must understand the relationship between
different types of strategic communication and attitudes. Thus, understanding how
each type of strategic message attempts to influence an attitude provides the simplest
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means to differentiate between agenda-setting, persuasion, framing, and priming.
One of the most common conceptulizations of an attitude is the expectancy-value
model (Ajzen and Fishbein 1980). The model suggests attitudes are an additive
function of different positive or negative beliefs regarding an attitude object with
different weights given to each belief component. The expectancy-value model can
be shown by the algebraic expression:
aj = Σ ei ∗ wi (2.1)
where an expression of an attitude a towards object j is a function of the sum of
all evaluations or beliefs e of attributes i of the attitude object or ei multiplied by
the weight w of all attributes i or wi. The weight w given to a belief regarding an
attribute ei must be between 0 and 1, while the weight of all attributes must sum to
1. Further, there is no theoretical limit to the amount of evaluative belief components
ei used in formulating an attitude, but empirically human memory is limited to 7 ±
2 items (Miller 1957).
The expectancy-value model is a simple, yet, informative guide to understanding
attitude formation and change. For example, a person’s attitude about the death
penalty aj,where j = death penalty , might consist of a combination of positive and
negative evaluations ei. These evaluations (considerations in public opinion lingo)
might be racial biases within the system (i = 1), the extent capital punishment serves
as a deterrent to crime (i = 2), the costs of conviction of a capital offense (i = 3),
and retribution for the crime (i = 4). An individual might have two considerations
opposing the death penalty (a negative valence), racial biases and high costs, and
two considerations in favor of the death penalty (a positive valence), deterrence and
retribution. The summary judgment or attitude will then be a result of the relative
weight w attached to each attribute i. Some individuals might give the greatest weight
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to racial biases (w1 = .08), equal weight to deterrence (w2 = .01) and retribution
(w4 = .01), and no weight to the costs of implementing the death penalty (w3 = .00).
Thus, this person will oppose the death penalty largely based on the racial biases
within the justice system.1 Another person might place all the weight on retribution
(w4 = 1) relative to other considerations and therefore favor the death penalty.
One of the foremost strategies to influence political outcomes is through agenda-
setting. Cohen (1963, 13) first noticed the ability of the mass media to set the public
agenda:
The press is significantly more than a purveyor of information and opin-
ion. It may not be successful much of the time in telling people what to
think, but it is stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think
about [emphasis in original]. And it follows from this that the world looks
different to different people, depending not only on their personal inter-
ests, but also on the map that is drawn for them by the writers, editors,
and publishers of the papers they read.
The ability to direct public concern or awareness toward some issues and away from
other issues is known as agenda-setting. In other words, “agenda-setting refers to the
process by which problems become salient as political issues” (Erbring, Goldenberg
and Miller 1980, 17-18). Specifically, scholars classify the ability of strategic actors,
particularly the mass media, to transfer the salience or importance of an issue onto
the public as agenda-setting.
In terms of the expectancy-value model, agenda-setting attempts to influence the
1More formally, the individual’s opinion would be the result of the following func-
tion: aj = (−racial bias) ∗ .08 + deterrence ∗ .01 + retribution ∗ .01 + (−costs) ∗ .00.
Notice the negative signs take into consideration the direction of affective valence
each belief has on the overall attitude.
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object of an attitude’s focus aj: the object j of an attitude a. More formally,
aj = Σ ei ∗ wi (2.2)
where j in equation 2.2 could be any issue (e.g., the death penalty, social security,
health care, civil rights, or foreign policy) and the purpose of agenda-setting is to
create a change in j. For instance, a successful attempt at agenda-setting would be to
shift a person’s attention from thinking about the death penalty (j = death penalty)
to thinking about some other issue such as the economy (j = economy).
Studies of agenda-setting begin with the notion that the mass public does not
expend a great deal of time and effort to understand public affairs. Instead, people go
about their everyday lives focusing their attention on their work, social relationships,
and leisure activities. Given the public’s lack of attention to politics, agenda-setting
research seeks to understand how the public focuses its attention on some problems
and policy solutions at the expense of alternative problems and solutions. For in-
stance, why did the public shift its attention to issues of crime and race during the
late 1960s instead of other issues like U.S. foreign policy in Latin America or health
care? The agenda-setting answer is that the frequency of attention to an issue or
political problem by strategic actors such as politicians, interest groups, or the mass
media provides a cheap and easily available cue that the public can use to determine
which issues or problems to focus their attention on. According to a prominent the-
ory of agenda-setting, the public focuses its attention on some issues or solutions in
proportion to the emphasis given to those same issues or solutions by opinion leaders
such as the mass media (McCombs and Shaw 1972). The agenda-setting hypothesis
derives directly from such theories. The agenda-setting hypothesis states that “those
problems that receive prominent attention on the national news becomes the prob-
lems the viewing public regards as the most important” (Iyengar and Kinder 1987,
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16).
Empirical evidence of agenda-setting is usually shown by the correlation between
the frequency a message is transmitted and the ranking of the same issue by the public
as important (McCombs and Shaw 1993, McLeod, Becker and Byrnes 1974, Takeshita
2005). For instance, Funkhouser (1973) examines media coverage of 14 issues during
the 1960s. He finds that the issue with the most news coverage, the Vietnam War,
is also the issue most frequently cited by the public as the nation’s “most important
problem.” The second most covered topic by the news media during this era, race
relations, was cited as the second “most important problem” facing the nation by
the public. Overall, Funkhouser (1973) shows a high correlation (0.78) between the
amount of media coverage of 14 issues and the importance ranking of these issues
by the public. Behr and Iyengar (1985) find that news coverage of unemployment,
inflation, and energy mirror objective conditions and that both influence the issue
priorities of the public. There is also evidence showing a more direct, causal rela-
tionship between the frequency of news coverage of a topic and individual ratings of
an issue as important. In a series of experiments, Iyengar and Kinder (1987) show
that people are more likely to feel an issue is more important after watching a news
broadcast featuring a story about that issue. For instance, people that watched a
news broadcast featuring a story on national defense or unemployment were more
likely to rate those issues as important than people that did not watch those stories.
The more stories a person saw about the same topic, the higher importance rating
that issue received.
Persuasion is a form of social influence that occurs when a strategic actor at-
tempts to induce attitude change by changing the belief content of an attitude object
(Nelson and Oxley 1999, 1040-1041). Similar to other forms of strategic communi-
cation, persuasive messages can take many forms (e.g., logic, symbolic), but must
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target the belief content of an attitude object. Individual opinions and attitudes
will tend to persist until a person learns something new about the attitude object
or a previously held belief is rejected in favor of a new bit a knowledge. These new
kernels of knowledge can be thought of as beliefs. Sometimes these beliefs change
because of new experiences, but other times they change because of the transmission,
reception, acceptance, and retention of new information (McGuire 1969). Persuasion
is successful when the target audience receives and accepts a message, changes the
belief content of an attitude object, and the change in belief content subsequently
alters the valence of the attitude.
The effect of a persuasive message can be shown using the expectancy-value
model where:
aj = Σ ei ∗ wi (2.3)
Persuasion occurs when a message changes the content of a person’s beliefs (ei) re-
garding the attitude object aj. Persuasion does not change the focus of the attitude
toward a new object (aj) as in agenda-setting or the weight attached to the belief
component (wi). Instead, persuasion alters either the valence of a belief component
or adds a new belief component to an attitude.
We can gain a better understanding of persuasion by reverting to the example of
a person’s attitude toward the death penalty (aj = death penalty). Imagine an indi-
vidual that opposes the death penalty based on a single consideration or belief—the
observation that the criminal justice system discriminates against African-Americans.
Also assume that the valence of this consideration is negative since our hypothetical
person oppose racial discrimination. The negative valence on the belief component of
racial discrimination should translate into an attitude opposing capital punishment.
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Formally:
−death penalty = −racial bias ∗ 1 (2.4)
where the negative sign on the attitude object (death penalty) indicates that the
individual opposes capital punishment and the negative sign on the belief content
(racial bias) indicates a negative belief about the death penalty. Now consider the
case where new information is made available that there no longer exists racial dis-
crimination in the criminal justice system. Instead, the criminal justice system is
extremely fair and impartial to everyone. If the argument was compelling enough
to change the single consideration (racial biases) from a negative to a positive belief
about the death penalty (since it’s implemented fairly), the resulting attitude toward
the death penalty would be favorable. The latter is an example of persuasion. In
short, persuasion is akin learning.
When thought about in terms of learning, persuasion is a very effective means of
communication. Teachers, advertising agencies, and social leaders spend a great deal
of resources attempting to persuade the public. However, the utility of persuasion
is often determined by the context of the situation (Mutz, Sniderman and Brody
1996, 5). In early voting studies, partisan identities and group loyalties showed great
resistance to persuasive campaign appeals (Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes
1960, Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet 1944). For example, Lazarsfeld, Berelson
and Gaudet (1944) realized that most voters had made up their minds about which
candidate they were going to vote for prior to the start of the campaign and very
rarely found a reason to deviate from their prior beliefs. These studies led to the
conclusion that although campaigns are effective at mobilizing voters, they rarely
have the ability to persuade people to change their minds about a policy proposal or
which candidate they going to vote for.
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More recent research suggests that the effectiveness of a persuasive appeal is
conditional on the complexity of the argument and the issue domain (Cobb and
Kuklinski 1997). These authors find negative arguments tend to be more persuasive
than positive arguments and easy to comprehend arguments are generally more per-
suasive than complex messages. Research also shows that prior beliefs are not only re-
sistant to persuasive appeals, but bias where individuals obtain information and how
they process information (Bartels 2002, Broadbent 1958, Lodge and Hamill 1986).
People are motivated to accept information consistent with their prior beliefs and
reject information contrary to those beliefs (Taber and Lodge 2006). Thus, although
persuasion is a common form of strategic communication in marketing campaigns and
educational programs, it is less successful as an agent of change within the realm of
politics.
As previously noted, the ability to define the essence of an issue is the ability to
command political power. The ability to define an issue, to give meaning to a series
of events or a political problem, is to engage in what is commonly known as issue
framing. Gamson and Modigliani (1987, 143) define an issue frame as the following:
[a] central organizing idea or story line that provides meaning to an un-
folding strip of events, weaving a connection among them. The frames
suggests what the controversy is about, the essence of the issue.
Issue frames refer to strategic attempts to define a problem for a target audience.
Frames do not necessarily provide false interpretation or meaning to a problem. In-
stead, a successful frame will often emphasize some parts of reality over other equally
plausible and realistic aspects of an issue. As Entman (1993, 52) notes,
To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them
more salient in a communicating text, in such as way as to promote a par-
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ticular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or
treatment recommendation
A frame does not have to try to give meaning to each of these aspects of an issue.
Instead, the definition of one attribute (i.e., the cause of a problem) can often lead
members of the target audience to infer other aspects of the the issue (i.e., the appro-
priate treatment or solution). Iyengar (1991) found that the attribution of a problem
to individuals leads people to prefer solutions to the problem that focuses on individ-
uals, while attributions of a problem to larger social conditions leads people to prefer
solutions that target those social conditions.
The expectancy-value model is particularly useful in differentiating between
framing, persuasion, and agenda-setting. Issue framing attempts to alter the im-
portance attached to each attribute or belief related to an attitude object. Nelson
and Kinder (1996, 1073) define an issue frame as a strategic attempt to “alter the
weight or importance attributed to certain considerations . . . while making other,
equally accessible ideas, seem less consequential.” Thus, instead of changing the fo-
cus of the attitude object aj (agenda-setting), or the belief content (ei) of an attitude
(persuasion), framing works by altering the weight w attached to each attribute i of
an attitude object.
aj = Σ ei ∗wi (2.5)
Framing effects can be understood by returning the running example of an atti-
tude toward capital punishment. Imagine an individual that has a neutral attitude
toward the death penalty based on two beliefs that are weighted equally: the death
penalty is a deterrent and the death penalty is implemented unfairly across races.
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Thus, each belief is weighted at 0.5. However, the deterrent belief is seen as a posi-
tive attribute of the death penalty, while racial biases within the justice system are
seen as a negative attribute of the death penalty. As it stands this person will have
a difficult time forming a stable opinion on the issue since they have equal reasons to
support each side. Now imagine that this individual receives and accepts a strategic
message discussing (i.e., framing) the use of the death penalty in terms of its success
as a deterrent. Subsequently, we can image that this person now gives more weight
or importance to the deterrent belief and reduces his or her reliance on the racial
bias belief when formulating their opinion toward capital punishment. A framing
effect occurs when the weight attached to the deterrent belief changes, altering the
valence of the attitude. In the example, the hypothetical person should support the
death penalty because they are placing more weight on the positive belief that capital
punishment is a deterrent of crime.
One distinctive feature of framing is that it is a deliberate attempt to alter what
considerations are important. The message sender makes no attempt to obscure the
frame. Instead, it is imperative to framing that the audience understand exactly how
the communicator wishes to define the issue. Thus, frames are explicit attempts to
alter what considerations are important when formulating or expressing an opinion
toward an attitude object.
A substantial amount of research shows the prevalence of issue framing within
politics. In the classic framing experiment, Nelson, Clawson and Oxley (1997) divided
students into two equal groups. The first group read a newspaper article about
a KKK rally emphasizing the potential for public disorder if the rally took place.
The second group read the same news article, but instead of concerns for social
order, the article emphasized the right to free speech that should be given to the
KKK. The authors found that people in the social order treatment had less support
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for the KKK rally and that concerns about public safety were more important in
their evaluations of the rally. Individuals that read the free speech version of the
same article had more support for the rally and rated free speech considerations as
more important when formulating their evaluation of the rally. Framing effects have
also been found to be prominent in public thinking about urban planning (Nelson
and Oxley 1999), welfare (Iyengar 1991), foreign policy (Entman 1993), government
spending (Jacoby 2000, Schram and Soss 2001), campaign finance reform (Grant
and Rudolph 2003), support for the Supreme Court (Nicholson and Howard 2003),
affirmative action (Gamson and Modigliani 1987), gun control (Haider-Markel and
Joslyn 2001), homesexual rights (Price, Nir and Cappella 2005), and nuclear power
(Gamson and Modigliani 1989). Thus, framing is often seen as a premier type of
strategic communication.
Strategic communication from public officials and news organizations also influ-
ences the standards citizens apply when making political judgments by increasing
the accessibility of a belief and subsequently making that belief more important.
This is known as priming. Priming is when information influences the weight at-
tached to a belief in the formation of political judgments or evaluations (Iyengar and
Kinder 1987, Miller and Krosnick 2000). Most scholars believe priming occurs be-
cause frequent media coverage of an issue increases the accessibility of an issue within
the minds of citizens (Iyengar and Kinder 1987, Krosnick and Brannon 1993, Kros-
nick and Kinder 1990, Valentino, Hutchings and White 2002). Citizens will then use
this issue in their subsequent political judgments even though the message did not
explicitly link the issue with the attitude object of those subsequent judgments. For
instance, (Iyengar and Kinder 1987) argue that when the news media covers a particu-
lar problem, that problem becomes more accessible in the minds of viewers, therefore
having a stronger influence on subsequent political judgments. Recently, however,
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attention to an issue has been shown to prime political judgments by increasing the
importance, rather than the accessibility, of an issue in subsequent judgments (Miller
and Krosnick 2000). If the latter study is correct, the effect of priming is the same as
the effect of issue framing. However, it is possible to differentiate priming and framing
based on whether the message is explicit or implicit. Framing is an explicit attempt to
define an issue by changing what considerations are important. Framing requires the
target audience to understand how the message sender is defining the issue. Priming
is an implicit message to change what considerations are important. There is no need
for the target audience to be aware of the purpose of the prime. Indeed, this is one
reason why primes are an effective means of influence. The expectancy-value model
is less useful when trying to differentiate priming and framing, but it can still show
how priming operates.
ai = Σ ei ∗wi (2.6)
Priming works when an implicit message, usually a symbol or image, becomes
more accessible within the minds of the target audience and increases the importance
wi of the primed attribute in the formulation and expression of the attitude. Assume
that there are an infinitely large number of possible considerations (beliefs) that
people can use when making an evaluation of an attitude object. The limitations
of human memory ensures that the number of considerations relating to an attitude
object is itself limited. According to Miller (1957) this number is approximately 7 ±
2. This means that the weight given to all of the other potential considerations is zero
because they are not accessible in memory. Priming operates by changing the weight
to considerations previously unaccessible in memory to some positive number meaning
they are now accessible in memory and subsequently important in the evaluation of
the attitude object.
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An example of a priming message is a news story about crime that uses a visual
image of a black male as an exemplar of a criminal. Although the story does not
explicitly say crime is a problem with black men, the image of blacks within the
context of the crime story becomes accessible with the minds of the readers. People
then began to weigh their opinions or stereotypes about blacks (the belief content)
more heavily when deciding if they support or oppose tougher criminal sanctions.
Again the key difference between framing and priming is that priming occurs via an
implicit message.
Scholars have found priming effects in several areas of American politics. Iyen-
gar and Kinder (1987) find that primes—inserting a news story about defense or
inflation—into a 30 minute news broadcast increases the use of those issues, respec-
tively, in how citizens evaluate political leaders such as the president. The prime is
implicit because there is never any attempt to link the president with either issue.
The more stories subjects were shown about an issue, the more they used that issue
in their subsequent political judgments. Mutz (1998) also finds that the number of
stories in the Associated Press on the “economy” and “war on drugs” increased the
weight given to these issues in evaluations of President Reagan. Simon (2002) finds
that the increase in attention to crime during the 1994 campaign season led voters
to rely on their attitudes about crime and punishment when voting in the California
gubernatorial election between Kathleen Brown and Pete Wilson. Mendelberg (2001)
shows that campaign advertisements featuring a black convict, Willie Horton, primed
racial attitudes and crime in voters evaluations of the presidential candidates Michael
Dukakis and George H. W. Bush. Although there was an explicit attempt to link the
issue of crime with presidential vote choice, the strategic prime linking racial attitudes
with presidential vote choice was implicit.
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1.2. Summary
Changing the agenda is effective when mobilizing support is likely to shift the balance
of power and lead to a new equilibrium outcome. Although agenda-setting does
not directly influence individual level support or opposition to an issue because it
only changes the object of attention, it still can shift aggregate levels of support or
opposition through mobilization. As strategic actors pay more attention to an issue,
the distribution of people that care about an issue will change. For instance, people
that support punitive policies, but not paying attention to an issue will suddenly
care about crime and began to voice their preference for punitive solutions to crime.
This increase in people supporting punitive policies voicing their preference can shift
the aggregate levels of support for punitive policies despite the inability of agenda-
setting to alter individual-level support toward an attitude object. This is similar
to the notion of a “silent majority.” Yet, when political actors began promoting an
alternative issue, the public might also shift their attention to that new issue. The
competition of issues on the political agenda results in the foremost weakness of
agenda-setting—issue displacement.
Persuasive messages are most effective when those messages are consistent with
a core belief component of the attitude object. Yet, persuasion is difficult when
a message directly challenges existing stereotypes, self-identies, values, and other
predispositions. Such predispositions are stable across time and highly resistant to
change. In some instances, a persuasive message can result in a counterargument
from the target audience that discounts the persuasive message and shifts opinion in
the direction opposite of that desired by the message sender. In addition, persuasive
messages require a number of necessary conditions prior to influencing an attitude.
McGuire’s (1968) theory of persuasion requires attention, comprehension, yielding,
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retention, and finally a change in opinion or behavior. Thus, persuasion is often
difficult especially when the beliefs being targeted are deeply held. Instead, persuasive
messages are most effective at reinforcing existing beliefs making an attitude stronger.
Often, the ability of strategic communication to influence public opinion requires
a more subtle approach that does not directly target the belief content of an attitude,
but the importance and accessibility attached to various beliefs. Framing and priming
messages are most effective when they resonate with existing values and common
experiences. Yet, Mendelberg (2001) argues that frames can lose their effectiveness
when they directly counter widely held social norms and values. The explicit nature
of the framing message means the public can identify and reject a frame counter to
their prior beliefs. Primes, on the other hand, are implicit. The target audience is
less likely to realize what belief component is being primed and therefore less likely
to resist a priming message unless it is made explicit. The weakness of primes is
that some belief components are chronically accessible. For instance, people tend
to rely on unemployment considerations when evaluating the president. Since these
considerations are almost always present when people think about the president an
attempt to prime unemployment considerations within this context will be ineffective
since those considerations are already accessible. Iyengar and Kinder (1987) find
a number of instances in their priming experiments where the priming effect did
not occur because, as they speculate, the consideration being primed is chronically
accessible among the public.
One expectation from this discussion is that framing and priming should be
more effective at shaping public opinion than persuasion. Persuasion is a complex
phenomena and persuasive messages often meet resistance. Priming should also be
more effective than framing when the consideration being activated is contrary to
existing beliefs or values as long as the consideration being primed is not chroni-
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cally accessible. Agenda-setting should be the least effective at altering the valence
of an attitude since it does not change the belief content or weight attached to be-
liefs. However, agenda-setting can lead to substantial shifts in aggregate opinion via
mobilization that can alter the balance of support for a policy.
2. Democracy and competition
Strategic communication does not operate in a vacuum. Instead, political actors must
attempt to shape political outcomes and public opinion within the context of demo-
cratic government. Democratic government provides a context where a diverse and
wide number of viewpoints must compete for public support. Political actors on all
sides of a debate can present arguments supporting their position and opposing the
position of political adversaries. In a few instances, there is widespread or unani-
mous support for a policy or viewpoint. Yet, usually there are competing viewpoints
and ideas surrounding a policy debate. Thus, citizens are not merely exposed to a
single type of strategic communication or a single point-of-view. Democratic govern-
ment facilitates competition among ideas and leads to an environment where citizens
can pick and choose among various arguments when making a political decision. In-
deed, competition among various political actors structures the relationship between
information and choice (Dahl 1971, Downs 1997 [1957], Jackson 1975, Chong and
Druckman 2007).
Yet, scholars rarely examine the effect of democratic competition on strategic
communication. A majority of the research on strategic communication (i.e., agenda-
setting, persuasion, framing, priming) examines the effectiveness of these appeals in
isolation rather than in a competitive context that resembles American democracy.
As a scholarly community, we have very little understanding of how strategic commu-
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nication operates within a competitive democratic context. It is unclear how effective
various forms of strategic communication are when they are competing against alter-
native forms of strategic communication and alternative messages.
Most of the research on message attributes focuses on the organization, structure,
and to a lesser extent the content of a message. One debate centers around whether
it is advantageous to present an argument first (a primacy effect) or last (a recency
effect). Miller and Campbell (1959) find that presenting an argument first is more
effective when both arguments are presented around the same time and the subsequent
judgment occurs at some later time. However, when the first message is temporally
removed from the judgment and the second message is temporally closer, the second
message is more effective. Yet, Haugtvedt and Wegener (1994) show that primacy
and recency effects are moderated by the degree of information processing that the
message requires suggesting that the ordering of a message matters less than the
content of a message and individual motivations.
The effectiveness of one-sided messages that present a single point-of-view or
two-sided messages that contrast two competing perspectives have also been stud-
ied. A general consensus is that two-sided messages are more effective, but can lead
to polarizing attitudes as people adopt the position closest to their predisposition
(Giner-Sorolila and Chaiken 1997, Lord, Ross and Lepper 1979). Two-sided mes-
sages are most effective when the opposing side’s argument is refuted prior to the
second message (Allen 1991).
An alternative to focusing on the organization of a message is to examine how
content shapes message effectiveness. Whether or not a message contains positive
or negative information can determine the message’s effectiveness. Several studies
suggest negative messages are better at shaping attitudes because they lead to higher
levels of information processing (Maheswaran and Meyers-Levy 1990, Meyerowitz and
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Chaiken 1987, Smith and Petty 1996). Negative information has also been shown to
have a greater effect on candidate evaluations than positive information (Lau 1982,
Lau 1985). Another aspect of message content is whether the message targets the
cognitive or affective component of an attitude. Some messages try to shape opinions
by appealing to reason by providing factual information on a topic. Other arguments
will appeal to emotions and affect by providing symbolic cues and images. Some
experiments show that affective arguments are more effective at inducing attitude
change (Edwards 1990, Edwards and von Hippel 1995), while other research suggests
that matching the message to the base of an attitude (i.e., cognitive message to an
attitude formed by cognitive considerations) is the most effective approach. Aside
from this research, there is very little emphasis on how the content of a message
affects its influence.
2.1. Expectation: Racial appeals matter
What aspects of the content of a message should be effective at shaping preferences for
punitive criminal justice policies? Effective messages should target deeply held beliefs
such as stereotypes, self-identities, or values. A message that resonates with strongly
held predispositions should be more effective than alternative messages. These mes-
sages are generally highly relevant to the target audience and result in highly elabo-
ration information processing. Petty and Cacioppo (1998) construct an elaboration
likelihood model (ELM) of attitude change. In the ELM, there are two different in-
formation processing routes that people use when processing a message. The central
route is a process of high elaboration, careful scrutiny of a message, and internal
thinking. Peripheral processing is a low elaboration effort where a limited amount of
effort is expended to form a judgment. Whereas the central route of information pro-
cessing results in the analysis of an argument, the peripheral route relies on heuristics
56
such as source cues, the number or length of arguments, and social identities. An
attitude formed through central processing tends to be stable across time, resistant to
change, and has the ability to influence other attitudes. An attitude formed through
the peripheral route is generally weak and unable to withstand strong counter argu-
ments. Since messages that resonate with deeply held beliefs are processed through
the central route, these messages should be effective at shaping public opinion.
What specific type of messages regarding crime and punishment resonate with
the public? In a 1993 interview, Jerome Miller, the executive director of the National
Center for Institutions and Alternatives, made an observation that is the basis for
much research on race, crime, and punishment in the United States. Miller’s claim is
that,
There are certain code words that allow you never to have to say “race”,
but everyone knows that’s what you mean and “crime” is one of those
. . . So when we talk about locking up more and more people, what we’re
really talking about is locking up more and more black men (Chiricos,
Welch and Gertz 2004, 359-360).
Roberts (1993, 1947) also suggests that much of the increasing support for punitive
policies stems from a widespread “belief system that constructs crime in terms of race
and race in terms of crime.” The contemporary dynamics of punitiveness among the
public stems from the race-coded rhetoric of public officials and from media coverage
that tends to portray crime as a problem among blacks (Beckett 1997, Mendelberg
2001, Peffley, Shields and Williams 2007). Thus, strategic messages that attempt to
link crime and race should correlate with the over time dynamics of public opinion
regarding crime and punishment. The more communication that makes these linkages,
the more punitive the public should become. When the opinion leaders and the
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media reduce their rhetoric regarding race and crime, the public should become less
supportive of punitive policies.
Message that make a link between crime and black Americans have become an ef-
fective form of strategic communication because racial rhetoric, symbols, and images
automatically trigger racial stereotypes. Stereotypes are “cognitive structures that
contain the perceiver’s knowledge, beliefs, and expectations about human groups”
(Hamilton and Trolier 1986, 133). Stereotypes are often exaggerated images of the
characteristics and behaviors of specific groups that are applied to individual mem-
bers of the group. Some stereotypes are accurate simplifications that enable people to
comprehend complex social situations. Other stereotypes can be gross misrepresenta-
tions about the behavior of group members. These mental representations are usually
durable and influential generalizations that allow people to understand members of
less familiar groups. Once established, stereotypes continue to persist despite new
information counter to the stereotype.2
Strategic messages that activate racial stereotypes are effective at influencing
policy opinions because stereotypes operate automatically (Devine 1989). The latter
is significant because it means the use of stereotypes is inevitible once it is triggered.
Devine (1989, 6) writes, “[a] crucial component of automatic processes is their in-
escapabililty; they occur despite deliberate attempts to bypass or ignore them.” In
other words, stereotypes occur reflexively, almost effortlessly once they are initiated.
Mental attempts to control or counteract the stereotype face tough resistance unless
the stereotype is explicitly made known to the target audience. In the latter case, a
2Some scholars argue that stereotypes can be data driven where new information
can influence existing belief structures (Locksley, Borgida, Brekke and Hepburn 1980).
However, empirical research indicates that people tend to discount a stereotype only
in the specific situation in which the counter-evidence for the stereotype exists (Fiske
and Neuberg 1990, Fiske and Pavelchak 1986).
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person may recognize and reject the stereotype, but only after it has been activated
and had its initial effect. Therefore, attitudes that are based on stereotypes tend to
be relatively stable over time.
There are several stereotypes about black Americans that are fairly common
among white Americans. Historically, blacks have been explicitly linked to stereotypes
that portray them as “violent,” “aggressive,” and “lacking western morals.” Blacks
were also directly labeled criminals by many white Americans for most of American
history. Biological racism suggested that the genetic makeup of blacks automatically
made them prone to engage in criminal behavior. Sloop (1996, 116) notes that the link
between racial stereotypes and crime continues today within media coverage of crime
that portrays blacks as “irrational, incorrigible, predatory, and dangerous.” These
stereotypes lead many people to assume that the best solution for reducing crime lay
with immobilizing the individual since the problems are inherent in black culture and
genetics rather than any adjustment in the social conditions of blacks. Subsequently,
negative racial stereotypes have been shown to be a powerful determinant of policy
opinions on a host of issues including crime and punishment, social welfare, affirma-
tive action, and housing laws (Gilens 1996, Kinder and Sanders 1996, Hurwitz and
Peffley 1997, Sears, Sidanius and Bobo 1980, Sniderman and Carmines 1997). A key
expectation from this discussion is that media coverage of crime containing strate-
gic racial appeals linking blacks to crime should be associated with the dynamics
of punitive sentiment. Increases in the frequency of racially-based messages within
crime news should correlate with increases in the punitive sentiment of the public.
2.2. Expectation: Message effectiveness varies over time
The competition of ideas and strategic messages within a democracy should also
shape the effectiveness of a message across time. The effectiveness of a strategic
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message should not be constant or static, but instead vary across time. Most research
on strategic communication assumes that the effectiveness of a message is constant
across time and space. Yet, politics is dynamic. Charismatic leaders come and go,
while events such as natural disasters, terrorist attacks, and new institutions can have
a dramatic and lasting influence on political relationships.
Indeed, there are many reasons why the effectiveness of a strategic message could
change over time. Politicians can craft and refine their messages over time increasing
the effectiveness of an appeal. Changes in the social and political environment can
also alter the effectiveness of a strategic message. For instance, arguments appealing
for government intervention in an economic crisis lose their relevancy once the eco-
nomic crisis disappears. A message that was once novel and appealing to the public
can become old, boring, and outdated after frequent use. The public can become
desensitized to a message decreasing the effectiveness of the appeal over time. Yet,
these examples suggest that the effectiveness of strategic appeals are not entirely
random. Instead, they should move to systematic forces that are identifiable. Specifi-
cally, this research intends to show that the effectiveness of racial appeals vary across
time in response to changes in social norms toward racial equality and changes in
actual criminal behavior.
Within the context of crime and punishment, changes in social norms regarding
racial equality should lead to variation in the effectiveness of an appeal over time.
Mendelberg (2001) argues that opinion leaders initially framed crime explicitly as
a problem among black Americans. However, once racial equality began to evolve
as the dominant social norm in America, explicit racial appeals were no longer an
appropriate crime frame. Citizens recognizing the conflict between racial equality
and stereotyping blacks as violent criminals began to reject the latter message in
favor of endorsing the norm of equality. Subsequently, opinion leaders began to
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prime negative racial stereotypes with implicit appeals. Thus, according to this view
the effectiveness of a message should change over time, but in relation to changes in
public support for racial equality.
5I predict that in 10 years, the Nation’s Capital will be unsafe for them in the
daytime. (Congressional Record, 1956, 102, pt9: 12946)
The historical record is full of examples of explicit attempts to link crime with
black Americans. Specifically, the use of frames to attribute crime to blacks was very
common among opinion leaders since there was no norm of racial equality. Although
these messages were deemed appropriate arguments for the 1950s, all of these com-
ments would be unacceptable in todays environment of growing racial equality. After
the establishment of Civil Rights, the use of explicit racial appeals declines. Instead,
opinion leaders began to rely on implicit strategic appeals to link race and crime.
These include using images of blacks in stories about crime or code words that target
populations understood to refer to blacks, even if the term “black” was not specif-
ically mentioned. For instance, during the 1964 presidential campaign, Republican
nominee Barry Goldwater (R-Arizona) would often speak of reducing “crime in the
streets” and restoring “law and order” without ever connecting crime to blacks. Yet,
many of his supporters knew that these were code words that meant eliminating black
crime. Opinion leaders even began to directly dispute that their symbolic language
was meant to implicate blacks as responsible for crime. In the 1968 Republican Na-
tional Convention, Presidential candidate Richard M. Nixon states explicitly that his
platform of restoring social order was not targeting blacks:
The wave of crime is not going to be the wave of the future in the United
States of America. We shall re-establish freedom from fear in America
so that America can take the lead in re-establishing freedom from fear in
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the world. And to those who say that law and order is the code word for
racism, there and here is a reply: Our goal is justice for every American. If
we are to have respect for law in America, we must have laws that deserve
respect. Just as we cannot have progress without order, we cannot have
order without progress, and so, as we commit to order tonight, let us
commit to progress.
It is clear that explicit racial messages were no longer acceptable to political leaders
or the public. The messages that might have shaped public opinion in one period do
not necessarily influence the public in future time periods. Thus, the effectiveness of
strategic appeals is time-varying and empirical tests of strategic communication must
consider the time-varying nature of relationships between different types of strategic
communication and public sentiment.
Another factor that could lead to variation in the effectiveness of racial ap-
peals over time is the amount of actual criminal activity in society. Recent research
on contextual theories of politics suggest that environmental factors such as demo-
graphic changes, spatial proximity, and social networks can directly shape political
behaviors and opinions on important policy issues (e.g., Gay 2006, Huckfeldt and
Sprague 1987, Sigelman and Welch 1993). Yet, most scholars reject the notion that
the crime rate or similar contextual factors have anything to do with the increasing
public sentiment for punitive policies (see Beckett 1997). Instead, most scholars view
crime as a socially constructed phenomena where opinion leaders rather than actual
crime shapes the opinions of the mass public. What is missing from each of these
literatures is the interaction between context and strategic communication. In other
words, it seems theoretically likely that strategic communication that enacts upon
changing contextual conditions such as an actual increase in crime will have more of
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an influence on public opinion than messages that have little or no basis in reality.
People receive an enormous number of messages each day ranging from personal
communication to advertisements. A small number of these messages constitute po-
litical attempts to influence political preferences. Citizens rarely pay attention to all
of these signals and probably pay the least attention to messages relating to politics.
Thus, it seems unlikely that strategic messages concerning crime and punishment
would have much of an influence on public sentiment alone. Instead, media coverage
informing people about actual changing conditions should shape and construct pub-
lic opinion by emphasizing some messages over other messages. Messages that have
more of a basis in reality should be seen as more credible than messages that are
completely constructed. When messages have little basis in real world conditions, it
becomes easier for alternative viewpoints to dispute such claims and reduce the effec-
tiveness of the original appeal. The messages that people are most likely to devote
their attention to are those that have immediate and direct consequences—messages
that relate to actual real world conditions. There is some speculation that this is
indeed the case. Iyengar and Kinder (1987, 114) suggest that “television news ap-
pears to be most powerful when it corroborates personal experience, conferring social
reinforcement and political legitimacy on the problems and struggles of ordinary life.”
Thus, strategic communication provides a means to link actual crime with punitive
policy prescriptions.
Gross and Ellsworth (2001, 52) make this clear in their summary of the relation-
ship between persuasive arguments regarding the execution of innocent prisoners and
opposition to the death penalty:
The common wisdom is that the recent decline is support for capital pun-
ishment reflects the American peoples distress about the escalating num-
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ber of near fatal mistakes. A system that once seemed to err on the side
of caution now seems hasty, careless, and corrupt. However, innocent
people have been released from death row for decades and there is no evi-
dence that the system for deciding capital cases has deteriorated recently.
The problem is not new; what is new is that people notice and care. It
has helped that the use of DNA identification in a small number of cases
has made this issue look new and scientifically undeniable, but the main
catalyst is timing. Crime and concern about crime are down, capital pun-
ishment is no longer a major item on the political agenda, and support
for the death penalty had become increasingly reflexive, a matter of habit
rather than passionate concern. Attitudes that remain fixed over a long
period without reflection can become vulnerable to new information, es-
pecially if that information is brought to life with memorable concrete
examples. In this context, stories of innocent people who came within
days of execution attract attention and raise doubts about the integrity
of the system.
It is clear in their conclusion that these messages would not have been effective
if not for the decrease in crime that pushed the issue of crime and punishment down
on the public’s agenda. The “timing” of a strategic message to fit with real world
conditions is an important component of whether that message will be accepted by a
large number of people.
The politicization of crime via strategic communication fits with evidence that
crime is socially constructed, but advances current theories by noting that the effec-
tiveness of strategic communication in constructing an issue partly depends on the
messages basis in reality. It also extends contextual theories by showing that changing
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social conditions influence policy opinions, but the politicization of these conditions
via strategic communication makes context much more relevant to public sentiment.
3. Summary
Strategic communication is an important means of political influence. In a democratic
political system where ideas and messages can compete for public approval, political
actors must strive to construct the most effective message possible. Politicians are
armed with a variety of tools to engage in strategic communication—agenda-setting,
priming, persuasion, and framing. Yet, few scholars have tested how these different
types of communication work in a competitive context and what makes each type
of message effective. The argument presented here is that the effectiveness of a
message depends on its ability to resonate with existing values, beliefs, or stereotypes.
Within the context of crime and punishment, strategic messages within the media
linking crime to black Americans should have a strong relationship with the over
time movement in the public’s preferences toward punitive criminal justice policies.
Furthermore, the effectiveness of these appeals should vary over time. However, this
variation should not be completely stochastic, but move in a systematic fashion in
relation to changing social norms and conditions.
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CHAPTER III
STRATEGIC MESSAGES IN THE MEDIA
A key expectation of this research is that strategic messages within crime news shapes
the over time dynamics of public sentiment toward punitive criminal justice policies.
The aim of this chapter is to develop measures of strategic messages (agenda-setting,
priming, framing, and persuasion) within crime news from 1950 to 2006. In addition,
a model of what determines the content of crime news will be developed and tested to
understand the extent that media coverage of crime reflects actual conditions relating
to criminal activity or if the media over-represents specific types of crime and criminals
in its coverage across time.
Although previous research suggests a connection between crime news and public
opinion regarding crime and punishment, there does not exist a systematic study of
the nature of strategic messages within crime news for an extended period of time.
Graber (1980), for instance, examines media coverage of crime from two local and
three network television broadcasts and four daily newspapers from 1976 to 1977.
Although this study provides a wealth of knowledge of media coverage of crime during
that year, it does not provide any indication of the dynamics of media coverage of
crime over a longer time period. Other scholars have examined media coverage of
crime over time, but focus on a single type of strategic message rather than the vast
array of potential messages that might appear in the media. For instance, Iyengar
(1991) examines several types of attribution frames, but does not consider the effect
of priming, persuasion, or agenda-setting on public attitudes toward punitive policies.
Still, other scholars only provide tangental evidence and conjectures regarding how
the media portrays crime.
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This chapter intends to provide an initial examination of strategic messages in
media coverage of crime from 1950 to 2006. This systematic examination should
provide insight into questions that have been the sources of much speculation: What
is the volume of coverage of crime over time? What strategic messages are the public
receiving regarding crime and punishment? Does the frequency of different types of
strategic messages change over time? Does the use of one type of strategic message
preclude the use of other types of strategic messages? How much do racial appeals
permeate coverage of crime? How often are blacks explicitly linked to crime in the
media? Did explicit racial frames linking blacks to crime disappear after some time
period or do they still remain a prominent means to frame crime? When did the
media began to use racial codewords to prime racial attitudes in crime coverage?
Finally, are there other types of strategic messages in media coverage of crime that
scholars have overlooked?
1. Constructing measures of strategic messages in the news media
The concept of interest in this research is the frequency and type of strategic messages
within the news media. Although strategic messages can emanate from public officials,
interest groups, or other citizens, it is unlikely that these messages directly influence
the public as a whole. Instead, these messages are more likely filtered through the
mass media from their original sources and into the public sphere. The media is
viewed as an important independent actor within the political system. The term
“independent” in this sense, however, does not mean the media is not influenced by
external actors or events—it certainly is. Instead, the use of the term independent
only means that the media has its own set of goals, objectives, and incentives in
reporting the news. These include adhering to journalistic norms, establishing a
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professional reputation or niche, increasing readership, and maximizing profits. Thus,
the news media makes it’s own unique contribution to the political system in choosing
1) what stories to report and 2) the content of those stories. Other actors in the
political system can and will sometimes influence both of these, but the media almost
always maintains discretion in choosing what stories to cover and what content to
include in those stories.
So how do we go about measuring strategic communication within the mass me-
dia? Ideally, we could observe each strategic message in all stories about crime from
every news outlet and each type of media. In practice, it is impossible to systemati-
cally observe the complete range of media coverage on any issue for any single time
period. The various forms of media (i.e., radio, newspapers, magazines, television,
and the internet), complex and numerous media markets, and the sheer volume of
stories make observing media coverage of an issue a daunting task. Examining media
coverage across a large time period of over fifty years adds to this complexity. Even
if an analyst were to obtain the entire universe of news stories on an issue like crime,
sorting through the population of news coverage for each type of strategic message
would take an immense amount of time and resources. The solution taken by all
researchers that utilize media data is to extract a sample of media coverage, a slice
or small portion, that hopefully represents to some degree the population or universe
of media coverage.
Unfortunately, a representative sample is impossible due to limitations in data
availability in most sources of media data. Scholars have to compromise between
the data that they need and the data that is available. For most of this research a
relevance sample of New York Times stories about crime is taken from the ProQuest
Historical Archives of the New York Times for the years 1950 to 1969 and the Lexis
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Nexis academic database for the years 1970 to 2006.1 The New York Times is one of
the longest running media sources in the U.S. having been available in print since 1851
and its online archive spans the entire time period of interest. For each year, the first
1,000 articles with the most relevance to the search term “crime” were downloaded
from the ProQuest and Lexis Nexis databases. The stories obtained from ProQuest
were scanned using Readiris Pro 11.5 Optimal Character Recognition software in
order to produce text files of each article. This procedure yeilded slightly less than
56,000 articles regarding crime from 1950 to 2006.2 The search was purposively broad
to capture the wide-range of articles, editorials, and events relating to crime. The
broadness of the search also helps avoid any selection biases that might occur based
on contemporary meanings of crime or changes in legal statutes that redefine criminal
behavior over time. The decision to use the most relevant 1,000 articles was made
to provide a large sample of stories and ensure any changes in message frequency are
not simply a function of changes in the frequency of crime news (see Woolley 2000).
Note the sample takes entire articles rather than using the New York Times indexes
of stories or the abstracts since the concept of interest is the content of these stories.
However, the stories do vary in length from a single paragraph to multiple pages.
Whenever appropriate, the analysis will control variation in the length of crime news
by analyzing the frequency of strategic messages per the total amount of text devoted
to crime news for each year.
1The New York Times archive in the Lexis Nexis database is not available prior
to 1970 requiring the use of the ProQuest Historical Archives of the New York Times
for the years prior to 1970. In order to ensure that both databases returned equiv-
alent articles, searches were completed for both databases for the year 1970. The
comparison of these searches resulted in the same articles supporting the reliability
of the searches within both databases.
2Articles regarding “war crimes” and book reviews relating to crime were excluded
from the analysis due to their lack of relevance.
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There are several potential problems with using a sample of stories from the New
York Times. Using a newspaper ignores other types of media such as television, radio,
and the internet. However, data archives for these other types of media outlets are
unavailable for the entire time-period of interest. Transcripts of radio archives are
almost non-existent and few news radio shows continue to be broadcast consistently
over time. Television news media also suffers from these same problems. For instance,
the Vanderbilt Television News archives contains television broadcasts from 1968 to
the present. Thus, it omits important time periods such as the 1964 presidential
campaign, urban unrest in the summer of 1967, and the relatively low crime era of
the 1950s. Television also underwent major changes in viewership during this same
time period, while newspaper readership has remained fairly constant over-time.3
Most major newspaper archives are only available from the 1980s, while major news
magazines like Newsweek are available online from 1975. Finally, the proliferation
of the internet as a major news source is a relatively recent phenomenon making it
unsuitable as a source for data of the over time coverage of crime. Thus, the Times
readership is relatively stable across the time period of interest.
Another potential problem is that the New York Times may not be representa-
tive of all newspapers in the U.S. The coverage of crime may systematically differ in
frequency and content from other newspapers in different parts of the country. For
instance, there is some evidence that the New York Times has a slight tendency to
cover local stories around the New York area more than other media outlets (Myers
and Caniglia 2004). However, several studies suggest that the New York Times is the
most reliable and valid newspaper source when using media data because it reports
3Newspaper readership has declined over the last several years with the increase
in internet news sources. However, the New York Times was one of the first major
newspapers to establish an online presence receiving 18 million unique readers to its
website each month (Bianco, Rossant and Gard 2005).
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on the same stories that other national and local media outlets cover and maintains
an agenda-setting influence on other media outlets (Taylor and Jodice 1983, Jackman
and Boyd 1979, Paige 1975, Olzak 1992). Several studies show that the addition of
alternative media sources to measure political events and information do not substan-
tially differ from those obtained if the New York Times is the sole media measure
(Jackman and Boyd 1979, Jenkins and Perrow 1977) (but see Woolley 2000). For in-
stance, Myers and Caniglia (2004) find that media coverage of urban riots were similar
in the New York Times, Washington Post and several local newspapers. In regards
to crime and punishment, Baumgartner, De Boef and Boydstun (2008) compare the
coverage of the death penalty in the New York Times to ten other newspapers and
find no substantial difference in the over-time dynamics of media coverage among
the different outlets. Both the amount of coverage and the content of coverage were
similar to the New York Times for each of the ten newspapers. Thus, the decision to
use the New York Times is due to both the relevance of its coverage, its tendency to
publish stories similar to those in other newspapers, and because it is the single best
source of information on crime and punishment news available.
Finally, the use of this single source of media coverage does not assume that the
New York Times directly influences public opinion regarding crime and punishment.
Instead, the Times is a measure or indicator of media coverage over time. Like all
measures, using the Times is not perfect because it contains both random error that
is uncontrollable and the systematic errors described above. However, alternative
measures of media coverage also contain systematic errors and the arguments above
demonstrate that the Times is possibly the best measure to minimize those errors.
Furthermore, the Times is useful as a measure because over half of its readership lies
outside of New York unlike most daily newspapers. Since the interest of this research
is national public sentiment towards crime and punishment, a media outlet that is
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read by a substantial portion of the entire nation is preferable to a media outlet that
is local in its readership. As long as these limitations are kept in mind, it is possible
to proceed to analyzing the nature of crime coverage.
1.1. Agenda-setting: The frequency of crime coverage
The first type of strategic communication that we need to address is agenda-setting—
that is we need to assess the volume of crime coverage over time. The agenda-setting
hypothesis states that the more stories about an issue, the more important that issue
will become in the minds of the public. We could take the sample of stories in the
New York Times described above and use the frequency of words in crime stories to
measure the frequency of text devoted to crime over time. That is the method used
to derive Figure 1, which shows annual data from 1950 to 2006 with the year on the
x-axis and the frequency of words in crime stories within the New York Times on the
y-axis. Using this measure, we see that media attention to crime is relatively stable
from 1950 to 1980. After 1980, this measure shows a dramatic increase in the amount
of text devoted to crime news. The average amount of text in crime stories went from
100,000 a year from 1950 to 1980 to over 700,000 a year from 1980 to 2006. Thus,
according to this measure there are two distinct periods of news coverage that have
their own equilibrium means with minor variation around the first period and quite
a bit more variation around the second period starting in 1980. Yet, this measure
is flawed in several aspects. The selection of the first 1,000 crime stories artificially
bounds the number of words devoted to crime each year. Second, the measure does
not control for increases in the total amount of space in the New York Times. Woolley
(2000) notes that the total number of pages in the Times has grown over the last 50
years, thus the growth in attention to crime might be misrepresented by this measure.
The changes in the amount of text given to crime news might be a function of changes
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Figure 1. Text devoted to crime in the New York Times, 1950 to 2006
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in the amount of space of the entire newspaper.
An alternative measure, and the one used throughout the remainder of this re-
search, samples from the total number of crimes stories in the New York Times from
the Times ’ index of stories. The sample of crime stories each year is divided by the
total number of pages in the Times each year to control for changes in newspaper
space that might distort how much crime news dominated the agenda.4 This method
controls for the over-time growth in the number of pages in the Times providing a
sense of how crime fit onto the Times agenda relative to other potential issues. Al-
though the measure relies on the New York Times index, research shows that the
4The data used here were originally collected by Frank R. Baumgartner and
Bryan D. Jones, with the support of National Science Foundation grant number SBR
9320922, and were distributed through the Department of Government at the Uni-
versity of Texas at Austin and/or the Department of Political Science at Penn State
University. Neither NSF nor the original collectors of the data bear any responsibility
for the analysis reported here.
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Figure 2. Crime coverage in the New York Times, 1950 to 2006
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indexes correspond to the full text articles. For instance, Althaus, Edy and Phalen
(2001) examine New York Times coverage of the 1986 Libya crisis and find that ana-
lyzing the indexes and full text stories results in parallel coverage of the issue. Figure
2 shows the attention to crime by the New York Times from 1950 to 2006. The data
are annual for each plot with the year shown along the x-axis. The first plot shows
the raw frequency of crime stories in the Times on the y-axis. The second plot shows
the proportion of crime stories to the total amount of pages in the Times on the
y-axis.
Note that our interest is not in the total distribution of stories, but in the over
time movement in attention to crime. Crime coverage in the 1950s appears to be
relatively modest. The peak of attention to crime occurs right where we would expect
it to be—during the first two years of the decade when the Kefauver Committee or
74
the Senate Special Committee to Investigate Crime in Interstate Commerce first met
to deal with organized crime. The committee traveled all over the country and held
several prominent hearings regarding crime and corruption in the U.S. After this
period, the attention to crime slowly decreases reaching its lowest points in 1958 and
again in 1962. The attention to crime shows a small increase in 1964 during the
presidential campaign of Barry Goldwater and Lyndon B. Johnson in which crime
became a major issue. Despite the elite attention to crime during the mid-1960s,
media attention to crime remained at relatively low levels.
The major shift in attention to crime occurs in 1967. Prior to 1967 about 2% of
New York Times stories focused on crime. After 1967, media attention jumps to over
3% in 1967 and continues to increase steadily into the 1970s. The shift in attention
to crime in 1967 is consistent with historical accounts of the urban and racial riots
during the long hot summer of 1967 being portrayed as criminal behavior rather than
social protest. Following this year, the attention to crime continues to increase as
the issue of “law and order” becomes a common feature of the American political
landscape. Even the escalation of conflict in Vietnam does not seem to reduce the
attention given to crime during this period.
Although the coverage of crime decreases when we examine the raw number of
stories, it remains fairly steady throughout the 1980s when we adjust for the total
number of pages in print. Increases in attention to crime occur in 1984 and 1985
starting with the second presidential campaign of President Ronald Reagan. This
coverage also follows alongside the crack cocaine epidemic that was associated with
criminal activity in large urban areas and eventually into rural America. Attention
to crime experiences a major increase into 1988 during the presidential campaign
of George H. W. Bush and Michael Dukakis. The issue of crime became a focal
point of the election when the Bush campaign ran advertisements criticizing Dukakis
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as a supporter of state prison furlough programs. The program in Massachusetts
where Dukakis was governor was criticized for the temporary release of a convicted
murderer, Willie Horton, who committed a rape and assault while on furlough in
Maryland. The Horton advertisements brought newfound attention to crime and
punishment that superseded other issues during the election.
Attention to crime subsided slightly in 1990 and 1991 as attention probably
shifted to the first Gulf War with Iraq. However, the 1992 presidential campaign
brought crime back into the national spotlight as both candidates supported “get
tough” approaches to crime. In a well publicized political maneuver, Democratic pres-
idential nominee William Jefferson Clinton flew back to his home state of Arkansas
where he was governor to oversee the execution of a convicted murderer, Ricky Ray
Rector. Rector, a black male, was functionally retarded and the trip by Clinton was
largely seen as an opportunistic move to increase his image as a supporter of tough
criminal justice policies.
The next major spike in crime coverage, the largest of the entire series, occurs
in 1998. This is the same year that 35 death row exonerees met at Northwestern
University’s School of Law for the National Conference on Wrongful Convictions
and the Death Penalty. The conference highlighting the use of DNA to exonerate
wrongfully convicted criminals attracting national attention to the death penalty
and issues revolving around crime and punishment. Within a few years, Governor
George Ryan declared a moratorium on executions in the state of Illinois. Afterwards,
attention to crime shows decreases to an equilibrium level as the War on Terrorism
and the War in Iraq dominate the news.
Thus, it becomes clear that attention to crime and attempts to put crime on the
public agenda is not constant. It contains a great deal of variation over time. Some
of this variation is predictable such as the increase attention to crime in the late
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1960s and during the 1988 presidential election. At other times, however, the media’s
attention to crime does not live up to the expectations of conventional wisdom. Per-
haps most shocking of all is the large amount of crime coverage in 1998. Very few, if
any, scholars have identified this period as a pivotal moment when attention shifted
to crime. It remains to be seen if media attention to crime shapes public sentiment
toward punitive policies.
1.2. Analyzing strategic messages in media content
To uncover the nature of strategic messages within crime news requires a little more
work than sampling the frequency of stories about crime and punishment. Instead, it
requires examining the content of each story. An automated content analysis of the
sample of New York Times stories about crime was conducted to assess the frequency
of various strategic messages within crime news. The automated content analysis is
the preferred method for analyzing large amounts of text because of its accuracy and
efficiency. Hand coding large amounts of texts results in human errors that arise
from fatigue or subjective judgments. Automated content analysis eliminates these
human induced errors increasing the reliability of the data. The automated process
also requires less resources and time to compute through large amounts of text.
An automated content analysis relies on well-constructed dictionaries of each
concept. These dictionaries consist of a list of words or expressions that comprise each
type of strategic message and extracts each instance of these messages when applied
to a text. To ensure the reliability and validity of each measure, dictionaries for each
type of strategic message (persuasion, racial frames, racial primes) were constructed
in a systematic manner as recommended by Krippendorff (2004). Dictionaries were
also constructed for three additional crime frames that were thought to permeate
media coverage of crime and may influence punitive sentiment: juvenile delinquency
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frames, organized crime frames, and violent crime messages. Thus, a total of six
dictionaries were created using the following process:
• An initial list of words and expressions relating to the theoretical concept were
compiled for each dictionary using secondary sources such as academic research
and historical narratives of crime.
• The initial list of words and expressions were expanded using Webster’s Dic-
tionary and Thesaurus leading to the refinement of each dictionary and the
addition of alternative words and phrases relating to the theoretical construct.
• A random sample of 655 Newsweek articles were downloaded from the Lexis
Nexis academic database using the search-word “crime.” The articles span the
years 1975 to 2006. Each of these articles were hand-coded by the author apply-
ing the rules of each dictionary on this sample of text. Any words or expressions
that could not be disambiguated across multiple articles were removed from the
dictionaries. Thus, any dictionary entry that did not convey a clear meaning
within multiple articles was deleted. The reading of these sub-samples of me-
dia coverage of crime also led to the discovery of additional words and phrases
associated with each concept that were added to the respective dictionary.
• Using an automated content analysis software, Yoshikoder, the final dictionaries
were applied to a random sample of 100 Washington Post articles taken from
the Lexis-Nexis database using the search-word “crime.” The results of this
automated content analysis were manually examined using the concordance
function within Yoshikoder to ensure that each dictionary entry captured the
concept of interest correctly, the ability of the dictionaries to pick up on complex
variations in strategic messages such as changes in capitalization, hyphenation,
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plural usages of words, and that alternative meanings of dictionary entries did
not dominate media coverage of crime.
• Once the dictionaries were validated, they were applied to the sample of almost
56,000 “crime” stories from the New York Times using the Yoshikoder software
developed by the Identity Project at Harvard’s Weatherhead Center for Inter-
national Affairs. The frequency of each strategic message and the proportion
of strategic messages per the total amount of text were extracted for each year
providing measures of the content of New York Times coverage of crime from
1950 to 2006.
1.3. Racial appeals
Of particularly interest is strategic messages using either explicit racial appeals that
frame crime as a problem among “blacks” and more covert racial appeals that prime
race using codewords and symbolic language. Racial frames are explicit attempts
to define crime as a problem among black Americans. Racial frames describe crim-
inal behavior as a problem within black communities or connect specific criminal
activity to black Americans. The media is using an explicit racial frame whenever
it reminds readers that crime is being committed by blacks and is occurring in pre-
dominately black neighborhoods. For instance, a New York Times story with the
opening paragraph stating that “[a]lthough Negroes make up only about 4 percent
of Milwaukee’s population of 764,000 they committed 43 percent of the city’s ma-
jor crimes” is a good example of a racial frame. The initial dictionary of racial
frames was derived from consulting academic research on racial frames (Gilens 2000,
Kellstedt 2003, Mendelberg 2001) and historical accounts of racial frames in crime
news (Mann 1993, Stabile 2006, Walker, Spohn and DeLone 1996). The racial frame
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dictionary was validated according to the previous defined rules. The final dictionary
for racial frames included phrases that use the words black, African American, or
negro to modify words associated with crime such as criminal, offender, drug dealer,
and suspect and phrases such as theft, crime, rape, or robbery by blacks, African
Americans, or negros. The construction of specific phrases or word stems helps pre-
vent false-positives by avoiding general terms like “black” that can be used to describe
non-criminal actions or objects such as a “black car” or a “black book.” It also avoids
coding messages where blacks are mentioned in crime news, but not as criminals such
as when there are “black victims” or “black witnesses.” However, a story mentioning
“black-on-black” crime would be included as a racial frame since a black person is
being described as the offender.
Racial primes are implicit attempts to covertly connect crime with black Amer-
icans through the use of racial codewords or symbols and subsequently prime nega-
tive racial stereotypes and beliefs. Racial primes convey a similar meaning as racial
frames—that blacks are criminals or blacks are violent—except racial primes do not
explicitly use racial nouns or adjectives (Mendelberg 2001, 9). A separate dictio-
nary of racial primes was devised by consulting multiple texts and articles detail-
ing various covert racial primes associated with crime and punishment (Edsall and
Edsall 1992, Gilliam and Iyengar 2000, Hurwitz and Peffley 2005, Mendelberg 2001,
Stabile 2006, Valentino 1999) and then validated according to the rules in the previous
section. The final dictionary of racial primes included words and phrases that have
been empirically shown to prime racial stereotypes and attitudes within the context
of crime news such as “urban crime,” “inner city,” “ghetto,” “street crime,” “crime
in the streets,” and “slums.” None of the racial prime messages explicitly mention
blacks, African Americans, or negroes.
Although the dictionaries for each type of racial appeal are not exhaustive of the
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Figure 3. Racial frames in the New York Times, 1950 to 2006
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entire universe of possible racial appeals within the news media, these dictionaries
seem to cover the most frequently used racial appeals. However, the inability to
create a complete list of racial appeals will provide conservative estimates of the total
frequency of racial appeals over time. However, the primary interest in this research is
how changes in strategic messages over time shape the dynamics of punitive sentiment.
Thus, the raw frequency or cross-sectional distributions of strategic messages are less
important than the over time variation of various appeals. Thus, these indicators will
be valid as long as each measure captures the relative change in each type of strategic
message from year-to-year.
Figure 3 shows two plots of racial frames within the New York Times coverage
of crime from 1950 to 2006. The year is shown on the x-axis for each plot. The
frequency and percentage of racial frames are shown along the y-axes, respectively.
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What are the dynamics of racial frames in the Times coverage from 1950 to
2006? Examining the raw frequency of racial frames there appears to be only few
instances of explicit racial frames linking blacks to crime in the 1950s. Although a
few years show instances of racial frames in crime news, the modal crime news story
does not appear to use explicit racial frames. The 1960s also show very few crime
stories that use racial frames. A dramatic increase in the use of racial frames does
occur in the late 1960s. The number of racial frames increases from 4 in 1966 to 57
in 1967. However, that number drops down to 13 in 1968 and continues around that
low frequency throughout the 1970s. The use of racial frames seems to increase after
1980. The number of racial frames reaches its peak in 1987 with 83 total messages
linking crime to blacks which is double the amount of racial frames from the previous
year. Between 1998 and 1992 there is an average of 50 racial frames in the Times
coverage of crime. The use racial frames varies from 11 to 43 between the years
1999 and 2006. Thus, the use of racial frames appears to be more prevalent in crime
news after 1980, which is contrary to expectations. There is very little evidence that
racial frames were a dominant component of crime news in the 1950s and 1960s by
examining the raw frequencies of racial frames.
Yet, when the series is adjusted to control for changes in the amount of text
given to crimes news, the dynamics of the series change. Strategic messages linking
crime to black Americans become more prevalent in 1956, 1957, and 1960—the same
period when Congress was debating Civil Rights legislation. Previous research shows
that politicians were using racial frames linking integration and racial equality among
blacks to criminal behavior among black Americans (Murakawa 2005, Weaver 2007).
The media might have picked up on these messages and transmitted them within
their coverage of crime during these years. This series continues to show the same
increase in racial frames in 1967 when protests and urban riots where linked to crime
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Figure 4. Racial primes in the New York Times, 1950 to 2006
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and lawlessness among blacks. Unlike the raw frequency series, the number of racial
frames does not appear to be a dominant message in contemporary coverage of crime
once the series is adjusted for the total amount of text devoted to crime. Thus, the
increase in racial frames after 1980 appears to be a function of the increase in the
amount of text dedicated to crime news in the Times. Regardless of whether racial
frames are adjusted for the amount of space dedicated to crime news, the use of racial
messages linking blacks to crime remains low across the entire series although it is
unclear if social norms for racial equality or some other force is constraining the use
of these explicit frames.
The use of racial primes in media coverage of crime, shown in Figure 4, is more
prevalent than the use of racial frames. Prior to 1967, the Times rarely used racial
primes in crime news. The average number of primes in the 1950s is 11.3 per year.
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That number increases to an average of 16 per year from 1960 to 1967. It is possible
that the majority of racial primes did not have the ability to prime racial attitudes
during this era, which could explain their lack of use. After 1967, the Times begins
to rely on racial primes in its crime coverage. There were a total of 80 racial primes
in 1967 and 143 racial primes in 1968. The number of racial primes remains steady
during the 1970s at an average of 36 racial primes a year. The proliferation of implicit
messages priming racial stereotypes in crime news shows a steady increase during the
1980s. This is during the same era where conservatives began using racial codewords
and images to describe welfare recipients as black (Gilens 2000). Compared to the
11.3 annual racial primes in the 1950s, the 1980s saw an average of 325 racial primes
in the New York Times’ crime coverage. Examining the number of racial primes per
the total amount of text dedicated to crime news shows similar trends over time.
Racial primes were rarely utilized during the 1950s, show a dramatic increase from
1967 to 1968, and have been used steadily since the 1980s. The adjusted series does
show a small decline in the number of racial primes in crime stories beginning around
1998 and continuing until the end of the series in 2006.
Does the use of one type of strategic message preclude the use of another type of
strategic message? In other words, can political actors like politicians or in this case
the news media use both types of strategic messages to connect blacks to crime or do
they vary their strategy over time replacing one type of message when another type of
appeal seems ineffective? To get a general since of the use of each type of message over
time requires a measure of association for the entire period of time. The correlation
coefficient between the frequency of racial frames and frequency of racial primes is 0.77
(p < .01) suggesting a fairly strong association between the use of racial frames and
racial primes. The correlation coefficient between the proportion of racial frames and
the proportion of racial primes per the total amount of text dedicated to crime news
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is 0.49 (p < .01), which also suggests a moderately strong correlation. Furthermore,
the visual examination of each series shows dramatic increases in the use of each type
of racial message in crime news around 1967 and a more gradual increase starting in
the 1980s. It appears that when an actor such as the media wants to connect black
Americans to crime, it will engage in both the use of framing and priming to influence
the public. Using both types of messages might be more effective at reaching different
audiences with the same message or could just reflect objective conditions regarding
what is actually happening in the streets—a topic explored further at the end of this
chapter.
One shocking conclusion from examining the use of racial messages in crime news
is that the use of explicit racial frames directly describing black Americans as criminal,
lawless, and engaging in anti-social behavior is not very prominent in media coverage
of crime. These findings contradict a great deal of speculation by scholars and popular
pundits that blacks are typically portrayed as criminals in crime news. However, these
findings are supported by past empirical research. After examining media coverage for
a year in multiple print and television outlets Graber (1980) concludes that assertions
that the media explicitly show criminals as non-white villains engaging in criminal
behavior is erroneous. Sheley and Ashkins (1981) also find race is rarely mentioned in
crime news in their study of a New Orleans Times-Picayune newspaper. The question
of whether or not racial frames disappeared from media coverage of crime after norms
of racial equality were established is moot. Racial frame never were that prevalent
to begin with and are rarely used. Instead, the dominate form of racial messages in
media coverage of crime is implicit racial codewords that prime racial stereotypes.
The frequency of racial primes is substantially higher than the use of racial frames
across the entire period of this research. When the media were using approximately
30 racial frames per year in crime news, they were also using an average of 200 racial
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primes in those same stories. When the number of racial frames increases to an
average of 50 per year, the average number of racial primes increases to an average
of 400 a year. Thus, the use of racial primes is the dominant form of racial appeal in
crime news.
1.4. Persuasive messages in stories about crime
A persuasive message is defined in this research as a direct appeal to change the
belief content of an attitude. Persuasive appeals explicitly attach a belief or kernel
of knowledge to the valence component—the favorable or unfavorable evaluation—of
an attitude object. For instance, the argument that people should support tougher
sentencing because it serves as a deterrent to crime is a pro-punitive strategic message.
It directly links the deterrent effect of sentencing (the belief content) to support (the
valence component) for tougher penalties (the attitude object). An argument asking
someone to oppose capital punishment because of biases in the judicial system is an
anti-punitive strategic message linking the belief content (biases in the justice system)
to a valence component (opposition) of an attitude object (capital punishment). The
explicit connection of the belief to the attitude object is important. Sending a message
that blacks are criminals is not a persuasive appeal regarding punitive policies because
there is no connection between the belief that blacks are criminals to the attitude
object of punitive policies. An argument asking someone to favor punitive policies
because blacks are criminals is a persuasive appeal for more punitive policies because
there is a connection between the belief that blacks are criminals and support for
punitive policies.5
5Note that the belief that blacks are criminals could be an attitude object. In this
case, an argument that blacks are lazy or blacks have no morals could be a belief
component trying to change the evaluation that blacks are criminals.
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The content analysis of persuasive messages in crime coverage of the New York
Times crime stories examined the count of pro-punitive messages and anti-punitive
messages. A pro-punitive appeal is an explicit attempt by the author or a figure
highlighted in the article making a specific comment supporting punitive policies for
any reason. An anti-punitive appeal is an explicit attempt by the author or a figure
highlighted in the article that makes a specific comment opposing punitive policies
due to any reason. The connection between the belief content and attitude object
must be explicit in the message. The coding of persuasive messages required the
construction of twelve general arguments that could be used either for or against
punitive policies. These general categories include:
• the ability of a policy to deter future criminal behavior
• the ability of a policy to rehabilitate criminals
• the ability of a policy to provide retribution or vengeance
• the morality of punitive policies (mention of values or religion)
• the ability of a policy to incapacitate criminals
• comparison with other policies
• procedural fairness including racial biases and wrongful convictions
• constitutionality of a policy
• the costs of a policy
• general efficacy or inefficacy statement (i.e., new study finds punishment effec-
tive/ineffective)
• miscellanous appeals
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Figure 5 shows the net tone of persuasive messages in the New York Times stories
of crime from 1950 to 2006. The year is shown along the x-axis of both plots. The y-
axis of the first plot shows the frequency of pro-punitive persuasive arguments minus
the frequency of anti-punitive persuasive arguments. The second plot adjusts for the
total amount of text dedicated to crime coverage. The net total of persuasive appeals
is analyzed under the assumption that pro and con arguments should cancel each other
out within a given time period. Each plot shows similar dynamics with the adjusted
series showing less variation than the raw frequency series. During the 1950s and
1960s, persuasive messages tended to be even in news coverage of crime with a slight
tendency to favor anti-punitive arguments. However, starting in the 1970s the net tone
of persuasive messages tended to favor punitive policies. The latter is consistent with
the well-known “law and order” rhetoric of the period and the public backlash against
activist judges during this era. The number of pro-persausive messages declines in
the early 1980s showing a small increase in the late 1980s. The tone of persuasive
messages turns toward an anti-punitive direction in the late 1990s. This change is
consistent with the increase in arguments opposing the death penalty because the
increase use in DNA analysis has exonerated a large number of previously convicted
criminals (Baumgartner, De Boef and Boydstun 2008, Gross and Ellsworth 2001).
1.5. Alternative crime frames
A series of alternative crime frames and narratives were also extracted using individual
dictionaries for each frame. The 1940s and 1950s are seen as a time when public fervor
over crime committed by teenagers led to an increase in media coverage framing crime
as a problem among juvenile delinquents (Bailey and Hale 1998). Recent research
suggests that media coverage “blaming children” for social unrest can create a moral
panic leading to a more punitive state (Schissel 1997). Estrada (2001) finds that
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Figure 5. Persuasive messages in the New York Times, 1950 to 2006
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media coverage of juvenile crime in Western Europe transformed from focusing on
petty crimes such as theft to more violent crimes. The shift in coverage has led to a
growing concern that juvenile crime is getting out of control and requires a punitive
response. A juvenile delinquency frame explicitly attempts to link crime with the
behavior of teenagers and younger generations. For example, a Times storying stating
that “[t]he recent outburst of juvenile violence in New York . . . has become a cause
of grave concern for the entire community” is a juvenile delinquency crime frame.
Juvenile delinquency frames often contain messages pairing words like “juvenile,”
“teenage(r),” and “youth” with words like “crime,” “criminal,” “delinquent,” and
“offender.”
The juvenile delinquency dictionary was applied to the entire sample of New
York Times crime stories. Figure 6 shows both the raw frequency of juvenile crime
messages and the frequency of messages per the total amount of crime coverage in
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Figure 6. Juvenile delinquency frames in the New York Times, 1950 to 2006
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New York Times from 1950 to 2006. The frequencies are shown on the y-axis and the
year is shown along the x-axis. The raw frequency plot shows that messages framing
crime as a problem among juvenile delinquents is relatively prevalent in the news
media. Peaks in the raw frequency of these frames occur in the late 1950s, the early
1980s, and throughout the 1990s. However, when we examine the total number of
juvenile crime frames per the total amount of crime coverage the dominance of juvenile
delinquency frames in the 1950s becomes clear. Linking crime to the activities of
teenagers dominates news coverage of crime in the 1950s and early 1960s. The phrase
“youth crime” was a particularly dominant message in the late 1950s crime stories
and many stories discuss attempts to curb delinquency with new legislation. After
1965, the use of the juvenile delinquency frame dwindle to trivial amounts and rarely
appear in contemporary media coverage of crime.
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Figure 7. Organized crime messages in the New York Times, 1950 to 2006
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Another popular journalist narrative to frame crime is the focus on organized
crime. Attributing crime to criminal organizations such as the mafia is a dominate
crime frame because it captures the attention of the public by providing an intriguing
crime narrative. The abundance and success of Hollywood films focusing on organized
crime such as The Godfather, Goodfellas, On the Waterfront, and Scarface demon-
strates how popular the genre is with the public. Thus, there is a clear incentive for
journalists to report stories on organized crime.
How prevalent are messages that link organized crime to criminal activity? A
dictionary of organized crime messages was composed in the same fashion as the
other dictionaries. Stories about organized crime contain words or phrases such as
“mobsters,” the “mafia,” “waterfront crime,” and “organized crime.” The frequency
of organized crime messages in the New York Times coverage of crime from 1950 to
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2006 is shown in Figure 7. The x-axis shows the year. The frequency is shown on the
y-axis of the first plot, while the frequency per total coverage is shown on the y-axis
of the second plot.
Examining the raw frequency of organized crime messages shows that the peak of
coverage occured during the 1980s as the FBI and law enforcement agencies began to
prosecute organized crime members on a large scale using the Racketeering Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) statutes. The shakeup and dismantling of
organized crime families across the country led to Hollywood style mafia wars and
murders that made headlines across the country. John Gotti, in particular, became a
darling of the media as he rose to the top of the Gambino crime family by murdering
the previous Gambino head Paul Castellano. Gotti’s subsequent arrest and conviction
in 1992 also contributed to high levels of media coverage of organized crime. The
frequency of organized crime frames per the total coverage of crime shows similar
inclines in coverage during the 1980s with a decline thereafter, but it also shows a
large number of messages in the early 1950s were focused on organized crime. In
fact the peak of coverage on organized crime was in the early 1950s. This reflects
several high profile government commissions to end waterfront crime at U.S. ports of
entry that were infiltrating unions and resulted in several high profile prosecutions
and murders.
Another type of strategic message that should permeate crime news is messages
about violent crime. The focus on violent crimes in the mass media is believed
to have several effects on the mass public. The most prominent is the connection
between violent crime in the media and violent behavior among individuals (Anderson,
Berkowitz, Donnerstein, Huesmann, Johnson, Linz, Malamuth and Wartella 2004).
Moreover, violent crime is overrepresented in media coverage of crime leading the
public to think crime is higher and more dangerous than more objective measures
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Figure 8. Violent crime messages in the New York Times, 1950 to 2006
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of crime (Garofalo 1981, Bushman and Anderson 2001). The media construction of
crime as violent could also lead to greater support among the public for punitive
policies (Brownstein 2000). The violent crime dictionary consists of words describing
certain violent crimes such as “murder,” “rape,” “stabbing,” and “shooting,” but
also phrases such as “violent crime,” “high murder rate”, and “increase number of
shootings.” The type of crimes listed in the dictionary are taken directly from the
Uniform Crime Reports’ Violent Crime Index.
The results of the content analysis of violent messages in New York Times cover-
age of crime from 1950 to 2006 is shown in Figure 8. The x-axis for both plots shows
the year. The first plot shows the raw frequency of violent messages on the y-axis
and the second plot shows the frequency of violent messages per total coverage on
the y-axis. Violent crime messages appear to be the most frequent type of message in
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the New York Times coverage of crime from 1950 to 2006. The frequency of violent
crime messages outnumbers racial primes, racial frames, mentions of organized crime,
persuasive messages, and juvenile crime frames. Historically, violent crime messages
were relatively low during the 1950s and 1960s. On average, a few hundred violent
crime mentions were in crime stories for each year during these decades. By 1990, the
Times was featuring over 2000 violent messages each year in its coverage of crime.
Examining the frequency of crime messages per the total amount of coverage shows
that in the 1950s and 1960s, violent crime messages moved around a stable equilib-
rium of about 1,500 violent crime messages a year. However, the post-1970 series
shows a clear break in that equilibrium as the frequency of violent crime messages
trends upward. Two conclusions can be drawn from this data: 1) messages that crime
is violent is prevalent in media coverage of crime and 2) these violent crime messages
have been increasing over time.
2. What determines media coverage of crime?
One last question pertains to the extent that media coverage of crime reflects actual
criminal behavior. A common view is that media coverage of crime grossly exaggerates
actual criminal conditions. Certain crimes such as violent crimes, drug offenses, and
high profile murders are seen as receiving a disproportionate amount of coverage in
the media (Fishman 1978, Sherizen 1978, Sorenson and Manz 1998). Media coverage
of crime is also criticized for overrepresenting blacks and other minorities as criminals
(Dixon and Linz 2000, Entman and Rojecki 2000, Gomes and Williams 1990, Russell
1998, Zilber and Niven 2000). Since the public receives a great deal of its political
information from the media, it is important to understand the extent that information
reflects reality. Why is there so much variation in the messages reported in the news
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media regarding crime? Does crime coverage reflect objective crime conditions or
does the media socially construct problems disproportionately to what is occurring in
society. How much does the content of media coverage of crime reflect elite attention
to crime? Does public concern for crime alter the content of crime news? This next
section describes a theory of media coverage based on the goals and incentives of
politicians, the public, and the news media. Then a model is derived from this theory
and tested using the above media data on racial messages, violent crime messages,
and juvenile crime messages in New York Times coverage of crime.
2.1. A theory of media attention to crime
The theory of media coverage that I propose posits three actors in the political system:
Public officials, the mass media, and the public. Each of these actors has their own
set of goals and objectives that lead to various interactions that determine the content
of the news. In addition, I assume that each of these actors behave in a manner that
they believe will help achieve their objectives. Thus, I employ a soft rational choice
approach that posits these actors engage in utility maximizing behavior. The central
argument I propose is that the media chooses to cover stories in a manner that fulfills
their objectives and goals in relation to the goals of the public and public officials.
What are the goals and objectives that each actor tries to achieve? Public officials
desire reelection and to enact their preferred policies into law (Arnold 1990, Mayhew
1974). In their attempt to achieve these goals they must gain popular support.
Gaining either electoral or policy support requires disseminating information that a
politician believes will benefit his or her agenda. Given the scant attention to politics
by the public (Delli-Carpini and Keeter 1996) and the costs of direct advertisements,
politicians need to use the news media to transmit their messages to the mass public.
However, public officials do not control the news media and cannot guarantee that the
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messages transmitted to the public by the media are the same messages that benefit
their political agenda. They need some means to increase the probability that their
preferred message is the same message the media transmits to the public. Politicians
can communicate their messages to the public via paid advertising (Jamieson 1996,
Nelson and Boynton 1997), but the ability of a politician to control the free press
remains vital to the success of that politicians’ objectives (Ansolabehere, Behr and
Iyengar 1991). Therefore, public officials will carefully craft their messages and try
to transmit them to the media in controlled environments such as speeches, press
releases, and pre-organized events.
In turn, the media have an incentive to utilize these elite signals. The news
media require reliable and accurate information on a regular basis. Limitations in
resources, internal constrains such as deadlines, and the desire for unique stories
leads reporters to rely on information from public officials. Public officials can provide
reliable information, quickly, and are privy to information that can make a mundane
story newsworthy. Thus, government sources serve as a primary source of information
on issues relating to politics (Bennett 1990, Gan 1980, Sigal 1973, Soley 1992).
• H1: Media coverage should follow elite attention to a subject
The public has an entirely different goal. The public desires information regard-
ing politics, but wants to make a minimal effort in acquiring that information. Ideally,
citizens would be well-informed on all the important policy issues of the day and the
positions on each candidate in order to make political decisions and judgments. Yet
there are several reasons why citizens have little incentive to engage in such an effort.
Citizens must balance the amount of time and resources spent on acquiring politi-
cal information with other individual and social needs such as working and leisure
activities. Further, there is very little payoff from most forms of political behavior
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leading Downs (1997 [1957]) to conclude that ignorance about politics is rational be-
havior. However, sometimes the public does want to be informed about politics for
either social desirability purposes, entertainment, because they have a sense of civic
duty, or because there is a higher probability of obtaining tangible benefits from a
policy. In these instances, the public wants information that will allow them to make
decisions as if they were fully informed, but without the effort needed to become
fully informed. So the goal of the public is to obtain political information that they
perceive as reliable, impartial, useful, and entertaining, but that requires very little
effort to obtain.
Above all else, the media’s goal is to maximize revenue through increasing read-
ership and subsequently advertising space. As the visibility of a news outlet increases,
advertisers will pay more to have their products seen by a larger number of consumers
leading to more profits for the news organization or parent corporation. Thus, the
media must in some respect pander to the desires of the public. Since the public wants
news that they perceive as objective, accurate, and entertaining, the media will tend
to report news that is based on objective conditions and provides an entertainment
value to the public. Accurate and objective reporting fulfills the media’s goal of “truth
in journalism” (Oliver and Maney 2000), but also ensures that the public will return
to that source the next time it requires information. The failure to report objective
and accurate information is therefore costly to the news media. Alternative media
outlets can expose false or misleading information leading to a decrease in public
reliance on a media outlet and loss in revenue. Therefore, the media is reliant on
objective information and are quick to retract stories with errors or falsifications due
to the potential backlash from the public, advertisers, and other media outlets.
• H2: Media attention to an issue should follow objective conditions relating to
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that issue
Reporters have individual goals to promote their own values, serve the public
interest, and advance in their career, but they must balance these goals with the
need to provide stories that will catch the public’s attention and remain objective.
Journalists also need to produce stories that are likely to catch the attention of a
passive media consumer that does not want to spend a great deal of time consum-
ing encyclopedic information. Things like protests, violent crime, natural disasters,
scandals, and events involving “novel” populations are seen as “newsworthy” stories
that entertain and inform the public (Oliver and Maney 2000). Scholars have found
that crime news is particularly newsworthy. Katz (1987) shows that public interest
in crime stories is higher than other types of political news and world events. The
ability of the public to recall crime news is also substantially higher than that of other
topics that regularly appear in the news such as social welfare issues, the economy,
healthcare, and the environment (Graber 1980, 50-51). Thus, crime news, particu-
larly violent crime and those involving unique populations or rare events, helps the
news media fulfill its goal of high readership with journalism that is interesting to the
public.
• H3: Media attention to an issue should follow public attention to an issue
2.2. Data and methods
The theory of media coverage seeks to explain what determines the content of media
coverage. To test the theory, I will examine media coverage of crime from 1971 to 2004
in the New York Times.6 I will test the theory using three different types of crime
6The time range is limited by the availability of data for the predictor variables.
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coverage: racial messages (racial frames and racial primes), violent crime messages,
and juvenile delinquency messages in crime news. The racial frames and racial primes
measures are shown in Figures 3 and 4, the violent crime news measure is shown in
Figure 8, and the coverage of juvenile crime is shown in Figure 6. Thus, I will have
multiple tests of the theory within the domain of crime news.
Each of the dependent variables should be associated with objective crime condi-
tions. Racial messages that explicitly or implicitly portray blacks as criminals should
be connected to actual crime committed by blacks. Violent crime messages should
be associated with the rate of violent crime in society. Juvenile delinquency messages
should correlate with the amount of crime being committed by Americans under the
age of 18. The percentage of blacks arrested for all crimes each year is used as a
measure of crimes committed by black Americans. The data is available for each year
from the Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics. The juvenile arrest rates from
the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention by the National Center
for Juvenile Justice are used as a measure of youth crimes committed by teenagers
under the age of 18.7 Finally, violent crimes are measured using the Uniform Crime
Report’s annual index of violent crimes. The index defines violent crime as any crime
that involves force or threat including murder, manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery,
and aggravated assault.8
In addition to actual crime conditions, crime news should be a function of elite
attention to crime. Elite attention to crime is measured using the number of crime
related messages in presidential speeches as reported in the Public Papers of the
President. Although any politician can craft specific messages regarding crime and
7Available online: http://ojjdp.ncjrs.org/ojstatbb/crime/excel/JAR 2008.xls.
8Note that the dictionary of violent crime messages matches the exact categories
of violent crime as described by the Uniform Crime Report.
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use the media to transmit these messages to the public, the most visible political actor
is the president. The president is also the ad hoc leader of his or her party and able to
influence other party members on high profile issues like crime. Furthermore, the use
of speeches rather than press releases and advertisements is the primary means that
presidents transmit their agenda to the media and the public (Kernell 2006). Thus,
presidential attention to crime should signal to other politicians, the news media, and
subsequently the public that crime is an important issue.
Finally, crime news should be responsive to public demand for crime news. Al-
though there is no direct measure of what the public wants from the news, we can
assume that an issue the public deems is important is also an issue that the public
would like to know more about. Thus, the more important an issue is seen by the
public, the more media attention should be given to that issue. The percentage of
respondents answering that “crime” is the “most important problem” facing the na-
tion each year to the Gallup poll is used as the measure of public concern for crime
under the assumption that the more concern for crime among the public, the more
demand for news coverage of the issue.9
2.3. Results: The content of crime news
A single-equation error correction model (ECM) estimated with ordinary least squares
regression is used to test the model of media coverage. The ECM for the bivariate
9The data used here were originally collected by Frank R. Baumgartner and
Bryan D. Jones, with the support of National Science Foundation grant number SBR
9320922, and were distributed through the Department of Government at the Uni-
versity of Texas at Austin and/or the Department of Political Science at Penn State
University. Neither NSF nor the original collectors of the data bear any responsibility
for the analysis reported here.
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case is:
∆Yt = α0 + α1yt−1 + β1Xt + β2Xt−1 + t (3.1)
where ∆ is the difference operator, Yt is the changes in media coverage modeled as a
function of the past value of media coverage Yt−1, the changes β1Xt and lagged levels
β2Xt−1 of a predictor variable, and an error term t. De Boef and Keele (2008) show
that the single-equation ECM is a simple reparameterization of the more familiar
autoregression distributed lag model (ADL). There are several benefits of using the
ECM versus a variant of an ADL model. First, the ECM does not place invalid
restrictions on the dynamics of the model and allows the direct estimation of both
long- and short-run relationships. Second, the ECM can be used with both stationary
and non-stationary data without leading to problems of spurious inferences.
So how well does the model estimate the dynamics of New York Times coverage
of crime? Table 1 shows the estimates of racial messages in crime coverage. The
first column shows the predictor variables: the lagged value of racial messages, the
percentage of blacks arrested for crimes, public concern for crime, and presidential
attention to crime. The second column shows the estimates of the number of racial
frames in Times crime news. Column three shows the estimates of the number of
racial prime messages in Times crime coverage. Column four shows the estimates of
an index of the total number of racial messages (both racial frames and racial primes)
in the Times coverage of crime.
For all three models, the number of blacks arrested has a positive and statisti-
cally significant relationship with the number of racial messages in crime news. An
increase in the number of blacks arrested for crime shows up in news coverage with an
immediate increase in the number of racial messages implicating blacks as criminals.
This relationship is robust showing up in the model of racial frames, racial primes,
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and the additive index of all racial messages. Furthermore, a change in the percentage
of blacks arrested does not occur entirely in the same year. The news will continue
to use messages framing blacks as criminals and using racial primes in future crime
news as indicated by the positive and statistically significant coefficients on all the
lagged levels of the percentage of blacks arrested measure. This relationship occurs
across all three models of racial messages in crime news. Thus, the past actions of
black criminals continue to have an effect on crime coverage that could result in a
cross-sectional bias towards overreporting blacks as criminals.
Public concern for crime does not appear to have any relationship with crime
news. The sign of the public concern coefficients are positive in the racial prime model
and the additive index model suggesting that more public concern for crime correlates
with more racial messages in crime coverage. However, the coefficients on the changes
and lagged levels of public concern for crime are statistically indistinguishable from
zero across all three models. This could be a result of the disconnect between a general
concern for crime and the specific content of racial messages. However, measures of
public concern about “black crime” are unavailable.10
Presidential attention to crime also maintains no relationship to racial messages
in crime news. Across all three models, the coefficient estimates on changes in presi-
dential attention to crime are positive, but statistically insignificant. The lagged levels
on presidential attention to crime are in the wrong direction and indistinguishable
from zero.
The consistency of the finding across all three indicators of racial messages sug-
gest that the media does ground its coverage of crime to changes in actual conditions.
10Kellstedt’s (2003) measure of racial policy sentiment was substituted in each
model for the “most important problem” indicator to test if specific attitudes toward
blacks shaped the frequency of racial messages in crime news. None of the models
show any differences than those reported here.
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Table 1. Media coverage of race and crime
Predictor ∆ Racial Frames ∆ Racial Primes ∆ Index
Racial messagest−1 -0.92** -0.56** -0.54**
(0.19) (0.22) (0.21)
∆ % Black arrests 3.49* 31.93* 16.81*
(2.03) (16.40) (8.62)
% Black arrestst−1 5.99** 54.36** 28.37**
(2.60) (26.45) (13.68)
∆ Public concern -9.10 558.22 287.02
(66.75) (584.97) (300.13)
Public concernt−1 -29.06 18.72 6.33
(48.19) (365.06) (192.32)
∆ Presidential attention 0.27 -0.18 -0.07
(0.07) (0.51) (0.27)
Presidential attentiont−1 -0.05 -0.47 -0.26
(0.05) (0.40) (0.21)
Intercept -134.81* -1298.78* -674.32
(64.78) (660.36) (340.74)
Bruesch-Godfrey (4 lags) χ2 8.48* 6.81 6.65
ARCH (4 lags) χ2 0.06 5.24 4.40
N 33 33 33
R2 0.48 0.37 0.36
Note: *p < 0.10 **p < 0.05.
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The latter does not necessarily contradict previous research showing that media cov-
erage of blacks is disproportionate to the actual distribution of crimes committed by
blacks. The latter research concerns the distribution of coverage at any given period
of time. Although changes in crime coverage seem to reflect changes in actual crimes,
a one-to-one ratio of crimes to coverage may not exist leading to the distributional
biases found in cross-sectional research.
Table 2 tests the model on several alternative crime frames. Note that for the
violent messages model the lagged “messages” variable corresponds to violent crime
messages and in the juvenile crime messages model the lagged “messages’ variable
corresponds to juvenile crime messages. The estimates for the violent crime messages
model are shown in column two and the estimates of the juvenile delinquency messages
are shown in column three. Similar to the racial messages models, reported crime
conditions show a statistically significant relationship with the content of crime news.
The model for violent crime messages shows that an increase in violent crime does
not result in an immediate increase in violent crime messages. Instead, the effect is
delayed over time as indicated by the statistically significant and positive coefficient on
the lagged levels indicator of violent crime. The estimates of the dynamics of juvenile
crime messages in crime news shows that an increase in juvenile crime results in an
immediate change in the number of juvenile crime messages. Furthermore, this effect
is entirely in the contemporaneous period with no lagging effect unlike the racial
messages models.
The violent crime model does show a significant and positive relationship between
public concern for crime and news coverage of violent crime. The more public concern
for crime does not result in an immediate change in the number of violent crime
messages, but an increase in the number of violent crime messages occurs in future
periods. The statistical significance in this model might be because there is a better
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connection between a general concern for crime as measured by the Gallup’s “most
important problem” question and violent crime. There does not appear to be any
relationship between public concern for crime and the dynamics of juvenile crime
messages. Similar to the racial messages models, presidential attention to crime does
show a positive relationship with crime coverage as predicted in the same time period.
However, the coefficients are statistically indistinguishable from zero indicating that
no relationship exists in these data.
Table 2. Media coverage of violent and juvenile crime
Predictor ∆ Violent Messages ∆ Juvenile Messages
Messagest−1 -0.60** -0.53**
(0.15) (0.24)
∆ Violent crime 0.01 -
(0.01) -
Violent crimet−1 0.00027** -
(0.00) -
∆ Juvenile crime - 0.16**
- (0.07)
Juvenile crimet−1 - 0.06
- (0.04)
∆ Public concern 2107.93 247.10
(1447.73) (387.33)
Public concernt−1 3767.01** 541.58
(1274.18) (352.30)
∆ Presidential attention 0.03 0.35
(1.39) (0.49)
Presidential attentiont−1 -1.45 -0.56
(1.12) (0.38)
Intercept -2820.90** -401.00
(868.93) (296.87)
Bruesch-Godfrey (4 lags) χ2 2.46 3.37
ARCH (4 lags) χ2 3.89 4.63
N 33 24
R2 0.44 0.54
Note: *p < 0.10 **p < 0.05.
Thus, the results of these models provide consistent evidence regarding the re-
lationship between media content of crime stories and reported conditions of crime.
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Media coverage of crime does reflect changes in actual crime conditions. The more
blacks and juveniles commit crimes, the more messages in crime news indicating
blacks and juveniles as criminals. The more violent crime in society, the more media
coverage of crime reflects the violence of crime. There is less support for other aspects
of the model. It appears that the public and president have little, if any, influence on
media content.
3. Summary
This chapter shows that there is a great deal of movement over time in the type of
strategic messages embedded within crime coverage—at least within the New York
Times. Although both racial frames and racial primes can coexist in crime news,
these data reveal that racial primes are used much more than explicit racial appeals
to frame crime as a problem among black Americans. The data also show that other
types of strategic messages dominant crime news from time-to-time. Crime news
in the 1950s was dominated by messages linking crime to juvenile delinquents and
organized crime. Violent crime, however, is the most prominent type of message in
crime news and continues to increase in use over time. Finally, this chapter shows
that the dynamics of racial messages, violent crime messages, and juvenile delinquency
messages within crime news follow the changes in actual crime conditions relating to
each of these categories. Thus, the information in the news media regarding crime is
not as biased as previous studies claim providing a little assurance that the public is
receiving quality information they can use to make informed political judgments.
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CHAPTER IV
A PENCHANT FOR PUNISHMENT: THE DYNAMICS OF PUNITIVE
SENTIMENT
The conventional wisdom is that Americans generally prefer punitive rather than
preventative policies and that these preferences are highly resistant to change. Many
scholars and policy-makers accept the punitive nature of public opinion as a fact of
contemporary politics. The recent trend in public approval of policies such as manda-
tory minimum sentencing, indefinite sentences, three-strikes law, truth in sentencing,
boot camps, chain gangs, and capital punishment appears to substantiate this view.
It seems the public’s demand for punitive policies has been able to withstand a great
deal of pressure from those that advocate alternative solutions to the American crime
problem. Zimring, Hawkins and Kamin (2001) suggest that public support of punitive
policies is a “constant” in U.S. history, rarely wavering under pressure. Recent studies
argue public support for specific policies such as capital punishment (Ellsworth and
Gross 1994) and tougher sentences (Zamble and Kalm 1990) are crystallized in the
minds of the public. Thus, there is a dominant perspective that the public is hostile
toward criminals, wanting to see them suffer tough punishment at the hands of the
criminal justice system and this support rarely wavers.
Scholars have tied this steadfast preference for a punitive solution to crime to core
cultural values and basic human instincts. Aladjem (2008) argues that American’s
have a “culture of vengeance.” Punitive policies are created to satisfy the public’s
desire for retribution in response to criminal behavior. However, since victimization
creates an emotional void that punitive policies can never fill, the public perpetually
demands more and more punitive policies. Garland (1996, 460) also argues that puni-
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tive polices are “a deep-seated aspect of our culture, embedded in the common-sense
of the public.” Garland (1996, 460) also specifically connects this culture for punish-
ment with the crystallized nature of public attitudes toward punitive policies noting
that, “[d]eliberate attempts by government to modify this culture . . . have shown the
resilience of the demand for harsh, custodial penalties.” Scholars also note attitudes
regarding crime and punishment are connected to emotional rather than rational parts
of the human psyche making those attitudes more resistant to arguments targeting
instrumental concerns. Thus, scholars at the individual level find little connection
between actual crime rates, perceptions of crime, and punitive policy preferences.
Instead, scholars connect punitive sentiment with emotional, rather than rational,
reactions to crime. Sutton (1997, 17), for instance, argues that alternative strategies
for preventing crime will never gain public favor because non-punitive strategies fail
to counter the deep, emotional attachment that punitive policies have within the pub-
lic consciousness. Freiberg (2001) makes a similar argument noting that support for
punitive policies are ingrained within human conciousness and attached to emotions
and affect.
Yet studies that examine the over-time movement in public opinion often find
that opinions are fluid and rational rather than an immutable constant. Page and
Shapiro (1992) examine support for capital punishment and judicial sentencing and
suggest the public, as a whole, adjust these attitudes to changes in the crime rate.
Similarly, Mayer (1993) finds that public support for capital punishment moves in
response to changes in the homicide rate at a five-year lag. Baumgartner, De Boef and
Boydstun (2008) show that support for capital punishment is responsive to changes
in the tone of media coverage regarding the death penalty. The more news stories
supporting capital punishment increased public support for the death penalty, while
news stories that featured opposition to the death penalty led to a decrease in public
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support for the death penalty. Although these studies suggest that public preferences
toward punitive policies are far from immutable, they all focus on a subset of punitive
policies. All but one study focuses on attitudes toward the death penalty, a policy that
might have more to do with moral and religious conviction than punitive sentiment
and instrumental considerations. The focus on a single issue, rather than the public’s
more general sentiment toward punitive solutions to crime limits our understanding
of both public opinion and criminal justice policy.
The approach advocated in this research focuses on the underlying sentiment
of American’s punitive policy preferences rather than specific individual level atti-
tudes toward specific issues. Specifically, this chapter creates an index of the public’s
preference for punitive criminal justice policies based on multiple indicators toward
specific policies over the last 50 years. This index of the public’s punitive sentiment
shows a dynamic portrait of the public with periods of dramatic increases in punitive
sentiment and periods of decline in punitive sentiment. Moreover, it will be shown
below that the public’s punitive sentiment moves in a rather uniform manner for sev-
eral sub-groups of the population that have different experiences with the criminal
justice system.
1. Conceptualizing punitive policy preferences
Punitive policies seek to increase the disciplinary function of the justice system. The
justice system consists of law enforcement agencies, courts, and corrections facilities,
which must operate within a framework of laws protecting individual rights. The ex-
pansion of punitive policies can occur in any or all of these organizations. The purpose
of punitive criminal justice policies are to punish criminals. Punitive policies seek to
deter future criminal behavior, provide retribution for crimes already committed, and
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prevent future crimes by keeping criminals off the streets. Punitive policies do not
seek to rehabilitate criminals although some punitive policies may have side-effects
that aid rehabilitation. In addition, punitive policies do not attempt to reduce crime
by going after the potential root causes of crime such as poverty, unemployment, and
discrimination.
Proponents of punitive policies view crime in terms of rewards and punishments.
Punitive policies attempt to reduce crime by increasing the transaction costs of doing
crime. Punitive policies increase the potential costs of crime either by imposing
harsher penalties on criminals when they are caught or by increasing the probability
that a criminal will get caught. There are a variety of policies that increase the
potential costs of doing crime, which can be classified as punitive. Increasing the
power and authority of law enforcement officials increases the probability of getting
caught and thus the cost of crime since criminals have to change their behavior (a
costly act) in response to changes in law enforcement tactics. These policies can
entail reducing civil liberties for security such as allowing police to do search and
seizers without a warrant, expanding the use of wiretaps for law enforcement agencies,
and increasing resources for law enforcement agencies. Laws that increase criminal
sentencing or set deterministic sentences for crime (by reducing judicial discretion)
also increase the cost of crime. The deterrent that sets the ultimate cost for crime is
the death penalty.
Rather than view crime as a function of individual will and transaction costs,
people that oppose punitive policies often view crime as stemming from social prob-
lems such as poverty, unemployment, and discrimination (Bazelon 1976, Cohen and
Felson 1979). The latter viewpoint leads to the belief that non-punitive policies
are more effective and efficient at reducing criminal behavior. Non-punitive policies
include counseling for drug addiction, anger/stress management coaching, increas-
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ing education, providing job training both within and outside of the justice system,
reducing poverty, reducing unemployment, dealing with racial discrimination, and
programs that help former convicts re-enter society.
A preference for punitive policies means the public favors or supports policies
that attempt to increase the costs of committing crime rather than policies aimed at
rehabilitation or the environmental causes of crime. The emphasis is on the public,
as a whole, rather than each individual’s preference for more or less punitive policies.
Although individual attitudes contribute to the dynamics of aggregate preferences,
it is aggregate preferences that have the greatest influence on politics. Politicians
obtain political capital from the support of the masses rather than individuals and it
is aggregate preferences that determine election outcomes. It is also the preferences of
the public, as a whole, that influence national policies (Stimson, Mackuen and Erikson
1995) and specifically federal criminal justice policy (Nicholson-Crotty, Peterson and
Ramirez 2009). Politicians are less likely to pay attention to public opinion on a
single issue—the death penalty, criminal sentencing, treatment programs, drug abuse
treatment, law enforcement spending, judicial discretion, and so forth—since data
on these individual issues are rarely available. Thus, politicians do not have a clear
signal on these individual issues upon which to react. Instead, it is more feasible
for politicians to pay attention to a national mood and respond to this more general
sentiment than try to attune into the vast number of individual signals coming from
the public (Kingdon 1973). Thus, this research is concerned with the aggregate
movement of public punitive sentiment rather than public opinion toward specific
policies. This requires aggregation across both individuals and issues.
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2. Constructing a measure of punitive sentiment
Almost all research on punitive policy preferences is cross-sectional using a single in-
dicator to describe individual preferences during a specific period in time. A problem
with this approach is that cross-sectional data are constrained by well-known survey
effects (Schuman and Presser 1981). Responses to any single policy question are prone
to influence by question wording effects, interviewer effects, and question ordering ef-
fects. Stimson (1999) notes that responses to an individual survey question captures
three things: 1) the latent sentiment toward the concept of interest (i.e., punitive
policies) 2) systematic variance related to that specific policy or question (e.g., a
question wording effect), and 3) random error. Unfortunately, the random error is
uncontrollable, but it is inconsequential as long as it remains idiosyncratic. There-
fore, the problem reduces to measuring the concept of interest—the public’s latent
sentiment towards punitive policies—while controlling for indicator specific variance.
The second problem with cross-sectional approaches is that they provide no in-
formation regarding opinion dynamics. To understand the dynamic movement of
punitive sentiment requires surveys that probe punitive attitudes consistently over
time. Unfortunately, surveys rarely ask the same questions at regular intervals needed
to perform a time series analysis. Some surveys have asked the same question over
time, but at irregular intervals preventing a usable time series of punitive attitudes.
For instance, the Gallup organization has asked Americans, “Are you in favor of
the death penalty for a person convicted of murder?” 42 times between 1936 and
2007. However, even the Gallup measure does not exist for every year. Even if the
question did exist for every year, it does not capture the entire concept of interest.
Thus, scholars face real limitations when trying to understand public preferences for
punitive criminal justice policies.
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The solution, and methodology adopted here, is a technique developed by Stim-
son (1999) to examine public preferences for liberal or conservative public policies.
Stimson’s (1999) WCALC algorithm extracts the common dynamic element from mul-
tiple indicators across survey organizations by focusing on the relative changes within
an item rather than the absolute values of the item. Although the absolute values of
survey marginals are incomparable across indicators (due to the aforementioned sur-
vey effects), the ratio of change between any two points in time within an indicator
is comparable across survey items.1 For instance, if more people prefer a punitive
solution on m indicators at time t relative to some previous period t − k, than the
algorithm will extract a latent dimension showing Americans becoming more punitive
across this time period. Beyond the work of Stimson (1999) and colleagues (Erikson,
Mackuen and Stimson 2002, Stimson, Mackuen and Erikson 1995), this measurement
strategy has been used for other aggregate analysis of public opinion (Durr 1993, Durr,
Gilmour and Wolbrecht 2000, Durr, Martin and Wolbrecht 1997, Flemming and
Wood 1997, Keele 2007, Kellstedt 2003).
Aggregating across indicators and extracting the shared variation of those in-
dicators assumes that there is a latent sentiment among the public regarding their
preferences for more or less punitive policies that is creating the movement in their
preferences toward individual policy proposals. If the concept of “punitive policy
preferences” is valid—if this latent sentiment exists and is the driving force behind
attitudes toward specific punitive policies—then individual measures of attitudes to-
ward specific punitive policies should move in parallel with each other across time.
However, if the concept is invalid, then the survey items should move independently
1Exponential smoothing is applied to adjust for fluctuations in sampling error.
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of one another.2 Four survey items regarding public attitudes toward specific punitive
policies are taken from the General Social Survey and Gallup poll and plotted in Fig-
ure 9. The items include questions about the leniency of the courts, expanding law
enforcement, support for capital punishment, and increasing spending to fight crime.
The items are standardized—shown as deviations from their mean—and plotted with
a WCALC index of the four items. The year is on the x-axis and the standardized
preference for policy support is on the y-axis. Higher values on the scale indicate a
greater preference for punitive policies.
Figure 9. The shared movement of public attitudes toward individual punitive poli-
cies, 1953-2007
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2Tyler and Weber (1982) argue that support for individual punitive policies such
as the death penalty measure a single aspect of a general political-social ideological
sentiment regarding punitive policies which is consistent with the argument here.
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Figure 9 provides some initial evidence that there is a latent public sentiment for
more or less punitive policies. Note, the focus should be on the over time variation of
each indicator rather than the absolute levels of support. The individual survey items
exhibit similar movement over time despite measuring different policies and being
administered by different survey organizations. The 1965 Gallup poll shows 48% of
Americans believe the courts are “not harsh enough” with criminals, which rises to
74% in the 1970s and over 80% in the 1980s. Attitudes toward capital punishment also
increase during this same era with 45% of Americans supporting the death penalty
in 1965, 57% supporting the death penalty in 1972 and over 70% favoring capital
punishment in the 1980s. The indicators for spending on crime shows the same over
time movement, albeit more subtle, with support rising from 65% in 1973 to 72% in
1982.
Furthermore, all all four items gradually decrease in the late 1990s. The belief
that courts are too lenient drops from 85% in the 1994 GSS to 74% in the 1998 GSS to
65% in both the 2004 and 2006 GSS. That’s a substantial 20% decrease over a ten year
period. The percentage of GSS respondents that believe we are spending “too little”
on law enforcement drops almost 10% from 1994 to 2006. The Gallup death penalty
and the GSS crime spending series also show declines during this same period. Notice
that the aggregated index of these four indicators created from the WCALC algorithm
and shown by the solid black line captures these dynamic movements. The index
shows a decline in punitive sentiment from the 1950s to the 1960s followed by a large
increase in punitive sentiment from the 1970s and into the 1980s. Similar to each of
the individual indicators, the punitive sentiment index shows a decline in the public’s
preference for punitive policies starting in the middle of the 1990s and continuing into
the present. Thus, it appears that an underlying latent sentiment toward punitive
policies is driving support and opposition to individual punitive policy proposals and
115
that creating an index from multiple indicators captures that sentiment in a more
reliable manner than relying on any single indicator.
Rather than rely on a single indicator, or even four indicators, the final index of
public sentiment toward punitive policies is created from a large collection of survey
items asked over the last 50 years. A multi-item index that captures the public’s latent
policy preference is preferable because it captures multiple dimensions of the concept
and extracts the latent preference without the idiosyncratic component inherent to
any single indicator. Using multiple indicators that contain at least some partially
shared variance of the latent concept of interest—punitive policy preferences—should
lead to a more reliable measure than any single indicator. It also provides an annual
time series of punitive sentiment for the last 50 years.
The construction of the final index of the public’s preference for punitive criminal
justice policies uses the survey marginals of 242 administrations of 24 different survey
items.3 Aggregation occurs across individuals and survey items. The individual
items, shown in Table 3 (details are in the appendix), range from attitudes toward the
death penalty to beliefs about the leniency of the courts to spending more on crime
to extending the authority of the police to preferences for mandatory sentencing
laws. Table 3 shows the survey organization that administered the item, the item
description, the number of times the item was asked to the public, and the association
between each item and the final index. Note that there is a wide range of survey
organizations represented in the construction of the punitive sentiment index. There
is also variation in the number of administrations of each question—the minimum
requirement is a question be asked twice in order to measure the relative change
between administration at time t and t + k, k < 0. The important aspect of Table
3All items are from nationally representative samples and accessed from the Roper
Center Public Opinion Archive.
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Table 3. Correlation of indicators with the punitive index
Survey Correlation
House Item Observations with index
Gallup courts 7 0.84
GSS courts 26 0.83
Harris death penalty 12 0.94
Gallup death penalty 42 0.93
Gallup death penalty (under 21) 3 -0.53
Gallup death penalty (options 1) 11 0.63
Gallup death penalty (options 2) 8 0.80
Gallup death penalty (frequency) 6 -0.71
Harris death penalty vs. prison 3 0.85
Harris death penalty (circumstance) 3 -0.42
LA Times death penalty 2 -1.00
GSS death penalty 26 0.92
Harris death penalty (rape) 2 1.00
Gallup death penalty (rape) 4 0.83
ABC prisons (build) 3 -1.00
Harris prisons (purpose) 3 0.99
Roper prisons (purpose) 3 0.91
Roper law enforcement 3 0.95
Gallup & LA Times law enforcement 8 0.26
Roper sentencing 3 0.85
GSS & Roper crime spending 40 0.70
GSS law enforcement spending 16 0.63
ABC “three strikes” 2 1.00
Gallup marijuna (criminalization) 6 0.05
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3 is the fourth column showing the correlation between each item and the index.
Most of the items are strongly correlated with the index. The Gallup and GSS items
measuring beliefs about the leniency of the courts correlate at .83 with the index.
Three of the death penalty items correlate with the index at .90 or greater. Even the
desire to increase spending on crime, an attitude that might relate more to ideology
than punitive preferences, correlates with the index at .70. As a whole, the index
explains 64% of the variance of the individual items (eigenvalue = 1.87). Despite
different question wording and being administered by different survey organizations,
these items all exhibit a great deal of shared variance capturing the public’s desire for
more or less punitive policies. A few items show a negative relationship. The lack of
association is mostly due to the few administrations of these items. These items are
left into the final creation of the punitive index since theory dictates their relation to
the concept of interest. However, it does appear that support for the criminalization
of marijuana is unrelated to punitive preferences. The Gallup organization has asked
this question 6 times between 1977 and 2003. With the exception of 1986, most
Americans are evenly split on the issue with slightly more favoring the legalization
of marijuana in the late 1970s and slightly more favoring criminalization in 2000
and 2003. It seems more likely that support for legalization of marijuana is strongly
connected to moral values and traditionalism rather than punitive sentiment.
3. The dynamics of punitive sentiment
The index of public preferences for punitive policies, shown in Figure 10, extends
annually from 1951 to 2007. The index is aggregated into years since there is not
enough measures taken each year to obtain reliable estimates at a smaller interval
of aggregation. The x-axis indicates the year. Higher values on the y-axis indi-
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cate a greater preference for punitive policies. Lower values on the y-axis indicate a
preferences for less punitive policies. Overall, Americans tend to favor punishment
(µ = 55.68, s.d. = 5.09). Compared to other time series of public opinion, American’s
punitive attitudes are quite stable. For instance, presidential approval moves in re-
sponse to current events and can often shift several standard deviations within a short
period of time. George W. Bush’s approval rating, for example, went from less than
55% approval to over 90% approval on 9-11. His approval subsequently fell to less
than 30% by the end of his presidency. Punitive sentiment is not that volatile. The
range of the series shows a total movement of 17.5 points—with the lowest level of
support for punitive policies in 1966 (46.49) and the highest level of support in 1982
(63.99). Similar high levels of support occur in 1990 (63.65) and 1997 (63.73). Yet,
these movements can still have substantial influence over policy outcomes. For exam-
ple, the public’s domestic policy sentiment—the mood of the nation that shapes the
policy outcomes of Congress, the President, and the Supreme Court on most issues
falling along the dominant liberal-conservative dimension of American politics—has
a total range of movement of 19.61 points for the same period (Stimson 1999).
The movement of the series shows that these attitudes are not immutable and
resistant to change despite their relative stability. The index shows a minority of
Americans—less than 50%—favor punitive policies in the late 1950s and early 1960s.
The latter is a decline from the middle of the 1950s when about 55% of Americans
supported punitive policies. The low levels of support for punitive policies is consistent
with prior research showing a lack of attention and concern for crime around this
period (Mayer 1993, Warr 1995). Further, these low levels of support occur during
the same period when media coverage of crime focused on juvenile delinquents and
organized crime.
By many accounts, the demand for punitive policies began in the late 1950s and
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Figure 10. Public preferences for punitive policies, 1953-2007
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early 1960s as entrepreneurial politicians—mostly conservative elite—socially con-
structed the problem of crime in an effort to make electoral gains and retain social
control over African-Americans (e.g., Edsall and Edsall 1992, Chambliss 1999, Weaver
2007). That does not appear to be the case according to these data. Also notable
in these data is that public preferences did not increase immediately after the 1964
Goldwater-Johnson presidential election despite Barry Goldwater’s rhetoric of an in-
creasing crime problem. Nor does the series increase directly in response to the 1964
Civil Rights Act. Instead, American’s start to desire more punitive policies during
1967, a time of intense social unrest and racially tinged rioting. The sharpest increase
in the index occurs during the 1970s alongside the “law and order” rhetoric of Presi-
dent Richard M. Nixon. In fact, the largest change in the series is a 17-point increase
in punitive sentiment—more than three standard deviations of the series—from 1966
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to 1982.
Public preferences for punitive policies continue to remain high during the 1980s,
showing an abrupt increase during the 1988 election. This is the same year of George
H. W. Bush’s “get tough” on crime presidential platform and the Willie Horton
advertisements. The series takes a quick four point drop in 1992 during a time when
the political agenda was focusing on a bleak economy and the Iraq War. The biggest
surprise in the series is that public preferences for punitive policies have been declining
since 1997, dropping ten points between 1997 and 2006. That ten point decline is
almost two standard deviations of the series.
Although popular accounts portray Americans as unwilling to forego punitive
policies in lieu of preventative policies, these data suggest a more dynamic opinion.
The creation of a dynamic measure of punitive sentiment shows periods of increased
support for punitive policies and periods of a decline in support for such policies.
There are a few unexpected movements in the series over the last 50 years and the
index demonstrates a great deal of face validity. It increases during the 1970s and
1980s when “law and order” rhetoric dominated the political landscape and shows a
decline during the last ten years when support for specific policies such as the death
penalty has wavered among Americans (Baumgartner, De Boef and Boydstun 2008,
Gross and Ellsworth 2001).
4. Summary
This chapter develops a measure of American’s support for punitive criminal justice
policies and describes the over time movement of these preferences. The results shows
that support for individual criminal justice policies such as spending on law enforce-
ment, capital punishment, mandatory minimum sentencing, and tougher judges are
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driven by an underlying sentiment for punitiveness. In addition, these data show
that the public generally supports punitive responses to crime rather than policies
that tackle the root causes of crime. Although the public supports “get tough” poli-
cies, there are periods when the public is inclined to accept non-punitive alternatives.
For instance, the 1960s saw a decline, rather than increase, in public preferences for
punitive policies. More recently, the data suggest a long-term decline in punitive
sentiment. Understanding the forces that move punitive sentiment across time is the
focus of the next few chapters.
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CHAPTER V
DID AMERICANS EXPERIENCE A CHANGE IN PUNITIVENESS?
The creation of an over-time index of the public’s sentiment for more or less punitive
criminal justice policies provides a means to begin answering questions that have
perplexed scholars for decades. One of the most basic questions concerns the timing
of the public’s penchant for punishment. The dominant consensus is that the public
experienced a fundamental change in their attitudes toward crime and punishment in
the 1960s. The year 1964 is commonly viewed as the turning point as the presidential
campaigns of Barry Goldwater and George Wallace brought law and order rhetoric
to the forefront of American politics. Whereas crime had previously been seen as
a problem among juvenile delinquents, in 1964 crime became connected to black
Americans, civil rights and the Civil Rights Act, and a lack of respect for social
order. Subsequently, many scholars conclude that Americans underwent a dramatic
change in their attitudes toward crime and punishment in 1964 (Barlow and Barlow
1995, Cronin, Cronin and Milakovich 1981, Edsall and Edsall 1992, Feagin and Hahn
1973, Finckenauer 1978, Flamm 2005, Furstenberg 1971, Western 2006). Yet, other
scholars suggest alternative periods of change: the 1968 presidential campaign of
Richard M. Nixon (Loo and Grimes 2004), President Nixon’s rhetoric during the
1970s (Baum 1996, Button 1978), President Ronald Reagan’s “War on Drugs” in the
1980s (Beckett 1997), or prior to the 1960’s as a preemptive attempt to alter public
attitudes by Southern politicians on the losing end of civil rights legislation (Feeley
2003, Weaver 2007). Although there has been a great deal of speculation concerning
when, if ever, fundamental change occurred in public preferences for punitive criminal
justice policies, until now there has been no means to formally test these various
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conjectures.
At the core of these arguments is the notion that at some point in the 20th
century, Americans experienced a fundamental change in their thinking about crime
and punishment. Essentially, what the aforementioned scholars are talking about is
a structural changepoint. A changepoint signifies a disruption to the equilibrium of a
time series. Classical tests for structural changepoints consist of fitting a series of mod-
els and using a series of tests based on the generalized fluctuation test framework such
as the CUSUM and MOSUM tests (Kuan and Hornik 1995) or tests based on the F
statistic such as the Chow and supF test (Andrews and Ploberger 1994, Hansen 1992).
These tests either rely on post-estimation diagnostics that provide little information
on the exact changepoint or require the researcher to know in advance where the
structural change occurs. Many of the estimation approaches associated with these
classical tests only allow for a single changepoint (cf., Park 2007). Competing theo-
ries may suggest multiple potential structural breaks leading to confusion about the
correct model specification. Specifying a single changepoint requires the analyst to
pick-and-choose a point consistent with their own prior theoretical expectations, while
ignoring alternative changepoints. For instance, the dominant view in the literature
on crime and punishment in America is that events around 1964 led to a structural
break in punitive sentiment, but competing theories also suggest fundamental changes
due to events in the late 1950s, the racial unrest of 1967, the radical response to Viet-
nam in the late 1960s, and the rhetoric of President Nixon from 1968 to 1972. Models
that use a single dummy variable to capture structural change are inadequate when
there are competing theories suggesting multiple potential changepoints.
Alternatively, a number of models have been proposed to estimate structural
changepoints when there is an unknown number of possible changepoints and the
specific timing of the structural change is undetermined. Although there are frequen-
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tist procedures to estimate changepoints (Bai and Perron 2003), a Bayesian approach
provides a probability distribution (the probability that a changepoint exists) for each
temporal period providing a measure of confidence that the changepoints identified
are actual structural breaks. Erdman and Emerson (2007) perform a Monte Carlo ex-
periment to show that Bayesian estimates provide unbiased and consistent estimates
of changepoints and outperform frequentist methods when there are short blocks of
equilibrium with multiple structural breaks.
1. A Bayesian changepoint model
Barry and Hartigan (1993) develop a model to estimate structural changepoints when
there is an unknown partition, p, of sequential blocks of data points such that the
means are stable within these blocks. The probability of a change at time t is p. The
prior distribution of µtj—the mean of the series at time t+1 and ending at time j—is
chosen as N(µ0, σ
2
0/(j−t)). The denominator of the variance component ensures that
small changes in the equilibrium of a series that persist for a short time are unlikely
to be identified as structural changes.
The MCMC algorithm, implemented in the bcp package in R (Erdman and
Emerson 2007), starts with the partition p = (U1, U2, . . . , Un) where n is the number
of time points or observations in the data and Ut = 1 indicates a structural break at
time t+ 1. To initialize the algorithm, Erdman and Emerson (2007) propose setting
Ut = 0 for all t < n, with Un = 1. A value of Ut is drawn from the conditional
distribution of Ut given the data and the current partition at each iteration of the
Markov chain. Consistent with the notion of Erdman and Emerson (2007), I let b
symbolize the number of blocks obtained if Ut = 0, conditional on Uj, for t 6= j.
The transition probability p for the conditional probability of a changepoint at
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time t+ 1 is attained from the following equation:
pt
1− pt =
P (Ut = 1 | X, Uj, j 6= t)
P (Ut = 0 | X, Uj, j 6= t) (5.1)
=
[
∫ γ
0
pb(1− p)n−b−1dp][∫ λ
0
ωb/2
(W1+B1ω)(n−1)/2
dω]
[
∫ γ
0
pb−1(1− p)n−bdp][∫ λ
0
ω(b−1)/2
(W0+B0ω)(n−1)/2
dω]
(5.2)
where W0 is the within block sum of squares when Ut = 0, B0 is the between block
sum of squares when Ut = 0, W1 is the within block sum of squares when Ut = 1, B1
is the between block sum of squares when Ut = 1, X is the data, γ and λ are hyper or
tuning parameters that can take on values between [0, 1]. For estimation, the hyper
parameters are set to 0.2, the value recommended by Barry and Hartigan (1993).
Altering these values does not alter the changepoint estimates in this research.
1.1. Results: Changepoint model
The changepoint model is estimated using Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) simu-
lations. The MCMC sampler consisted of 1,000 burn-in iterations that were discarded
to ensure proper mixing. The final posterior sample consisted of 20,000 MCMC iter-
ations. The MCMC algorithm estimates both the posterior distribution around the
mean value of the series and the posterior probability of a breakpoint at each time
period. The punitive sentiment series is annual and is estimated using the years 1951
to 2006. Figure 11 graphs the changepoint estimates of the punitive sentiment series.1
The x-axis indicates the year. The y-axis is the probability changepoint. The prob-
ability of a changepoint for each time period is shown by the solid black line. The
circles indicate the observed data of the punitive sentiment series, while the dashed
1The posterior sample of the parameters passes all standard diagnostic tests for
convergence. All parameters show no signs of autocorrelation, immediate convergence
to a mean level with no signs of non-convergence in the traceplots.
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line shows the estimates of the posterior mean.
Figure 11. Posterior probability and mean estimates of the public’s punitive policy
sentiment
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According to the estimates, there is a 0.5 or higher probability that there exists
three structural changepoints in the series. Changepoints in the public’s preference
for punitive policies are detected at the years 1956, 72, and 97. The changepoint in
1956 is the start of a slow decline in punitive sentiment and relatively low levels of
punitive sentiment during the 1960s. As shown in the previous chapter, this is an era
when media coverage of crime focused on organized crime and juvenile delinquency.
The probability of a changepoint is highest, 0.90, for the year 1972. The annual
data prevent pinpointing a more exact date or event within 1972, but this year co-
incides with the peak of President Richard M. Nixon’s popularity and his landslide
victory over George McGovern in the 1972 presidential election. The issue of crime
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and radicalism was the focus of the 1972 presidential election alongside the Vietnam
War and marked the beginning of the “War on Drugs” as a catalyst of street crime
(Epstein 1977). Nixon had been touting punitive responses to crime since 1968 and
implemented largely symbolic punitive justice policies at the Federal level throughout
his first presidential term. It seems the public began to wholeheartedly endorsed puni-
tive policies in 1972 consistent with Button’s (1978) observation that it was Nixon
who had the ability to capitalize on the turmoil of the late 1960s and garner public
support for punitive policies.
Yet, why did the public change its attitude toward punishment in 1972, four years
into Nixon’s presidency? I believe the answer lies not in the office of the presidency
or the actions of any single political entrepreneur promoting “law and order,” but
instead in the actions of the U.S. Supreme Court. In 1972 the Supreme Court voted
to abolished the death penalty. The Court ruled by a 5 to 4 vote that the arbitrariness
of implementation of the death penalty in the states constituted “cruel and unusual”
punishment and violated the eighth and fourteenth amendments. It seems more likely
that the fundamental change in public attitudes arose in response to this decision.
Wlezien (1995) suggests that the public, as a whole, moves like a thermostat.
When public policy changes in one direction, the public adjusts its overall mood
and moves in the opposite direction to slow down rapid policy change. The public
backlash against the decision fits with the thermostatic model. The annual punitive
sentiment series prevents pinpointing a more precise timing of the changepoint. The
individual components of the punitive series do not exist at more refined intervals nor
does any single series exist at smaller intervals for the year of 1972. However, there is
a great deal of qualitative evidence that suggests a substantial backlash occurred in
response to the Supreme Court’s decision and led to the rise in punitiveness shown
in the data.
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Smith (2008) argues that the Supreme Court’s attempt to regulate capital pun-
ishment led to the “politicization and entrenchment” of the death penalty and puni-
tive policies in America. Prior to the Court’s decision, all indicators pointed to
a decline in the use of capital punishment although other punitive solutions were
still popular. States were restricting the use of capital punishment to fewer and
few crimes, Governors were increasingly commuting capital sentences, and few death
penalty sentences actually resulted in executions (Lain 2007). For instance, there
were 119 executions in 1944. That number dropped to 85 in 1954. By the year 1964,
there were only 15 executions, 7 in 1965, 1 in 1966, 2 in 1967, and none from 1968 to
the Court’s decision to abolish the death penalty. Yet, most Americans did not notice
this decline despite the increasing rhetoric calling for the restoration of law and order.
In seems, most Americans and the news media were not paying attention to the case
whatsoever. Only 8 Amicus briefs were filed for the case—7 opposed to the death
penalty and 1 in favor. Three of the opposing briefs were filed by the complainants
(the Court had consolidated three death penalty cases into the Furman decision),
while the state of Illinois filed the only brief supporting the death penalty. Thus,
the decision to restrict the death penalty was a shock to almost everyone, including
the petitioners of the case (Meltsner 2006). Thus, for most Americans the decision to
abolish the death penalty across the country came as a surprise—perhaps the starkest
example of legislating from the bench. The shock resulted in a substantial backlash
and rise in punitive sentiment.2
It’s possible to see the lack of attention given to the death penalty prior to
2The general finding of a changepoint at 1972 in punitive sentiment holds when the
death penalty items are extracted from the punitive sentiment series although with a
lower probability. This is consistent with Finckenauer’s (1988, 90) observation that
increases in support for capital punishment captures a single aspect of the public’s
total backlash against the judicial activism of federal Courts in the 1970s.
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the Court’s decision and the rise in attention after the Court’s decision by examining
media coverage of the issue. Figure 12 shows newspaper coverage of the death penalty
from the New York Times, Los Angeles Times, Chicago Sun-Times, and Washington
Post preceding and following the Court’s decision. The y-axis shows the frequency
of stories mentioning the death penalty. The x-axis shows the month spanning from
May of 1971 to December 1972. These data were accessed via ProQuest historical
newspaper archive. Each newspaper was searched individually using the search term
“death penalty” on a month-by-month basis. The newspapers were selected solely on
their availability during the time period of interest, but provide a good representation
of major national newspaper media from each part of the country.
Figure 12. Newspaper coverage of the death penalty
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The Court granted certiorari to Furman on June 28, 1971. The newspaper
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coverage in Figure 12 begins in May, a month prior to the certiorari decision and
provides a baseline level of coverage. In all four newspapers, coverage of the death
penalty around the certiorari decision is fairly low—limited to a few stories a month.
Oral arguments for Furman happened on January 17, 1972. Although there is a spike
in coverage, mostly regarding the oral arguments, attention to the death penalty
remains low. Coverage does increase after February due to a California Supreme
Court decision abolishing the death penalty within that state. However, the Los
Angeles Times, Chicago Sun-Times, and Washington Post show a decline in coverage
after the March attention to the California case. The New York Times continued to
increase its coverage of the death penalty leading up to the Furman decision, but none
of those stories mention the Furman case. Overall, attention to the death penalty was
relatively low leading up to the Court’s decision. After the Court’s decision on June
29, 1972 media attention of the death penalty spikes in all four newspapers. Whereas
little attention was given to the issue prior to the Court’s decision, the aftermath of
the Court’s unexpected decision was an increase in attention to capital punishment.
The largest spike in coverage occurs in the Los Angeles Times, which ran almost 60
stories on the death penalty in November—mostly concerning the backlash to the
Court’s decision. The attention to the death penalty also increases in November for
the other three media outlets as many states passed new procedures for administering
the death penalty in order to circumvent the Court’s Furman decision. A total of
37 states enacted new capital punishment laws to overcome the Court’s concerns
about the arbitrary implementation of the death penalty—always in a more punitive
direction. Thus, Smith (2008, 287) concludes that “the politicization of the death
penalty in the 1970s was a watershed event.” It led to an increase in public support
for punitive policies and a rise in efforts by state legislators to make it easier to
implement the death penalty. If there was an event in 1972 that led to a breakpoint
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in punitive sentiment, the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision Furman is the most likely
explanation for that shift.
Table 4. Probability of a changepoint in punitive sentiment
Year Posterior mean S.D. Posterior Probability
1956 51.58 1.9 0.63
1964 48.44 0.37 0.02
1967 48.82 0.54 0.12
1968 49.03 0.58 0.09
1972 49.69 0.09 0.90
1975 57.53 1.00 0.33
1979 60.42 1.36 0.47
1980 61.84 0.68 0.09
1988 62.10 0.22 0.02
1992 61.16 1.59 0.24
1997 62.25 0.46 0.61
1999 58.44 1.54 0.29
2001 57.23 0.68 0.16
The periods when fundamental changes did not happen are just as interesting
as the changepoints identified in the data. Table 4 shows the results of the Bayesian
posterior means, standard deviations, and probabilities of a changepoint. The table
shows a select number of time-points that have been identified by scholars as possible
changepoints along with the estimates of the three changepoints already identified.
Although an immense literature from various disciplines points to 1964 as the key
year when crime and punishment emerged in the public sphere, these data show no
evidence of a fundamental change in punitive sentiment among the public in that year.
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The punitiveness of the public did not change in response to the 1964 Civil Rights
Act or the presidential campaigns of Barry Goldwater and George Wallace. Contrary
to popular accounts, the public became less punitive between 1964 and 1967. These
results also shed light onto other periods that have been characterized as periods of
pivotal change in American’s thinking about crime and punishment. The punitive
series begins to increase starting in 1967—a year characterized by “long, hot summers”
immersed in racial unrest, protests, and riots. In fact, Weaver (2007) categorizes these
incidents as “focusing events”—events that gave credence to elite concern over crime
that facilitated mobilization and public support for punitive policies. Yet, these data
show no evidence that events in 1967 are responsible for any fundamental change
in public sentiment toward punitive politics. Furthermore, there is no evidence of a
changepoint at other significant upturns in federal law enforcement policy such as the
enactment of the Law Enforcement Assistance Act (LEAA) in 1965, the Omnibus
Crime Bill and Safe Streets Act in 1968, or the Kerner commission in 1968. The
introduction of the LEAA is significant as President Johnson’s first major speech
on crime, but it seems that Johnson’s newfound attention to crime did not lead
to the dramatic upturn in punitive sentiment among the public. Other possible
changepoints that fail to show any fundamental change in punitive sentiment are the
1980 presidency of Ronald Reagan (although there is almost a 50% probability of a
changepoint in 1979) and the 1988 presidential campaign of George W. Bush with its
focus on crime and use of black criminals to prime racial attitudes.
2. Does judicial activism lead to a public backlash?
The changepoint findings above provide an interesting empirical portrait that differs
from many historical accounts of crime and punishment in America. Recall that public
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sentiment for punitive criminal justice policies experienced a sharp increase starting
in the late 1960s, but the data show a fundamental change occurring in 1972—the
same year as the Supreme Court’s ruling that abolished the death penalty. Yet, the
aggregated nature of the data and inability to examine public opinion immediately
prior to and after the Court’s decision makes it difficult to determine if the rise in
punitive sentiment is a result of activist judicial rulings regarding the death penalty.
To understand if there was a public backlash against the Court’s ruling against the
death penalty requires a more systematic examination of the determinants of public
support for punitive criminal justice policies.
I propose that the dynamics of the public’s sentiment toward punitive crimi-
nal justice policies moves in response to both instrumental factors and socially con-
structed concerns. Economic theories of public opinion posits the public as a util-
ity maximizing actor. In short, the public will respond to objective environmental
conditions or at least their perceptions of those conditions and adjust their policy
preferences accordingly. Thus, when the perceived need for more punitive policies
increases, the public will increase its demand for punitive policies. When perceptions
change and the need for punitive policies decreases, the public will react rationally
by decreasing its demand for punitive policies. The central premise of this theoretical
perspective is that the public prefers policies that will achieve instrumental goals such
as reducing crime and punishing those guilty of criminal behavior.
The main instrumental concern in this context is reducing criminal activity, keep-
ing existing criminals off the streets, and providing retribution and justice for criminal
behavior. One factor that might influence these instrumental concerns is the crime
rate. The public is more likely to demand more policies to reduce criminal behavior
when the amount of criminal activity increases. These policies might include preven-
tative policies such as job growth and community outreach programs, but they can
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also include punitive responses to crime. Thus, changes in the crime rate should be
followed by similar changes in support for punitive policies.
A poor economy, increases in unemployment, and rising poverty have also been
shown to contribute to increases in criminal behavior (Cantor and Land 1985, Chambliss
1975, Ludwig, Duncan and Hirschfield 2001, Raphael and Winter-Ebrner 2001). When
times are tough, those unable to sustain a living through conventional means often
turn to criminal behavior such as property crimes and theft to fulfill basic needs. The
public sensing an upturn in crime due to a poor economy might increase their support
for punitive policies. Conversely, in good economic times the public should no longer
feel threatened by criminal activity and therefore decrease its demand for punitive
policies.
Finally, the public should change its policy preferences in response to changes in
public policy. When policies that attempt to reduce crime are abolished, such as the
death penalty in 1972, the public feeling a sense of injustice or possible vulnerability
should demand the return of those policies. More generally, punitive changes in public
policy should result in less punitive sentiment and attempts to reduce the punitive
nature of criminal justice policy should result in more support among the public for
punitive policies. This should be particularly true in regards to judicial activism that
overturns legislative policies enacted by democratically elected public officials. When
the Supreme Court of the United States overturns a state policy supported by the
elected representatives of the people in that state or a majority of states, the public
should respond by demanding the reinstatement of that policy.
An alternative theoretical perspective argues that punitive sentiment is not based
on instrumental concerns, but is instead socially constructed by elite actors such
as politicians and the media. Political actors engage in various forms of strategic
communication to alter public opinion in a fashion that meets their own desired goals
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and objectives. Although political actors have a variety of strategic messages at their
disposal, scholars have identified racial appeals as the most effective type of strategic
communication influencing punitive sentiment (Barkan and Cohn 1994, Beckett 1997,
Brewer and Heitzeg 2008, Mendelberg 2001, Mullen 2005, Russell 1998, Weaver 2007).
Recall racial appeals activate negative racial stereotypes of blacks as criminals and
increase public support for punitive policies (Eberhardt, Goff, Purdie and Davies
2004, Peffley and Hurwitz 1998, Peffley and Hurwitz 2002). The more race and crime
are connected in the same media stories, the more the public should favor punitive
policies.
Elite and media attention to crime can also raise the public’s concern for crime
and lead to an increase in support for punitive policies. When political actors focus
more attention on crime and less attention to other issues, the public will perceive
crime as a more important problem (Iyengar and Kinder 1987). Aggregate levels of
support can then shift due to changes in individual level preferences or because of
the mobilization of new groups with different policy preferences. Thus, an increase
in elite or media attention to crime should be associated with an increase in support
for punitive criminal justice policies.
2.1. Measurement and Data
A key expectation of instrumental theories is that public opinion should respond to
changes in actual criminal activity. People sensing that crime is increasing should
increase their demand to combat criminal behavior by favoring punitive and other
policies. Yet, it is extremely difficult if not impossible to measure all criminal activity
since many crimes will go unnoticed or unreported. The necessity to measure criminal
activity in a geographical area as large as the United States compounds this problem.
Instead, researchers must rely on several less reliable sources of the amount of criminal
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activity that come from either official government sources such as law enforcement
agencies or unofficial sources obtained from non-governmental organizations such as
interest groups or polling firms.
The Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Uniform Crime Report or UCR is the
most common official source of crime data used to measure the frequency of crime
in the United States. The federal government has been compiling crime data into
the UCR from local and federal law enforcement agencies since the 1930s and on a
more regular basis since the 1950s. In particular, researchers rely on the the UCR’s
“crime index” as an official statistic of the amount of criminal activity in the United
States. The crime index is a measure of the most visible, frequent, and serious
crimes in America. The index reports the number of violent crimes (i.e., murder or
manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery, and aggravated assault) and property crimes
(i.e., burglary, motor vehicle theft, arson, and larceny/theft). These crimes receive
the most attention from the mass media and should be of more concern to the public
than petty crimes and misdemeanors. Nonetheless, the crime index does omit a large
number of minor crimes such as traffic violations, white collar crimes such as fraud or
money laundering, computer crimes, professional malpractice, or workplace violations
of national health and safety regulations. However, these crimes should have little
connection to punitive sentiment because they do not serve as exemplars of crime
among members of the mass public.
Several problems exist with the UCR as a measure of the amount of crime in
the United States (see Skogan (1981) for a detailed account of potential problems
with both official and unofficial crime data). The UCR does not reflect the actual
frequency of crime, but what is defined as a crime, what is reported as a crime, and
what is documented by law enforcement officials as a potential crime. First, what
constitutes a criminal action can change over time as changes in social norms and
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technology alter the scope of legal and illegal behaviors. Something deemed legal
today may be illegal tomorrow or vice versa. In addition, there can be inconsistencies
between what legislatures and law enforcement officials view as a crime and what
citizens believe are crimes that could lead to underreporting of crime. For example, if
citizens in a locale do not view illegal drug use as a criminal problem, citizens in that
area will be reluctant to report illegal drugs use to law enforcement agencies leading
to underreporting of what is technically illegal behavior.
The amount of criminal activity can also be underreported by official statistics
because victims may not be willing to come forward and report a crime to law en-
forcement officials. Victims may fail to report crimes for a variety of reasons: They
do not view law enforcement agencies as effective agents of crime control, they may
have an existing criminal record or warrants and do not want to get involved with
the police, they might have past negative experiences with the police, they might
not believe the crime is serious enough to warrant police involvement, or they may
experience shame and humiliation of being a victim.
Another potential problem with official sources is that the data is accumulated
across a wide range of state and local law enforcement jurisdictions. Different law
enforcement agencies have unique biases in investigating and arresting individuals for
criminal behavior. Police officers have a high amount of discretion when investigating
a crime and charging citizens as criminals. These street level bureaucrats can be
partial when implementing policies and often define policies—such as what constitutes
a crime—when implementing the law (Lipsky 1983). The most serious discretionary
bias that can systematically influence the UCR data are racial biases. Some law
enforcement agencies may target specific areas inhabited by minorities relative to
white neighborhoods with equal amounts of criminal activity. Racial profiling among
law enforcement agencies also leads to systematic biases in the UCR data. Some
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law enforcement organizations and personnel are more willing to charge minorities
with a crime while letting a white offender go with a warning for the same criminal
activity. In addition, minorities are more likely to have minor offenses upgraded to
a more serious offense, while reducing major offenses to minor offenses for whites
(Mann 1993).
Another classification problem with law enforcement agencies is the incentive to
over-report arrests to create a perception among the public that the agency is “getting
tough” on crime or to under-report crimes to make their jurisdictions appear safer
than reality. The lack of professionalization within law enforcement organizations
also reduces the reliability of the UCR data. Local police organizations that lack the
proper training, resources, and institutional structure are less accurate in reporting
criminal activity according to the FBI’s guidelines. Alternatively, individuals in more
professional organizations are more likely to collect UCR data consistent with other
agencies abiding by the UCR guidelines and across time within a single agency.
Finally, the UCR does not include the amount of criminals convicted by judicial
institutions, so even those arrested, but eventually found innocent remain in the
UCR database. All of these problems potentially confound the UCR data with a
systematic tendency to underreport some criminal behavior and overreport other
criminal activity. Thus, scholars who use the UCR data must keep these deficiencies
in mind when using the reported crime data as a measure of all criminal activity.
The most common unofficial crime data is the victimization surveys administered
by the National Opinion Research Center (NORC) and the National Crime Survey
(NCS) administered by the Bureau of the Census for the U.S. Justice Department.
Other unofficial sources include historical and anecdotal accounts of crime, newspaper
coverage, and participant-observer studies such as those conducted by W.E.B. Du Bois
in The Philadelphia Negro.
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Crime victimization surveys started in 1967 to poll citizens regarding their ex-
periences with crime. Specifically, the victimization surveys poll a rolling panel of
Americans living in 26 major metropolitan areas about their experiences as a victim
of the same set of violent and property crimes as used in the UCR’s crime index. Un-
like the UCR data, the crime victimization surveys are collected by a single agency
each year, increasing the reliability of the data. However, the victimization surveys
rely on individual self-reporting of victimization. Researchers find crime to be about
twice as high in victimization surveys relative to the UCR during the same time peri-
ods. Thus, the victimization surveys are used as evidence that the UCR suffers from
the underreporting problems stated above (Skogan 1981).
Several problems exist with the victimization surveys. The first is the use of a
rolling panel from 26 cities rather than a random cross-section of Americans. These
surveys leave out rural areas, suburbs, and tourists that might experience different
amounts of crimes or different types of crimes than those in cities. The reliability of
crime victimization surveys suffers from common survey problems such as interviewer
effects, question wording effects, question order effects, and inter-coder reliability
(Gove, Hughes and Geerken 1985). They are also reliant on personal reflections of
individuals leading some scholars to question the ability of individuals to accurately
and completely recall their experiences with criminal activity from the past year
(Skogan 1981). Similar to a problem of the UCR, victimization surveys rely on citizens
to define what is a criminal act that may not be consistent across individuals or with
legal statutes. In addition, victims can underreport crime for reasons of shame or
humiliation of being a victim. These biases can be more pronounced in victimization
surveys where respondents are not dealing with professional law enforcement officials
and unsure of their anonymity. Finally, media coverage of crime may lead citizens to
report that crime is higher than what they actually experience.
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Both sources of crime data have their pros and cons. They each suffer from
potential underreporting and overreporting. However, the victimization surveys also
have the potential to be confounded by media coverage of crime and attention given to
crime by elite actors—a confound especially troubling for this research. Furthermore,
victimization surveys do not exist for the entire time period of interest since they
only date back to 1967. Instead, the UCR can be obtained for the entire period of
interest and is collected on an annual basis. Thus, the FBI’s UCR is used as the
measure of criminal activity for each year. The crime rate variable is the number of
index crimes per 100,000 citizens as reported in the Uniform Crime Report published
by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The crime index is the number of reported
crimes, but does approximate over time trends in criminal activity.
Public perceptions regarding the health of the economy are also expected to
shape punitive sentiment. The public should expect rising crime when economic
conditions are bad and therefore seek to limit this increase with more punitive policies.
Public expectations regarding the economy are measured using the index of consumer
sentiment from the University of Michigan’s Survey of Consumers. The index of
consumer sentiment is derived from averaging the following five questions regarding
personal, national, past, current and future perceptions of the economy:
• “We are interested in how people are getting along financially these days. Would
you say that you (and your family living there) are better off or worse off
financially than you were a year ago?”
• “Now looking ahead–do you think that a year from now you (and your family
living there) will be better off financially, or worse off, or just about the same
as now?”
• “Now turning to business conditions in the country as a whole–do you think
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that during the next twelve months we’ll have good times financially, or bad
times, or what?”
• “Looking ahead, which would you say is more likely–that in the country as a
whole we’ll have continuous good times during the next five years or so, or that
we will have periods of widespread unemployment or depression, or what?”
• “About the big things people buy for their homes–such as furniture, a refriger-
ator, stove, television, and things like that. Generally speaking, do you think
now is a good or bad time for people to buy major household items?”
Wlezien (1995) proposes a thermostatic model of public opinion where the public
tempers public policy by reacting to changes in public policy by preferring policies
contrary to the direction of the previous change in policy. For instance, when the fed-
eral government enacts more punitive policies, the public should respond by favoring
less punitive policies. When the government senses the public’s change in prefer-
ences and limits the punitiveness of criminal justice policies, the public responds by
demanding more punitive policies.
I incorporate two indicators of federal criminal justice policy into a single index of
federal punitive policy. The first indicator measures the extent citizens are actually
punished by the federal government using the number of citizens incarcerated in
federal prisons each year per 100,000 citizens. However, the number of incarcerations
does not perfectly capture the punitiveness of the federal government. I supplement
this indicator with a measure of the number of people the federal government attempts
to punish each year using the number of charges filed in U.S. District Courts per
100,000 citizens. The latter measure captures the intent of federal agencies to punish
citizens, while the former measures the success of those agencies in punishing the
public. Each measure is available from the Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics
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from the Bureau of Justice Statistics (Blumstein and Beck 1999). Since each series is
non-stationary, the first difference of each series is averaged into a single indicator of
the punitiveness of federal criminal justice policy.
It is unlikely that the public follows these indicators of punitive policies. In-
stead, the public might respond to policy change that is more visible such as judicial
decisions that create rapid shifts in punitive policy. A key expectation from the
changepoint model is that the public’s punitive sentiment is a function of judicial
activism placing limitations on capital punishment. The annual nature of the data
prevents pinpointing an exact event such as the Court’s Furman decision as the cat-
alyst of the dramatic increase in punitive sentiment. However, if it were possible to
measure the frequency of judicial activism on capital punishment cases over time,
it would be possible to test if these decisions resulted in a public backlash and an
increase in support for punitive policies.
Fortunately, this data does exist. The frequency of liberal Supreme Court deci-
sions on capital punishment cases each year is taken from the U.S. Supreme Court
Judicial Database.3 Liberal decisions are those that are in favor of the defendants’
rights and seek to limit the use of the death penalty or aspects of the death penalty.
For instance, when the Court declares that capital punishment is unconstitutional in
cases involving rape, then it decreases the amount of punishment for the crime and
is classified as a liberal decision.4 Further, cases are coded based on the date of the
decision rather than the Court term, when the Court agreed to hear the case, or when
oral arguments for the cases were heard. It is the public’s reaction to the decision of
3This data is available online at http://www.cas.sc.edu/poli/juri/sctdata.htm and
is maintained by Harold J. Spaeth.
4Note that coding of each case as a liberal decision is not done by the author,
but is contained in the original coding of the dataset making it consistent with past
research.
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the Court that is expected to alter their punitive sentiment.
Note that the measure only captures the frequency of decisions and not the degree
of limitations imposed by the Court. The Court did not hear any cases regarding
capital punishment during the 1950s. The year 1967 shows the largest number of
liberal Court decisions on death penalty cases followed by the years of 1971 and 1972
when the Court abolished capital punishment. Although the Court reinstated the
use of the death penalty in 1976, it continued to make liberal rulings on similar cases
from 1976 to 1980.
Social construction theories propose that various elite actors strategically influ-
ence public opinion by attempting to draw attention to crime during campaigns or
using their official offices. The more attention elite actors pay to crime, the more
the public will believe crime is an important problem and demand more punitive
policies. Although any elite actor can engage in strategic communication, the most
visible actor in American politics is the president. The president can command at-
tention through official press releases and speeches, but also as the unofficial leader
of their political party. Presidential attention to crime can influence the behavior
and rhetoric of other political actors that attempt to follow the president’s agenda.
To measure elite attention to crime I use the frequency of crime mentions in a given
year in presidential speeches. The data is obtained from the Public Papers of the
President.
In addition to elite attention to crime, the media can also provide more or less
attention to crime, which in turn might shape the public’s punitive sentiment. The
agenda-setting hypothesis states that the more attention give to crime in the media,
the more important crime becomes as an issue among the public increasing the de-
mand for policies to reduce crime. Recall that media attention to crime is measured
by sampling the number of crime stories each year in the New York Times index
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adjusted for changes in the size of the Times.
Finally, negative stereotypes of black Americans as criminals have been shown
to increase individual support for punitive policies. In turn, scholars have proposed
that the social construction of crime as a problem among blacks is responsible for the
overall support among Americans for punitive criminal justice policies. Two types
of racial appeals are believed to influence punitive attitudes. The first is explicit
racial frames linking criminal behavior to black Americans. The measure of racial
frames is the adjusted frequency of explicit racial frames in New York Times crime
stories from Chapter III. The second type of racial appeal is implicit racial primes—
codewords and symbolic language that attempt to trigger racial stereotypes regarding
black Americans and crime. The measure of racial primes is the adjusted frequency
of racial primes in New York Times crime stories from Chapter III. Each of these
variables are expected to have a positive relationship with punitive sentiment with
an increase in racial appeals resulting in an increase in punitive sentiment.
2.2. Model: Changepoint model with covariates
Recall that the Bayesian changepoint estimates of public preferences for punitive
sentiment shows a 90% probability of a changepoint in 1972. This result leads to
an expectation that the determinants of punitive preferences will have a different
relationship with punitive sentiment in the pre- and post-break time periods. A
Bayesian changepoint model of punitive sentiment provides a robust means to test
this assertion. For each time period t, punitive sentiment Y is estimated as a function
of the following model:
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Yt ∼ N(µt, σ2), t = 1, . . . T, (5.3)
µt = β1st + β2stCrimet + . . . β9stRacial framest, st = 1, . . . ,M (5.4)
β1...k ∼ N(β0, B−10 ) (5.5)
σ2 ∼ Inv Gamma(c0/2, d0/2) (5.6)
where s is the current state of the model and M is the total number of states.
The use of the term “state” in this context refers to a given time period. Based on
the previous estimates it is likely there are two major states—one prior to 1972 and
another after 1972. The prior values for the β coefficients are standard improper
uniform distributions providing the same estimates as if the model was estimated
using more conventional maximum likelihood estimation. However, the Bayesian set-
up provides more intuitive results and more efficient estimation. The conditional
error variance σ2 is estimating from draws of an inverse Gamma distribution where
c0 is the shape parameter and d0 is the scale parameter.
The model is estimated with Markov Chain Monte Carlo simulations with the
Gibbs sampler implementation in the MCMCpack package in the R software. A single
MCMC chain was run with 500,000 simulated draws after a burn-in period of 10,000
to provide adequate mixing in the parameter space. None of the estimates show
evidence of non-convergence and meet standard diagnostic of Bayesian estimation
which are shown in the appendix.
2.3. Results: Changepoint model with covariates
The estimates of the changepoint model are shown in Table 5 with the pre-break
estimates for the years prior to 1972 and the post-break estimates for the years after
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1972. The table shows the mean of the posterior estimates and the 90% Bayesian
credible intervals.
Table 5. Punitive sentiment model estimates pre and post changepoint
Pre-break Post-break
Variable Mean 90% C.I. Mean 90% C.I.
Intercept 53.54 [35.00, 71.77] 63.39 [56.08, 70.67]
∆ Crime 0.00 [-0.005, 0.004] 0.00 [-0.005, 0.003]
Economy -0.09 [-0.25, 0.07] -0.07 [-0.16, 0.01]
Policy -0.67 [-1.61, 0.25] 0.11 [-0.70, 0.94]
Judicial activism -0.16 [-1.12, 0.78] 0.60 [0.09, 1.10]
Pres. attention -0.01 [-0.03, 0.001] 0.01 [0.003, 0.02]
NYT coverage 235.30 [-45.96, 511] -23.49 [-132, 85.90]
Racial primes 0.01 [-0.05, 0.08] 0.04 [-0.008, 0.09]
Racial frames -0.01 [-0.12, 0.09] -0.23 [-0.58, 0.11]
N 19 33
To facilitate interpretation of the results, Figure 13 summarizes the posterior dis-
tributions for each estimate. Each window shows the pre-break posterior distribution
indicated by the dotted line and the post-break posterior distribution indicated by
the solid line. These results show how the relationship of each variable with punitive
sentiment changed (or in some instances did not change) after 1972 (the post-break
period). The results show several noticeable shifts in the relationship between the
covariates and punitive sentiment. Simon (2007) provides the rationale behind these
shifts arguing that the Court’s Furman decision altered the political landscape for
not just capital punishment, but punitive policies in general because it shifted the
balance of power away from the rights of victims and their families toward criminal
defendants. The public saw the Court’s decision as failing to deal with the growing
crime problem that started in the 1960s. Liberal social policies such as Johnson’s
“War on Poverty” and the “Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968”
had failed to curb the growth in crime leading many citizens to doubt the utility
of economic and social policies. Instead, citizens were beginning to put more faith
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in punitive policies as the only alternative measure to fight crime. When the Court
began taking away the most visible means of punishing offenders, a public backlash
ensued. The Furman ruling shifted the dynamics of the debate regarding crime and
punishment making the issue of punitive versus preventative policies more visible,
more important, and more contentious among politicians and the public.
The Court’s ruling provided a context that validated the arguments of public
officials arguing for more punitive policies to combat criminal behavior. The public
became more accepting of elite appeals for more punitive policies. The failure of
liberal social welfare policies to curb the rising crime rate gave the public more faith
in elite appeals that punitive solutions were needed. The Court’s decision to abolish
the most visible punitive policy and potentially the most effective deterrent to crime
gave politicians a firmer bases onto which they could appeal to the public for more
punitiveness rather than less. These factors all created an atmosphere where messages
that crime was growing and the nation needed to implement more punitive policies
had legitimacy.
This is evident when examining the pre- and post-break differences of presidential
attention to crime and punitive sentiment. Prior to the 1972, presidential attention to
crime did not influence public preferences for punitive policies. A high proportion of
the pre-break posterior distribution shows a negative relationship between presidential
attention to crime and punitive sentiment, but the 90% credible interval overlaps with
zero. However, after 1972 the relationship between presidential attention and punitive
sentiment becomes positive and within the bounds of the 90% credible interval. The
more attention to crime by the president in the post-Furman era, the more public
support for punitive policies. This finding is consistent with the notion that the
Court’s decision politicized the issue giving credence to strategic appeals for “law
and order.” The estimates of the relationship between media attention to crime and
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punitive sentiment do not show this effect. Although it appears that attention to crime
in the New York Times had a positive relationship with punitive sentiment prior to
1972 and no relationship with punitive sentiment after 1972, the visual analysis of
the posterior distributions are misleading. Inspection of the 90% credible intervals
shows that there is no relationship between media attention to crime and punitive
sentiment in either the pre- or post-Furman eras.
Of particular interest is the posterior distribution of liberal death penalty de-
cisions. The expectation is that more liberal death penalty decisions should have
a positive effect on punitive sentiment suggesting more liberal rulings increase pub-
lic support for punitive policies. Moreover, this relationship should occur after the
Court’s ruling in Furman brought attention to capital punishment and changed the
dynamics of the debate over punitive policies. According to the posterior estimates,
there is no relationship between Supreme Court decisions regarding capital punish-
ment and punitive sentiment prior to 1972. After 1972, the relationship shifts where
more liberal Court decisions limiting the death penalty are associated with increases
in punitive sentiment. Previous studies have hinted at possible changes in the dy-
namic relationship between Court decisions and public opinion. Page, Shapiro and
Dempsey (1987) find a negative relationship between Court rulings and public opin-
ion on a range of issues. However, they note that they are “not certain about the
negative effect of courts . . . because of the instability of coefficients across data sets.”
These findings enhance our understanding of this relationship showing that the nega-
tive relationship within this domain did not exist prior to 1972. Instead, a continued
public backlash against liberal Court decisions on death penalty cases occurs after
1972. This relationship exists only after the changepoint, but is consistent with their
observation regarding the instability of the relationship across time. The finding of
a public backlash to liberal Supreme Court decisions on death penalty cases is also
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consistent with the previous speculation that the Furman decision led to the dramatic
changes in punitive sentiment.5
The rest of the posterior estimates suggest the other explanatory variables have a
lower probability of influencing punitive sentiment. The pre and post-1972 crime rate
posterior distributions show no relationship between criminal activity and punitive
sentiment. Both posterior distributions are firmly centered around zero. Consumer
sentiment shows a negative relationship with punitive sentiment in both periods,
which is consistent with the expectation that citizens prefer more punitive policies
when they perceived the economy as declining and are willing to temper their punitive
support when the economy is good. Yet, the 90% credible interval for both of these
estimates includes zero. The punitiveness of federal criminal justice policies shows
a negative relationship with punitive sentiment in the pre-1972 estimates consistent
with the thermostatic model of public opinion, but the 90% credible interval of this
estimate also includes zero.
Finally, the 90% credible intervals for all the estimates of the relationship between
racial appeals and punitive sentiment include zero. The posterior distribution of
racial primes does move in a positive direction after 1972, suggesting an increase in
the effectiveness of these messages over time. Furthermore, the posterior distribution
of racial frames moves in a negative direction after 1972, suggesting the effectiveness
of these messages might have declined over time. Yet, substantively any relationship
between racial appeals and punitive sentiment appears small.
5Note the relationship between public opinion and policy is certainly endogenous.
However, time series analysis allows us to temporally lag relationships ensuring that
the explanatory variables are temporally observed prior to the response variable. The
relationships and conclusions drawn here are the same when the Court’s rulings are
temporally lagged. Furthermore, endogeneity does not provide the same problems in
MCMC estimation as it does in ordinary least squares regression.
151
3. Summary
This research started with the question of when, if at all, did Americans experience a
fundamental change in their preferences for punitive criminal justice policies. Scholars
have made numerous arguments over the years that different points in time and events
led to a dramatic change in punitive sentiment. The results of a Bayesian changepoint
model suggest with a 90% probability that 1972 is the year when punitive sentiment
underwent a structural change. Evidence was given that the catalyst for this change
was the Supreme Court’s decision to abolish the death penalty. The decision was
unexpected by the public and led to a large punitive backlash among the public
and politicians. Many states reacted by passing laws with tougher death penalty
statutes. To test the relationship between anti-punitive Supreme Court decisions and
punitive sentiment, a Bayesian changepoint model with covariates was estimated.
The results shows the public does respond to liberal Court decisions by supporting
punitive policies, but only in the post-Furman era. In addition, other variables such
as presidential attention to crime show a stronger relationship with punitive sentiment
in the post-1972 era.
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CHAPTER VI
STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION AND PUNITIVE SENTIMENT
The changepoint model suggests that there is a dynamic relationship between some
of the explanatory variables and punitive sentiment across time. One limitation of
the changepoint model is that it finds the breakpoint with the highest probability
and constrains all the parameters in the model to that changepoint (Park 2007).
Although the previous analysis suggest a 90% probability that a changepoint exists
at 1972, it is unclear if the relationship between all of the parameters and punitive
sentiment shift at that time period. The changepoint model also suggests other time
periods that have a high probability of a breakpoint, although none as high as the 90%
probability around 1972. Regardless, it is unclear from the changepoint estimates if
the relationships shown are robust across the entire time period of interest or if they
wax and wane around some time point other than 1972.
Recall from Chapter II the expectation that the effectiveness of strategic mes-
sages should vary across time. Messages may lose their relevancy to current events,
the public can become desensitized to an argument, or alternative appeals can lead
the public to discount a once popular message. Indeed, the ability of an alterna-
tive message to diminish the effectiveness of another argument should be a defining
feature of politics in a competitive democratic political system. Political actors have
various types of strategic messages and can alter the content within those messages to
influence political outcomes. In fact, Chapter II describes the confusion among schol-
ars regarding what type of strategic appeal is responsible for shaping the dynamic of
punitive sentiment.
Yet, current studies fail to test how different types of strategic messages shape
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public opinion within a competitive framework. Existing research examines the effec-
tiveness of each type of message in isolation of other types of strategic appeals. The
focus of this chapter is to build a model of punitive sentiment based on the afore-
mentioned instrumental factors and the social construction of the issue. Whereas
the previous changepoint model examined the relationship between racial appeals
and punitive sentiment, this chapter will test the relationship between each type
of strategic appeal (agenda-setting, persuasion, priming, and framing) and punitive
sentiment. A key expectation is that the effectiveness of these appeals will vary over
time. Furthermore, this variation is not expected to be completely random, but a
function of systematic forces such as changing attitudes towards black Americans and
contextual factors such as the crime rate.
1. Model: A state-space model with time varying parameters
Estimation of a dynamic series such as punitive sentiment with time varying param-
eters is done using a Gaussian state-space model (Beck 1991, Durbin and Koopman
2001). The state-space model simultaneously estimates the latent unknown state
of the dependent variable (punitive sentiment) via a measurement or observational
equation (equation 6.1) and the relationship between the latent state and a set of
covariates with a structural equation (equation 6.2). The observations of punitive
sentiment yt are modeled as a function of the state or value of the latent variable of
punitive sentiment St and idiosyncratic error t. The coefficient of the latent state αt
is the estimate of how well the latent variable correlates with the observed value yt.
yt = αtSt + t, t ∼ N(0, Et) (6.1)
The state-space model also consists of a structural or transition equation that
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links a set of covariates to the observation equation above. The structural equation
estimates the state of the latent variable St as a function of past values of the latent
variable St−1, a set of static explanatory variables Zt, a set of time varying explanatory
variables Xt, and idiosyncratic disturbances ωt.
St = λSt−1 + Ztβ +Xtβt + ωt, ωt ∼ N(0,Wt) (6.2)
The λ coefficient provides an estimate of the dynamics inherent in the latent state.
The β coefficient captures the static relationship between the explanatory variables
Zt and the latent state, while βt captures the time varying relationship between
explanatory variables Xt and the latent state (Dethlefsen and Lundbye-Christensen
2006).
Both equations are estimated simultaneously using the Kalman filter (Beck 1989).
The Kalman filter is similar to ordinary least squares regression in that it minimizes
the mean of the squared error. However, the Kalman filter seeks to minimize the
squared error between the observed data at time period t− 1 and the predicted value
at time period t whereas least squares minimizes the difference between the observed
value at time t and the predicted value at time t. The Kalman filter also estimates t
different models, one for each time point for the years 1953 to 2006.
The model estimates punitive sentiment as a function of a set of instrumental
factors, non-racial strategic messages, and racial strategic messages. Since each of the
variables are described elsewhere in this research, the following list provides a brief
description of each indicator:
• Crime rate: Uniform Crime Report Crime Index
• Economic perceptions: University of Michigan’s Index of Consumer Sentiment
• Judicial activism: Frequency of liberal Supreme Court death penalty decisions
155
• Elite attention: Frequency of crime mentions in presidential speeches
• Agenda-setting messages: Percentage of crime stories in the NYT index
• Persuasive messages: Net-tone of persuasive appeals in NYT crime news
• Racial frames: Explicit racial appeals in NYT crime news
• Racial primes: Implicit racial appeals in NYT crime news
In the state-space model, the crime rate and economic expectations are estimated
as having a static relationship with punitive sentiment since there is no theoretical
expectation that the effectiveness of these instrumental concerns will change over
time. This point is consistent with the previous Bayesian changepoint estimates
that show no evidence of different parameter estimates between the pre- and post-
1972 eras. Since a key expectation is that the effectiveness of strategic messages are
dynamic, the parameters of each type of strategic message is allowed to vary across
time. In addition, the number of liberal Supreme Court decisions is expected to have
a stronger influence on punitive sentiment after 1972 and is also modeled as a time
varying parameter.
2. Results: State-space model
Figure 14 plots the state-space model estimates for each of the instrumental factors
that are believed to influence punitive sentiment. The first window shows the inter-
cept is positive and statistically significant which is consistent with the conventional
wisdom that Americans tend to support punitive criminal justice policies. The sec-
ond window shows the relationship between the crime rate and punitive sentiment.
Although it is expected that the public’s demand for punitive policies will increase
as the crime rate increases, the results shows a slightly negative point estimate with
156
confidence intervals that include zero. Thus, according to these results there is no
relationship between the crime rate and punitive sentiment.
Are any instrumental forces driving punitive sentiment? Similar to the change-
point estimates, punitive sentiment moves in response to the public’s economic ex-
pectations. The estimate is negative suggesting that when the public perceives a
downturn in the economy, they become more willing to accept punitive policies to
combat crime. When the economy starts to improve, the public will began to favor
non-punitive solutions to crime. Thus, it is possible the public senses the changes
in criminal activity due to an economic downturn and prepares accordingly. This is
consistent research showing the public is more willing to support liberal social policies
when economic times are good and less likely to support those policies when the econ-
omy is bad because the public is able to deduce how future economic conditions will
influence their environment (Durr 1993). It makes sense that the public would rely
on their perceptions about the state of the economy when formulating their policy
preferences given the sheer amount of information regarding the national economy
(Mutz 1992). Economic perceptions have become a reliable mechanism for the public
to make inferences about the future of other policy domains such as crime and poverty
and make adjustments to their policy preferences in those domains.
The results also suggest that judicial activism by the Supreme Court is shaping
punitive sentiment. The positive parameter estimate indicates that when the Court
restricts the actions of democratically elected lawmakers regarding capital punish-
ment, the public responds by demanding more punitive (and less restrictive) policies.
The relationship is fairly constant in these estimates, but there is a noticeable increase
in the equilibrium relationship between punitive sentiment and liberal Supreme Court
decisions in the early 1970s. At that time, the equilibrium relationship shifts upward
to a new mean level that slowly tapers off 20 something years after the Court’s Furman
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decision.
What does this result say about the relationship between the Court and public
opinion? Some scholars argue that the Court has the ability to influence public
opinion through its decisions (Dahl 1957). When the Court rules against capital
punishment, for instance, its high level of public support and legitimacy as a non-
partial institution should give credence to the policy decision of the Court. This
legitimacy function has found its supporters and detractors over the years (Bass and
Thomas 1984, Franklin and Kosaki 1989, Hoekstra 1995, Johnson and Martin 1998,
Marshall 1998, Rosenberg 1991). The results of this research run counter to the
legitimacy function of the Court and suggest that within this domain the Court’s
ruling had the opposite effect of what would be expected if the Court’s decisions were
automatically supported by the public via the legitimacy function.
Figure 15 shows the over-time coefficient estimates of non-racial strategic mes-
sages on punitive sentiment. Three types of non-racial strategic appeals are shown:
presidential attention to crime, media attention to crime, and the net-tone of persua-
sive messages. Presidential attention to crime is shown to have a negative influence on
punitive sentiment during the 1950s and 1960s. Yet, this relationship starts to change
in the mid-1960s when changes in presidential attention to crime starts to have a small
influence on punitive sentiment. By the mid-1970s, presidential attention to crime
has a positive correlation with punitive sentiment. The parameter estimate shows
presidential attention to crime having the strongest substantive effect on punitive
sentiment during the presidencies of Ronald Reagan and George H. Bush. Yet, after
these presidencies, the relationship becomes virtually indistinguishable from zero.
In addition to elite attention to crime, the media can also pay more or less
attention to crime making the issue seem more or less important among the public.
The estimates here are similar to the estimates of the changepoint model showing
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that increases in the New York Times coverage of crime is associated with increases
in public support for punitive policies. However, unlike those estimates, the time
varying approach shows a constant relationship over time. Substantively, agenda-
setting appears to be a very effective form of strategic communication. The size of
the coefficient estimate is larger than any other types of strategic communication,
which suggests that getting citizens to think about crime as a growing problem leads
them to support punitive solutions to the crime problem.
The effect of persuasive messages on punitive sentiment are contrary to expec-
tations. The more pro-punitive messages to con-punitive messages results in a small
decrease in punitive sentiment rather than have the desired effect of increasing puni-
tive sentiment (desired from the point of view of the message sender). In other words,
persuasive arguments tend to have a “boomerang” or “bolstering” effect leading to
an outcome opposite of that intended (see Johnson, Smith-McLallen, Killeya and
Levin 2004). The reasons for this effect is believed to be psychological. On issues
such as punitive policies where people hold strong convictions and predispositions
people are likely to engage in biased information processing and motivated reasoning
(Peffley and Hurwitz 1997, Taber and Lodge 2006). Persuasive messages counter to
established beliefs are more likely to be scrutinized and discounted by individuals
and shift their attitudes in a manner contrary to that of the intention of the message.
Thus, it is possible that people are resistant to persuasive messages and the results
indicate a backlash among the public when they receive appeals that try to alter their
beliefs.
This finding is also consistent with empirical evidence on persuasion and capi-
tal punishment. Justice Marshall made a claim that providing factual information
about the ineffectiveness of punitive policies (i.e., capital punishment does not work
as a deterrent and therefore we should abolish capital punishment) would reduce
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public support for punitive policies. Yet, studies show mixed, if any, support that
providing people with more information about various aspects of punitive policies
leads to more support for those policies (Bohm, Clark and Aveni 1991, Cochran and
Chamlin 2005, Ellsworth and Ross 1983, Harris 1986). For instance, Ellsworth and
Ross (1983) conclude their study of the Marshall hypothesis by saying that “although
most of the people who have made up their minds on the issue of capital punishment
believe that factual evidence concerning the relative deterrent efficacy of the death
penalty is in line with their position, it appears that their position is not based on
the factual belief. The majority are quite willing to admit that a change in the belief
would have little influence on the attitude.” Thus, it is not surprising in these results
that persuasive messages have the opposite effect as their intent. People have a psy-
chological incentive to hold on to their prior beliefs and resist explicit attempts that
counter their predispositions (Petty and Wegener 1986).
Figure 16 shows the dynamic relationship between racial appeals and punitive
sentiment. A general expectation is that the effectiveness of these appeals will vary
over time and that both racial primes and racial frames will increase punitive senti-
ment by activating negative racial stereotypes. However, an alternative perspective is
that the relationship between racial appeals and punitive sentiment will change over
time. Mendelberg (2001) argues that the effect of racial frames should decrease over
time as norms of racial equality increase and that the effect of racial primes should in-
crease as long as their intention remains covert. The estimates of explicit racial frames
shows a negative, but insignificant relationship with punitive sentiment for the entire
time period. Several possible reasons could explain the lack of a relationship. First,
recall from Chapter III that racial frames were limited in number throughout the
time period of this research. It’s possible that the news media were hesitant to use
racial frames subsequently making their influence on punitive sentiment limited. It’s
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also possible that the public already equated crime with black Americans reducing
the effect of these explicit messages linking the two together. Thus, these messages
might reinforce existing attitudes, but have little effect in altering those attitudes.
Racial primes implicitly targeting racial stereotypes are shown to have an overall
positive effect on punitive sentiment. Moreover, this relationship is dynamic over
time consistent with the time varying model of strategic communication. The esti-
mates show a negative relationship prior to the 1960s. However, after the 1960s the
relationship shows that racial primes are leading to an increase in punitive sentiment.
This relationship increases throughout the 1970s consist with historical accounts that
the use of racial primes became a prominent means to shape public opinion. Racial
primes are most effective at influencing punitive sentiment around 1980. Edsall and
Edsall (1992) have documented the effective use of racial primes by conservatives,
particularly President Ronald Reagan, in shaping the public debate over welfare and
crime during this era. The empirical evidence presented here is consistent with their
historical work. Racial primes remain an effective means of strategic communication
into the 1990s alongside the 1988 presidential campaign of George H. Bush. However,
racial primes appear to lose their effectiveness after the early 1990s.
What type of strategic messages were most effective at shaping punitive senti-
ment from 1953 to 2006? The evidence points to agenda-setting. The more stories
about crime correlates with punitive sentiment for the entire period. The effect is
substantively larger than any of the other coefficient estimates and it persists across
time. Racial primes were also effective, but the substantive effect is smaller than
agenda-setting and lasted for about a 30 year period from 1970 to 2000. There is
some indication that such appeals are no longer effective at shaping punitive atti-
tudes. This could be because racial stereotypes are automatically activated in any
mention of crime with or without a racial appeal (Gilliam and Iyengar 2000), the rise
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of new strategic messages, or because of changes in society. The results also show that
instrumental concerns such as perceptions of the economy and instances of judicial
activism also influence the punitiveness of public opinion.
3. Context and strategic communication
The state-space models assume that the time variation in the parameters is a stochas-
tic process. The relationship between an explanatory variable and punitive sentiment
varies across time, but not as a function of a systematic factor that can be measured
across time. However, there are several systematic factors that might explain the time
variation in parameter estimates—particularly among racial messages and punitive
sentiment.1 The first is how much those appeals resonate with existing values and
specifically public supports norms of racial equality. The second systematic factor is
environmental forces that lend credence to strategic appeals.
3.1. Racial conservatism and racial appeals
Mendelberg (2001) argues that norms of racial equality can alter the effectiveness
of racial appeals over time. When racial equality and harmony increases as a social
norm, the effectiveness of explicit racial appeals should decrease and the effectiveness
of implicit racial appeals should increase. When society no longer endorses a norm of
racial equality, the effectiveness of racial frames should increase and the effectiveness
of racial primes should decrease. Racial equality moderates the relationship between
racial appeals and punitive sentiment because when citizens know a strategic message
is racial in nature it is seen as violating social norms. When a message violates social
1The emphasis here is on the relationship between racial primes and racial frames
since agenda messages and persuasive messages were not shown to have any time
variation in their relationship with punitive sentiment.
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norms, citizens are more likely to reject that message. When a message resonates with
existing norms or values, however, the message should be more effective at shaping
an attitude.
The problem facing researchers is that there is no indicator of racial norms of
equality that spans a sufficient period of time to test these claims. Mendelberg (2001)
relies on qualitative and historical evidence of changing social norms that assumes
public support for racial equality is linear in nature and trending upward since the
1950s. A qualitative analysis shows that racial frames were more prevalent in eras
where racial equality was probably low, but there is no empirical evidence that these
frames were more effective in this era. Instead, we have to equate the frequency of
these messages within speeches and the news media with their effectiveness rather
than examining the response of public opinion to these messages. Further, the exper-
imental evidence is taken from a period were these norms are constant and cannot
be manipulated among experimental subjects. Thus, we are left wondering about the
empirical foundation of the moderating relationship of support for racial equality on
racial messages and punitive sentiment.
The lack of a valid measure of racial equality across time at regular intervals
prevents a formal test of the moderating effect of social norms and strategic messages.
However, it is reasonable to assume that a society that supports norms of racial
equality is also supportive of specific policies to aid black Americans such as providing
them equal housing protection, increasing racial integration, supporting government
efforts to achieve racial equality, and opposing school segregation. Conversely, when
support for racial equality waivers, so should support for these policies that benefit
black Americans.
Kellstedt (2003) creates such a measure of the public’s racial policy liberalism.
166
The data is available for each year from 1951 to 2006.2 The measure captures the pub-
lic’s sentiment toward policies aimed at helping blacks. Of course, support for these
policies depends on more than social norms of racial equality. People have multiple
considerations that contribute to their opinions, including their general attitudes to-
ward the role of government in society. Yet, Kellstedt (2003) shows that this measure
of racial liberalism moves in response to messages of equality within news coverage of
blacks. Furthermore, he shows that this racial liberalism merges with more general
public sentiment regarding government spending and this merger is largely a function
of race rather than attitudes toward the role of government. Thus, this measure of
racial liberalism does capture public sentiment towards black Americans and norms
of racial equality. In the analysis that follows, Kellstedt’s (2003) racial liberalism in-
dex is reflected so higher values indicate more opposition to racial policies (i.e., racial
conservatism) and lower values indicate more support for racial policies (i.e., racial
liberalism). The index is set on a 0 to 100 scale.
Since the theory specifies that racial norms should moderate the effectiveness of
racial messages, the model only includes each type of racial message: racial primes
in crime news from the New York Times and racial frames in crime news from the
New York Times. A third measure is taken from extracting the frequency of crime
messages in Newsweek stories of black Americans. The initial database of stories is
described in Kellstedt (2003). A dictionary containing messages of criminal behavior
was created and the frequency of crime messages in these stories was extracted using
Yoshikoder.
The model can be estimating using a standard fixed parameter method such as
2The original series stopped at 1996. An updated series was obtained from the
original author.
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least squares regression.3 Table 6 reports the coefficient estimates along with their
standard errors and level of statistical significance.
Table 6. Racial conservatism and racial messages
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
(Intercept) -4.94 31.80* -5.20
(15.73) (15.08) (15.24)
Crime rate 0.01* 0.01* 0.01*
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Consumer sentiment 0.08 0.07 0.01
(0.05) (0.06) (0.05)
Policy 0.10 0.08 0.15
(0.43) (0.47) (0.36)
Racial conservatism 0.95* 0.13 1.04*
(0.29) (0.24) (0.27)
Racial primes 0.94*
(0.28)
Conservatism * primes -0.02*
(0.01)
Racial frames -1.15
(0.89)
Conservatism * frames 0.02
(0.02)
Crime in race news 0.04*
(0.01)
Conservatism * race news -0.01*
(0.00)
N 54 54 54
R2 0.75 0.72 0.83
adj. R2 0.72 0.68 0.80
Resid. sd 3.03 3.24 2.55
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ indicates significance at p < 0.05
The coefficient on the crime rate represents the effect of crime on punitive sen-
3Note that there is a high degree of multicollinearity among all the variables in the
state-space model above. Although this is not problematic in the state-space format,
it will cause the standard error in an OLS model to increase with the potential to
mask important substantive relationships. Therefore, the OLS models are estimated
with the most basic model of instrumental control variables and a single indicator of
strategic communication.
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timent. For each of the three models, the coefficient is positive and statistically
significant. A point increase in the crime index results in a .01 increase in punitive
sentiment. Multiplying a standard deviation of the crime rate (1,664) by the coeffi-
cient estimate (.01) shows that a standard deviation change in the crime rates results
in a 16 point shift in punitive sentiment. Substantively, this is almost three times as
much as a standard deviation of the punitive sentiment series (5.7). The crime rate
is showing a substantial influence on punitive sentiment.
The key test involves the influence of racial messages, racial conservatism, and
the interaction of racial messages with racial conservatism. The coefficient estimate
on racial conservatism shows the effect of racial liberalism on punitive sentiment when
there are no strategic messages linking race to crime. In model 1 and model 3, the
coefficient estimate is positive and significant. The public’s general sentiment toward
blacks is shaping their punitive policy preferences. In model 1, a standard deviation
change in racial conservatism (3.9) results in a 3.7 point change in punitive sentiment.
In model 3, a standard deviation change in racial conservatism results in a 4 point
change in punitive sentiment—slightly less than a standard deviation change in the
dependent variable.
The coefficient on each type of racial message shows the relationship between that
specific message and punitive sentiment when racial conservatism is zero. In other
words, when the public is most willing to support policies that promote racial equality.
For racial primes and crime messages in news about black Americans, the coefficient
estimates are positive and statistically significant. This means that these messages
are effective even when the public is supportive of policies promoting racial equality.
This result is not as surprising as it might appear at first glance. The effectiveness
of these covert racial messages is because they can target socially undesirable beliefs
in a manner that makes the public unaware that these attitudes are being solicited.
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The public does not realize their racial attitudes are being primed by these messages
and unaware that the message contradicts their support for racial liberalism. When
strategic messages explicitly target a belief that is socially unacceptable, such as an
explicit racial frame, the appeal is ineffective because the public is aware that the
message violates socially desirable standards of racial equality. This is supported by
the statistically insignificant racial frames coefficient.
Racial primes have the most substantive effect on punitive sentiment. A standard
deviation shift in the number of racial primes in crime news (26.5) results in a 24.9
point change in punitive sentiment. A standard deviation shift in the number of crime
mentions in stories about black Americans (557.5) results in a 22.3 point change in
punitive sentiment.
The key test is in the interaction coefficients. Mendelberg (2001) argues that
the effectiveness of racial primes will increase when social norms of racial equality
increase. Thus, an increase in racial liberalism/conservatism should be associated
with an increase/decrease in the effectiveness of racial primes. Since the racial liber-
alism scale is reflected, the coefficient estimate of the interaction of racial primes and
racial conservatism should be negative and statistically significant—which is what
the estimate shows in model 1 of Table 6 shows. As racial conservatism increases,
the effectiveness of racial primes decrease because the public is not inhibited by their
contradictory support for racial equality. Implicit racial primes are unnecessary be-
cause punitive sentiment is already being driven by anti-black sentiment shown by the
constituent term. Instead, when racial conservatism decreases (i.e., when the pub-
lic begins supporting racial equality) racial primes become more effective at shaping
punitive support because these messages target racial attitudes in a covert fashion
that does not conflict with racial liberalism. This same relationship holds in model 3
examining crime messages in news coverage of black Americans.
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3.2. Crime and racial appeals
The time varying nature of the parameters of racial messages in the state-space model
could also be a function of other systematic factors. The crime rate should moderate
the relationship between strategic messages and punitive sentiment. When crime is
high, strategic messages linking crime to black Americans should be more effective at
shaping public opinion as the high level of crime lends credence to these appeals and
public concerns about crime. When crime is low, these strategic messages should lose
some of their influence as public concerns shift to other issues. Thus, messages that
resonate with actual conditions should be more effective at shaping public opinion.
The model testing how crime interacts with each type of racial message can be
estimated using a fixed parameter least squares approach. All the variables in the
model are described elsewhere. The expectation is that the effectiveness of each type
of strategic message will increase when the crime rate is high and decrease when the
crime rate is low. The coefficient estimate on the interaction term of the crime rate
and strategic appeals should be positive and statistically significant. Table 7 shows
the estimates of the model along with the standard errors and level of statistical
significance.
The coefficient on racial primes represents the effect of implicit messages linking
blacks to crime when the crime rate is zero. Although there is no point in the
time where there is no crime, that effect of a racial prime under this hypothetical
situation would have a negative effect on punitive sentiment. In other words, strategic
messages priming racial attitudes in crime news are not an effective means to increase
support for punitive policies when there is no crime. However, racial primes do become
effective at shaping punitive sentiment when the crime rate increases. The coefficient
on the interaction term is positive and statistically significant. Thus, the time varying
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Table 7. Social context and racial messages
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
(Intercept) 46.61* 40.95* 49.76*
(4.97) (4.69) (4.41)
Crime rate 0.02* 0.03* 0.07*
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
Consumer sentiment 0.03 0.04 -0.01
(0.05) (0.05) (0.04)
Policy -0.22 -0.24 -0.07
(0.38) (0.42) (0.35)
Racial primes -0.19*
(0.05)
Crime * primes 0.42*
(0.01)
Racial frames 0.05
(0.16)
Crime * frames 0.00
(0.00)
Crime in racial news -0.03
(0.03)
Crime * racial news 0.18*
(0.01)
N 54 54 54
R2 0.74 0.71 0.80
adj. R2 0.72 0.68 0.78
Resid. sd 3.06 3.27 2.72
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ indicates significance at p < 0.05
nature of racial primes is systematically driven by changes in the social environment,
specifically the crime rate.
Similar to the rest of the models in this research, racial frames do not show any
relationship with punitive sentiment. The constituent term and interaction term with
crime are not statistically significant. Also statistically insignificant is the coefficient
for crime messages in stories about blacks. This indicates that when the crime rate is
zero, the effect of crime messages is stories about blacks does not have any effect on
punitive sentiment. Although the absence of crime is an unlikely situation, the result
172
does show face validity. With no crime there is no reason for the public to believe
messages that crime is a problem and thus no reason to support punitive criminal
justice policies. When crime is increasing, the effectiveness of strategic messages
also increase. This provides more evidence that context moderates the effectiveness
of strategic communication if a message is consistent with some degree of objective
conditions.
4. Summary
The state-space model provides additional insight into the time varying nature of var-
ious strategic appeals. In the changepoint models, presidential attention and racial
primes show positive shifts in their relationship with punitive sentiment. In the state-
space estimates, the dynamic nature of these shifts are shown in more detail. The
effectiveness of both of these types of strategic appeals increased from the 1970s to
the 1980s. In addition, the state-space model more accurately captured the competi-
tive nature of democratic politics. Modeling punitive sentiment as a function of four
different types of strategic communication shows that some types of appeals are effec-
tive (agenda-setting), some are effective in certain periods of time (priming), some are
not effective at all (framing), and some have unintended consequences (persuasion).
Further, this chapter shows that the effectiveness of strategic communication is depen-
dent on social context. Messages that resonate with social norms and values are more
effective than those that try to challenge strongly held predispositions. Implicit racial
primes and racial sentiment have direct and interactive effects on punitive sentiment.
Messages that are credible due to existing social conditions are also more effective at
influencing public opinion. Overall, the results show that punitive sentiment responds
to both instrumental forces and the social construction of crime via strategic com-
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munication. Moreover, these forces do not always work against each other. Instead,
they can interact resulting in more complex relationships with punitive sentiment.
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CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION: WHY SHOULD WE CARE ABOUT PUBLIC OPINION AND
CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY?
The punitiveness of the American criminal justice system should be of serious concern
to scholars, practitioners, and citizens. The ability of the government to take away the
freedom and basic rights of its citizens should always be held under close observation.
The American criminal justice system is currently experiencing two alarming trends
during the post-war era: an exponential increase in incarceration despite decreasing
levels of crime and an increase in punitive measures as a response to crime. These
trends are often tied to public preferences for government to become more active
and punitive in combating crime. Given the importance of the public’s preferences
translate into public policy, it is of great interest to understand the dynamics of puni-
tive sentiment and the determinants of punitive sentiment. In addition, the results
have implications for understanding how information shapes public opinion within a
competitive environment that more closely resembles a democracy than previous re-
search designs regarding strategic communication show. The results also speak to the
debate regarding the ability of the public to meet its normative expectations within
a democratic government. Each of these issues will be taken up in turn within this
chapter.
1. Implications for public opinion and democracy
America is widely presumed to have a democratic political system, and various
normative theory and scientific scholars have articulated expectations for the be-
havior of the mass public in a democracy. These various conceptions of demo-
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cratic government make it difficult to assess the extent that America and its citi-
zens fulfill their democratic obligations. Some political theories advocate a great deal
of citizen involvement with citizens being informed and deliberating on each issue
(Habermas 1985). A more minimalist perspective argues the involvement of citizens
in governance should be limited to voting in periodic elections under the assump-
tion that citizens do not have clear opinions or knowledge on most political issues
(Schumpeter 1950, Schattschneider 1975). Yet, even in this minimalist perspective,
citizens should have some information that the representatives they are voting for
are going to enact policies that are aligned with their preferences or interests. Thus,
most conceptualizations of a democracy insist that the public maintain at least a
basic knowledge of the major political issues and be able to express those preferences
either through voting or directly to lawmakers.
Given this basic agreement among various normative democratic theorists, we
are left with two basic expectations that are useful in assessing democracy in Amer-
ica. The most general expectation is that the public maintains an opinion on the
basic political issues of the day and that they communicate these preferences to their
government. This communication can be direct via public deliberation, letter writing,
and protests or indirect via elections and public opinion surveys. Further, there is
a basic expectation that the government listens to the public. If the public sends a
clear signal regarding its policy preferences, but public representative fail to listen
or act in accordance with those preferences, then American is falling short of the
most basic of democratic ideals. Thus, public preferences should translate into public
policy. These two expectations form a simplistic view of democracy and a view that
cannot fully capture the breadth and depth of all theories of democracy. Further,
they lack many of the intricacies and conceptual rigor that various theorists have put
forth regarding democratic government. Yet, these two expectations form the core of
176
most conceptions of democracy and, perhaps more importantly, these expectations
can be empirically assessed.
This research is primarily concerned with the first expectation—the ability of the
public to have informed preferences that are communicable to government officials.
Does the public meet this most basic expectation of this simplistic view of democracy?
Is there a clear, coherent signal that the public can send to the government regarding
the policies they favor? In other words, does the public, as a whole, have clear and
rational preferences? I use the term rational to mean based on reason and logic. A
rational public moves systematically in theoretically predictable ways in response to
phenomena that are relevant to that opinion rather than moving capriciously through-
out time. Thus, if public opinion, as a whole, is moving in a systematic manner in
response to theoretically relevant events, then we can characterized that public as ra-
tional and able to meet the most basic of democratic expectations. However, if public
opinion moves capriciously in response to random events than the public would be
failing to meet their democratic obligation. A noisy, random signal would make it
difficult, if not impossible, for government officials to translate public preferences into
policy. An aggregate public opinion that moves about randomly is the macro equiv-
alent to the micro level concept of individuals possessing a non-attitude toward a
political object.
There is some evidence in this research for a rational public. The slow movement
of the punitive sentiment series suggests some stability that politicians can rely on—
keeping in mind the caveats presented in the previous section. When it comes to puni-
tive policies, the public does not appear to be making up their opinions on the spot.
Instead, punitive sentiment has been shown to move in response to both instrumental
and socially constructed concerns in theoretically expected ways. Furthermore, the
use of both instrumental factors and strategic messages means the public is gather
177
information from a variety of sources rather. Thus, the public is not simply relying on
strategic communication, but leveraging those messages with actual conditions. The
interactive relationship between crime and strategic appeals and deeply held beliefs
and strategic appeals shows a degree of rationality among the public. The public is
not simply forgoing their values or forgetting about what is happening in the streets
when they receive strategic messages. Instead, they are weighting those messages
accordingly before formulating their opinion. Thus, although citizens are not com-
pletely immune to strategic communication and the possibility of elite manipulation,
they do not blindly follow these messages.
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APPENDIX 1
MEASURING PUNITIVE SENTIMENT
The over time measure of the public’s preferences for punitive policies is con-
structed from 242 administrations of 24 different survey questions. The survey
marginals (percent favoring the punitive response option), along with the date of
survey administration, and sample sizes for each item are computed into a single in-
dex using the WCALC algorithm by Stimson (1991). The measure explains 64% of
the variance of the individual indicators (Eigenvalue = 1.87, µ = 55.68, s.d. = 5.09).
Listed below is the survey organization for each indicator, the complete question word-
ing, and the range of years the item was administered. Also included is the number of
administrations (n) contributing to the final index, the mean and standard deviation
of each item and the correlation between each item and the component series. All
of the items are taken from national representative samples accessed from the Roper
Center for Public Opinion Archive.
Item: courts
Survey organization: Gallup
Question wording: In general, do you think the courts in this area deal too harshly
or not harshly enough with criminals?
Administrations: 1965-1993, n = 7 (µ = 72.5, s.d. = 11.0); 0.84
Item: courts
Survey organization: General Social Survey
Question wording: In general, do you think the courts in this area deal too harshly
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or not harshly enough with criminals?
Administrations: 1972-2006, n = 26 (µ = 78.5, s.d. = 6.8); 0.83
Item: death penalty
Survey organization: Harris
Question wording: Do you believe in capital punishment, that is the death penalty
(death penalty), or are you opposed to it?
Administrations: 1969-2003, n = 12 (µ = 64, s.d. = 9.3); 0.94
Item: death penalty
Survey organization: Gallup
Question wording: Are you in favor of the death penalty for a person convicted of
murder?
Administrations: 1936-2007, n = 42 (µ = 63.7, s.d. = 10.5); 0.93
Item: death penalty (under 21)
Survey organization: Gallup
Question wording: Are you in favor of the death penalty for persons under 21 (for
murder)?
Administrations: 1936-1965, n = 3 (µ = 41.3, s.d. = 6.6); -0.53
Item: death penalty (options 1)
Survey organization: Gallup
Question wording: What do you think should be the penalty for murder—death or
life imprisonment, with absolutely no possibility of parole?
Administrations: 1985-2000, n = 11 (µ = 54.3, s.d. = 3.8); 0.63
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Item: death penalty (options 2)
Survey organization: Gallup
Question wording: If you could choose between the following two approaches, which
do you think is the better penalty for murder—the death penalty or life imprison-
ment, with absolutely no possibility of parole?
Administrations: 2000-2006, n = 8 (µ = 52.0, s.d. = 2.9); 0.80
Item: death penalty (frequency)
Survey organization: Gallup
Question wording: In your opinion, is the death penalty imposed—too often, about
the right amount, or not often enough?
Administrations: 2001-2006, n = 6 (µ = 47.3, s.d. = 4.7); -0.71
Item: death penalty vs. prison
Survey organization: Harris
Question wording: Suppose that it could be proven to your satisfaction that the
death penalty was not more effective than long prison sentences in keeping other
people from committing crimes such as murder, would you be in favor of the death
penalty or opposed to it?
Administrations: 1973-1983, n = 3 (µ = 40, s.d. = 8.0); 0.85
Item: death penalty (circumstance)
Survey organization: Harris
Question wording: Do you feel that all persons convicted of . . . first degree murder
should get the death penalty, that no one convicted of . . . first degree murder . . . should
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get the death penalty, or do you feel that whether or not someone convicted of . . . first
degree murder . . . gets the death penalty should depend on the circumstances of the
case and the character of the person?
Administrations: 1973-1983, n = 3 (µ = 31.7, s.d. = 5.9); -0.42
Item: death penalty
Survey organization: LA Times
Question wording: Generally speaking, are you in favor of the death penalty for per-
sons convicted of murder, or are you opposed to that—or havn’t you heard enough
about that yet to say? (If in favor or opposed) Is that (in favor/opposed) strongly or
(in favor/opposed) somewhat?
Administrations: 1986-1989 , n = 2 (µ = 71.5, s.d. = 2.5); -1.00
Item: death penalty
Survey organization: General Social Survey
Question wording: Do you favor or oppose the death penalty for persons convicted
of murder?
Administrations: 1972-2006, n = 26 (µ = 68.2, s.d. = 5.4); 0.92
Item: death penalty (rape)
Survey organization: Harris
Question wording: Do you feel that all persons convicted of . . . rape . . . should get
the death penalty, or do you feel that whether or not someone convicted of . . . rape
. . . gets the death penalty should depend on the circumstances of the case and the
character of the person?
Administrations: 1973-1976, n = 2 (µ = 19.5, s.d. = 0.5); 1.00
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Item: death penalty (rape)
Survey organization: Gallup
Question wording: Are you in favor of the death penalty for persons convicted of
. . . Rape?
Administrations: 1978-1988, n = 4 (µ = 41.3, s.d. = 7.3); 0.83
Item: prisons (build)
Survey organization: ABC News
Question wording: Would you approve or disapprove of building more prisons so that
longer sentences could be given to criminals?
Administrations: 1982-1994, n = 3 (µ = 71.5, s.d. = 1.5); -1.00
Item: prisons (purpose)
Survey organization: Harris
Question wording: Now what do you think should be the main emphasis in most
prisons—punishing the individual convicted of a crime, trying to rehabilitate the
individual so he might become a productive citizen, or imprisoning him to protect
society from future crimes he might commit?
Administrations: 1970-1982, n = 3 (µ = 14.7, s.d. = 4.8); 0.99
Item: prisons (purpose)
Survey organization: Roper
Question wording: There are different opinions about the main purpose of prisons.
Which one of the statements on this card comes closest to expressing your point of
view on prisons? (Punish criminals, rehabilitation, both equally).
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Administrations: 1971-1980, n = 3 (µ = 22.7, s.d. = 7.0); 0.91
Item: law enforcement
Survey organization: Roper
Question wording: Most people are concerned about the increase in crime and law-
lessness that has been taking place across the country. On which would you like to
see us rely more heavily: severer penalties, corrective programs, on both, don’t know?
Administrations: 1975-1981, n = 3 (µ = 55.0, s.d. = 2.9); 0.95
Item: law enforcement
Survey organization: Gallup & Los Angeles Times
Question wording: To lower the crime rate in the U.S., some people think additional
money and effort should go to attacking the social and economic problems that lead
to crime through better education and job training. Others feel more money and
effort should go to deterring crime by improving law enforcement with more prisons,
police, and judges. Which comes closer to your view?
Administrations: 1989-2004, n = 8 (µ = 32.7, s.d. = 5.3); 0.26
Item: sentencing
Survey organization: Roper
Question wording: Frequently on any controversial issue there is no clear cut side
that people take, and also frequently solutions on controversial issues are worked out
by compromise. But I’m going to name some different things, and for each one would
you tell me whether on balance you would be more in favor of it or more opposed to
it? . . . Harsher prison sentences for those convicted of crimes?
Administrations: 1978-1984, n = 3 (µ = 84.3, s.d. = 2.1); 0.85
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Item: crime spending
Survey organization: General Social Survey & Roper
Question wording: (We are faced with many problems in this country, none of which
can be solved easily or inexpensively. I’m going to name some of these problems and
for each one I’d like you to tell me whether you think we’re spending too much money
on it, too little money, or about the right amount.). . . Halting the rising crime rate?
Administrations: 1971-2006, n = 40 (µ = 65.7, s.d. = 4.7); 0.70
Item: law enforcement spending
Survey organization: General Social Survey
Question wording: (We are faced with many problems in this country, none of which
can be solved easily or inexpensively. I’m going to name some of these problems, and
for each one I’d like you to tell me whether you think we’re spending too much money
on it, too little money, or about the right amount). Are we spending too much, too
little, or about the right amount on . . . law enforcement?
Administrations: 1984-2006, n = 16 (µ = 54.8, s.d. = 4.0); 0.63
Item: “three strikes”
Survey organization: ABC News
Question wording: Would you favor or oppose a law requiring mandatory life impris-
onment for anyone convicted of a violent felony for the third time?
Administrations: 1994-2002, n = 2 (µ = 84.0, s.d. = 2.0); 1.00
Item: marijuana (criminalization)
Survey organization: Gallup
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Question wording: Do you think the possession of small amounts of marijuana should
or should not be treated as a criminal offense?
Administrations: 1977-2003, n = 6 (µ = 50.4, s.d. = 9.2); 0.05
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